Robert Amatrone v. Randy Champion ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT AMATRONE; et al., No. 17-17147
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01356-JST
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RANDY CHAMPION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Robert Amatrone, Nick Amatrone, and Marla Sharlow appeal pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations arising from the search of their home. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
imposition of terminating sanctions. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of
Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing terminating
sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) and 41(b) because
plaintiffs willfully violated discovery orders, which prejudiced defendants, and the
district court had previously imposed monetary sanctions against plaintiffs for not
complying with discovery orders and had warned plaintiffs of the possibility of
terminating sanctions. See Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.
2010) (factors for determining whether to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b));
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096-97 (factors for evaluating terminating
sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motions
for appointment of counsel because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ multiple
motions to stay or continue the action because plaintiffs failed to show that they
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were prejudiced by the denials. See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 961
(9th Cir. 2001) (denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion and
requires a demonstration of prejudice).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion
to disqualify Judge Tigar because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate “extrajudicial
bias or prejudice.” Thomassen v. United States, 835 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1987)
(standard of review); see also United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54
(9th Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, the alleged bias must stem from an extrajudicial
source. [J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” (alteration in original, citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We reject as without merit plaintiffs’ numerous contentions regarding
judicial misconduct and constitutional violations.
We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court.
See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts
not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
Appellees’ motion for leave to file corrected excerpts of record (Docket
3 17-17147
Entry No. 15) is granted.
AFFIRMED.
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