Christopher Collins v. Roger Barber ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 3 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER LILBURNE COLLINS, No. 12-55683
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-09614-JFW-JPR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROGER BARBER, individually; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 18, 2014**
Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Lilburne Collins appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his rights
arising from defendants’ attempts to prevent him from using certain golf-related
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Collins’s
request for oral argument is denied.
facilities. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Collins’s claims against the City of Los
Angeles because Collins failed to allege the existence of any unconstitutional
policy or custom. See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006)
(municipal liability under § 1983 exists only for constitutional violations occurring
pursuant to an official government policy or custom).
The district court properly dismissed Collins’s claims against the private
party defendants because Collins failed to allege facts showing that these
defendants acted under color of law. See DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d
636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (bare allegations of state action cannot defeat a motion to
dismiss; rather, plaintiff must allege facts showing that defendants acted under
color of state law or authority).
The district court properly dismissed Collins’s claims against defendant
Torres because Collins failed to allege facts showing that Torres violated his rights.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating elements of a
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cause of action under § 1983).
The district court properly dismissed Collins’s claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1985 and 1986 because Collins failed to allege facts showing that defendants
conspired to obstruct a judicial proceeding or to discriminate against him on the
basis of his race or other protected ground. See Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198
F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 908-09 (9th Cir.
1993) (elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)); Trerice v.
Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] cause of action is not
provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 absent a valid claim for relief under section
1985.”).
Collins’s contentions concerning court filing deadlines, alleged clerk errors,
the district court’s alleged grant of qualified immunity, and his alleged entitlement
to default judgment are unpersuasive.
Collins’s request for appointment of pro bono counsel, set forth in his reply
brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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