Doe v. University of Pacific , 467 F. App'x 685 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JAN 31 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JANE DOE,                                        No. 10-17315
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00764-FCD-
    KJN
    v.
    UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC,                       MEMORANDUM *
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Frank C. Damrell, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted January 17, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Doe was sexually assaulted by three male University of the Pacific (“UOP”)
    basketball players. Doe claims that UOP acted with deliberate indifference and
    retaliated against her in violation of Title IX. The district court granted summary
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    judgment for UOP on all claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
    and we affirm.
    Damages under Title IX are available only if an official with authority to
    address the alleged discrimination and institute corrective measures has actual
    knowledge of the discrimination and fails to adequately respond—i.e., acts with
    deliberate indifference. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    524 U.S. 274
    ,
    290 (1998). The test for deliberate indifference is “whether a reasonable fact-
    finder could conclude that the [official]’s response was clearly unreasonable in
    light of the known circumstances.” Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 
    440 F.3d 1085
    ,
    1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is
    properly entered when a school’s response to the harassment was not clearly
    unreasonable as a matter of law. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    526 U.S. 629
    , 649 (1999).
    I.   DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
    A.     Doe claims that UOP’s response to a prior campus rape in April 2008
    was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances, and thereby
    increased the risk of her assault. Doe bases this claim on a suspicion by Edward
    Michael Belcher, UOP’s Director of Public Safety, that one of the assailants may
    have been involved with the April rape. At the time of Doe’s assault, however,
    2
    Stockton police and UOP had only a general description of the attackers from the
    prior incident. Belcher reported his suspicion to the Stockton police but they chose
    not to pursue it because the victim had declined to cooperate further. UOP had no
    actual knowledge that any of the assailants in this case were involved in the April
    incident. Additionally, Belcher was not clearly unreasonable in concluding that the
    connection between the assailants and the April incident was too tenuous given the
    general nature of the description and the lack of sufficient evidence. Given the
    information that was available to UOP at the time of Doe’s assault, the district
    court did not err in concluding that UOP’s actions were not clearly unreasonable.
    B.     Doe next contends that UOP’s response to her sexual assault was
    clearly unreasonable and subjected her to further harassment. Doe first claims that
    UOP itself harassed her when Elizabeth Griego, the Vice President for Student
    Affairs, allegedly admonished her that the men “were very popular and did not
    need to force anyone to have sex with them.” Inadmissible evidence, however, is
    insufficient to create a relevant factual dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4);
    Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 
    83 F.3d 1075
    , 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if this
    statement were admissible, it does not create a factual dispute that, if resolved in
    Doe’s favor, would show that an official at UOP with authority to address the
    3
    alleged discrimination and institute corrective measures had actual knowledge of
    and failed to adequately respond to the harassment.
    Doe also claims that UOP unreasonably responded to her assault by
    requiring her to be in contact with her assailants when it refused to expel two of the
    men. In Oden, we stated that “[a]n aggrieved party is not entitled to the precise
    remedy that he or she would 
    prefer.” 440 F.3d at 1089
    . After hearing over fifteen
    hours of testimony, the Judicial Hearing Board found Doe’s attackers guilty and
    the men were punished—one assailant was expelled and two were suspended. The
    suspended assailants were required to complete further education and training in
    substance use and sexual assault awareness, and, when they returned after their
    suspensions, were required to adhere to several probationary terms, including no
    direct or indirect contact with Doe or her family. The assailants were further told
    that they would be expelled if they committed any additional violations of the
    Student Code of Conduct, and their academic transcripts and records would reflect
    the suspensions. The district court did not err in concluding that UOP’s response
    was not clearly unreasonable as a matter of law in punishing the assailants. See
    
    Oden, 440 F.3d at 1089
    .
    4
    II.   RETALIATION
    Doe contends that UOP retaliated against her by requiring the men’s
    basketball team to have “no contact” with her. To prevail on a claim of retaliation
    under Title IX, the claimant must prove that she was retaliated against because she
    complained of sex discrimination. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 
    544 U.S. 167
    , 184 (2005).
    Doe first argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding
    evidence of the “stay away from [Doe]” directive. The district court found that this
    evidence was inadmissible hearsay. The statement at issue was allegedly a
    directive from Lynn King, the Athletic Director, given to the head of the men’s
    basketball team, which was then relayed to Doe through another coach. There is
    no evidence that King or the coaches were authorized to speak for UOP or that this
    was a policy adopted by UOP; thus the statement did not fall within the hearsay
    exception for a statement by the opposing party or its agent. See Fed. R. Evid.
    801(d)(2)(C), (D). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
    Even if this particular statement had been admitted, there is no evidence that
    the university acted with a retaliatory motive or that the non-retaliatory motive
    given for its actions was pretextual. UOP claims that its decisions were motivated
    by its desire to reduce tensions between the two teams and to avoid making Doe
    5
    the target of harassment. Doe has not offered any evidence to show that this
    justification was pretextual. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding
    that Doe failed to make out a retaliation claim sufficient to defeat summary
    judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-17315

Citation Numbers: 467 F. App'x 685

Judges: McKeown, Clifton, Bybee

Filed Date: 1/31/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024