Mirian Carcamo-Medrano v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 13 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIRIAN CARCAMO-MEDRANO, AKA No. 20-71084
Miriam S. Carcamo,
Agency No. A072-988-342
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 11, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Mirian Carcamo-Medrano, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her
motion to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for asylum, withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny in part
and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA denied Carcamo-Medrano’s untimely and numerically barred
motion to reopen, concluding that Carcamo-Medrano’s new same-sex relationship
was a change in personal circumstances and not a change in country conditions. In
reaching that conclusion, the BIA reasoned that Carcamo-Medrano had not shown
that country conditions in Honduras had materially worsened for gay people since
her original deportation hearing in 1993. Because the record lacks evidence
showing that country conditions for gay people in Honduras materially worsened
between 1993 and 2019, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Carcamo-
Medrano’s untimely and numerically barred motion to reopen. See Salim v. Lynch,
831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he changed country conditions exception
[to the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen] is concerned with two points
in time: the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s previous
hearing, and those at the time of the motion to reopen.”); Chandra v. Holder, 751
F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that to qualify for the country-
conditions exception to the deadline for a motion to reopen, a noncitizen may not
“rel[y] solely on a change in personal circumstances”) (emphasis in original).
To the extent Carcamo-Medrano argues that the BIA erred in not equitably
tolling the deadline for filing her motion to reopen, Carcamo-Medrano did not
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meaningfully present an equitable tolling argument to the BIA, so we lack
jurisdiction to consider this argument. Amaya v. Garland, 15 F.4th 976, 986 (9th
Cir. 2021) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review conclusory
arguments not meaningfully presented to the BIA). To the extent Carcamo-
Medrano is attempting to assert a due process argument, her argument is not raised
with enough specificity for us to address it. See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123,
1125 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a claim that is not addressed with any
specificity in a brief is deemed abandoned); see also Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d
1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a successful due process challenge
requires establishing error and substantial prejudice).
Petition DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
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