Alan Vazquez-Ramos v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 10 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALAN MARCELO VAZQUEZ-RAMOS,                     No.    18-70556
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A087-966-784
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted January 6, 2023**
    Before:      HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    Alan Marcelo Vazquez-Ramos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro
    se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his
    motions to reopen and reconsider and dismissing his appeal from an immigration
    judge’s (“IJ”) decisions finding him removable, denying his motion to terminate,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    and denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
    the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen or
    reconsider. Chandra v. Holder, 
    751 F.3d 1034
    , 1036 (9th Cir. 2014). We review
    de novo questions of law, Cordoba v. Holder, 
    726 F.3d 1106
    , 1113 (9th Cir. 2013),
    except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the
    governing statutes and regulations, Orellana v. Barr, 
    967 F.3d 927
    , 934 (9th Cir.
    2020). We deny the petition.
    The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vazquez-Ramos’s motions to
    reopen and reconsider the IJ’s decision, where the IJ did not err in sustaining the
    charge of removability after determining that the elements of Oregon Revised
    Statutes (“ORS”) section 163.187 categorically match the mens rea and actus reus set
    forth in the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. “The BIA has
    further explained that to involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential
    elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.” Silva v. Garland, 
    993 F.3d 705
    , 712 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A
    conviction under ORS § 163.187 requires that the defendant “(1) knowingly
    (2) impeded the victim’s normal breathing or circulation of the blood (3) by applying
    pressure on the victim’s throat or neck or blocking her nose or mouth.” State v.
    Hendricks, 
    359 P.3d 294
    , 302 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, the IJ did not err in finding
    2
    that Vazquez-Ramos’s conviction met the elements of a crime of moral turpitude.
    Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
    Vazquez-Ramos failed to show that it is more likely than not he would be tortured
    by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico.
    See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(4); see also Zheng v. Holder, 
    644 F.3d 829
    , 835–36 (9th
    Cir. 2011) (finding speculative possibility of torture did not establish eligibility for
    CAT relief).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Vazquez-Ramos’s contention that
    the BIA erred by streamlining its decision or by issuing a one-member decision.
    DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-70556

Filed Date: 1/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/17/2023