Joseph Duran v. Nancy Berryhill ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 31 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOSEPH MARCOS DURAN,                            No.    17-15786
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            No. 1:16-cv-00347-SAB
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
    Commissioner Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Stanley A. Boone, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 29, 2018**
    Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
    Joseph Duran appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Duran’s application for supplemental
    security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review the district court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    order de novo and the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and legal error.
    Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
    Duran’s omission of evidence indicating that he had limitations stemming
    from asthma or back pain does not demonstrate that the ALJ neglected his duty to
    fully and fairly develop the record. See Mayes v. Massanari, 
    276 F.3d 453
    , 459-60
    (9th Cir. 2001) (claimant bears the burden of proving disability; “An ALJ’s duty to
    develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or
    when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.”).
    The ALJ properly provided specific and legitimate reasons for
    discounting the contradicted opinions of Duran’s treating psychiatrist and
    examining psychologist. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 
    871 F.3d 664
    , 675 (9th
    Cir. 2017) (“If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by
    another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific
    and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    Admin., 
    554 F.3d 1219
    , 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ may reject a treating
    physician’s opinion that is “brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by
    clinical findings” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
    Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ “may
    reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based to a large extent on a
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    claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
    
    439 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled
    effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining
    eligibility for SSI benefits.”); Benton v. Barnhart, 
    331 F.3d 1030
    , 1038 (9th
    Cir. 2003) (ALJ may consider the “duration of the treatment relationship and
    the frequency and nature of contact” between the doctor and claimant).
    The ALJ properly provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
    discounting Duran’s testimony concerning his symptoms and limitations. See
    
    Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678
    (“the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the
    severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons”);
    see also 
    Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112
    (ALJ may consider factors such as
    “inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the testimony and
    the claimant’s conduct”); 
    Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227
    (ALJ may consider, as one factor
    among others, lack of objective medical evidence to corroborate the claimant’s
    allegations); Orn v. Astrue, 
    495 F.3d 625
    , 636 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ may rely on a
    claimaint’s “unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment”
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
    Warre, 439 F.3d at 1006
    .
    The ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to the lay witness testimony of
    Duran’s mother, Catalina Bautista. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1218
    3
    (9th Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ need only give germane reasons for discrediting the
    testimony of lay witnesses.”; inconsistency with evidence is the record is one such
    reason); see also Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 694 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (where “the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
    [the claimant’s] own subjective complaints, and . . . [the claimant’s] testimony was
    similar to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for
    rejecting [the lay witness’s] testimony”);
    Duran has not identified specific evidence in the record that the ALJ
    improperly failed to consider in formulating Duran’s residual functional capacity
    (“RFC”), or shown how the ALJ’s Step Five findings lack substantial evidentiary
    support. See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    528 F.3d 1194
    , 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (when evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s
    decision should be upheld” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
    Osenbrock v. Apfel, 
    240 F.3d 1157
    , 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ need not include
    in the hypothetical to the vocational expert impairments that are not supported by
    substantial evidence).
    AFFIRMED.
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