Christopher De Vera-Yadao v. Jefferson Sessions ( 2018 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 14 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHRISTOPHER DE VERA-YADAO, AKA No. 14-72118
    Chris Yadao, AKA Christopher Yadao-De
    Vera,                                 Agency No. A022-461-048
    Petitioner,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted November 15, 2017**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER,*** District
    Judge.
    Petitioner Christopher De Vera-Yadao, a native and citizen of the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    Philippines, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order
    dismissing De Vera-Yadao’s appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) order finding
    him removable. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We deny the
    petition for review.
    De Vera-Yadao was born in 1976 and immigrated to the United States on
    June 4, 1979, when he was three years old. On June 16, 2003, De Vera-Yadao was
    granted a waiver of removal under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act (INA), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(H), and his immigration status was
    adjusted to lawful permanent resident. On February 14, 2012, De Vera-Yadao was
    convicted in California state court of possession of methamphetamine for sale and
    of being a felon in possession of ammunition. On June 28, 2013, De Vera-Yadao
    was served a Notice to Appear (NTA), informing him that he was charged with
    being removable under INA section 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(B)(i).
    De Vera-Yadao appeared pro se for his removal hearing. The IJ reminded
    De Vera-Yadao of his right to an attorney and continued the hearing to allow him
    time to find a lawyer. Three weeks later, De Vera-Yadao appeared at the hearing
    and told the IJ he would proceed pro se. Under oath, De Vera-Yadao admitted that
    he was not a U.S. citizen and that he had been convicted of a removable offense.
    De Vera-Yadao also stated that his parents, who were not born in the United
    States, came to the United States in 1993, and they became naturalized citizens in
    2                                    14-72118
    2000, when De Vera-Yadao was over eighteen years old. De Vera-Yadao said his
    aunt brought him to the United States in 1979. The Government stated its
    understanding that De Vera-Yadao was granted a section 237 (a)(1)(H) waiver of
    removal in June 2003 because the petition submitted by his aunt fraudulently
    represented De Vera-Yadao to be her son. The IJ provided De Vera-Yadao with an
    INA Form I-589 (Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal) and
    continued the hearing for one week to allow De Vera-Yadao to complete the
    application. One week later, De Vera-Yadao returned without an attorney and
    without having completed the Form I-589. The IJ again continued the hearing,
    granting De Vera-Yadao’s request for additional time to complete the form and to
    find an attorney. De Vera-Yadao returned one week later, again without an
    attorney and without having completed the Form I-589. De Vera-Yadao informed
    the IJ that he did not intend to seek asylum. The IJ ordered De Vera-Yadao
    removed to the Philippines and advised him that he had the right to appeal.
    De Vera-Yadao appealed to the BIA asserting that the IJ failed to consider
    De Vera-Yadao’s ties to the community, his family’s hardship, and the possibility
    he was a U.S. citizen because he immigrated to the U.S. when he was three years
    old. The BIA granted De Vera-Yadao a three-week extension to file his opening
    brief. Two weeks after missing the extended filing deadline, De Vera-Yadao hired
    an attorney, who filed a request for a second extension of time to file an opening
    3                                    14-72118
    brief. The BIA denied the second extension.
    On June 11, 2014, the BIA issued its order dismissing De Vera-Yadao’s
    appeal. The BIA held: (1) De Vera-Yadao had not established any derivative
    citizenship claim through his parents under former INA section 321(a), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1431
    (a) (1994), because De Vera-Yadao was twenty-three years old when his
    parents were naturalized; (2) De Vera-Yadao was removable under INA section
    237(a)(2) and statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA section
    240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), due to his controlled substance violation; and
    (3) De Vera-Yadao would have to seek any request for humanitarian relief through
    the Department of Homeland Security.
    On appeal, De Vera-Yadao does not challenge the BIA’s removal
    determination. Instead, De Vera-Yadao argues he may have acquired derivative
    citizenship if his aunt adopted him in 1979, and therefore a genuine issue of
    material fact exists regarding his nationality. De Vera-Yadao further argues the
    BIA violated his right to due process by not affording him the opportunity to
    develop the record.
    Although this court lacks jurisdiction to review a criminal alien’s final order
    of removal, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(C), we do have jurisdiction to determine De
    Vera-Yadao’s citizenship claim, 
    id.
     § 1252(b)(5)(A), and his constitutional due
    process claim, id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Both are legal questions, which we review de
    4                                      14-72118
    novo. See Ram v. Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 1238
    , 1241 (9th Cir. 2008).
    De Vera-Yadao argues it is possible that his aunt adopted him prior to his
    entry into the United States on June 4, 1979. Absent a genuine issue of material
    fact, we must decide De Vera-Yadao’s nationality claim. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(5)(A). Traditional summary judgment rules apply to our consideration
    of De Vera-Yadao’s citizenship claim. Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 
    572 F.3d 736
    ,
    737 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable
    presumption of alienage, shifting the burden to the alleged citizen to prove
    citizenship. Upon his production of substantial credible evidence in support of his
    citizenship claim, the presumption of alienage is rebutted.” (citations omitted)).
    De Vera-Yadao does not dispute that because he was over eighteen when his
    parents became naturalized citizens, he could not obtain derivative citizenship
    through his parents’ naturalization. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1431
    (a) (1994). However, he
    asserts it is possible that his aunt adopted him, which would make him a citizen.
    Only hypothetical scenarios support De Vera-Yadao’s assertion, which appears for
    the first time in this appeal. A genuine issue of material fact is not created “[i]f the
    evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative.” Anderson v.
    Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 249 (1986) (citations omitted). De Vera-Yadao
    produced no evidence, and gave no indication that there is any evidence, to support
    his hypothesis that his aunt might have adopted him. De Vera-Yadao has not
    5                                     14-72118
    demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Mustanich v.
    Mukasey, 
    518 F.3d 1084
    , 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying transfer to the district
    court for an evidentiary hearing because there was no genuine issue of material fact
    concerning the petitioner’s nationality).
    De Vera-Yadao’s due process claim is also without merit. De Vera-Yadao
    did not raise the adoption issue before the IJ or the BIA, and thus there was no
    need to further develop the record regarding an adoption. De Vera-Yadao was
    granted numerous extensions of time both to find an attorney and to file the
    necessary applications for relief. There is nothing in the record that could have
    caused the IJ to investigate an undisclosed and hypothetical possibility that De
    Vera-Yadao was adopted by his aunt. The BIA has broad discretion to grant or
    deny extensions of time within which to file briefs, see 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.3
    (c)(1),
    and was within its discretion when it denied De Vera-Yadao’s second request for
    an extension of time. Also, De Vera-Yadao failed to show he suffered any
    prejudice. See Avila-Sanchez v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 1037
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
    The record demonstrates that the proceedings before the BIA satisfied De Vera-
    Yadao’s right to due process. See Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1013-14 (9th
    Cir. 2010).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    6                                  14-72118