Sharif Rangrej v. Nancy Berryhill ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 20 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARIF RANGREJ, No. 16-35151
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
1:14-cv-00287-EJL-CWD
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting MEMORANDUM*
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 19, 2018 **
Before: FARRIS, CANBY, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges
Sharif Rangrej appeals pro se the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Rangrej’s application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided
by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
**
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly determined that Rangrej’s
degenerative disc disease and speech impediment were severe impairments at step
two because they caused more than a minimal effect on his ability to work, and the
ALJ properly continued to subsequent steps in the evaluation process. See Webb v.
Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ considered Rangrej’s
chronic low back pain resulting from his degenerative disc disease in subsequent
steps of the evaluation, and did not err by failing to conclude that chronic low back
pain was a severe impairment at step two. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002,
1004-05 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that symptoms alone cannot support a finding
of an impairment).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the objective
medical evidence showing only mild degenerative disc disease supported a
conclusion of no more than moderate functional limitations. See Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that this Court must defer to the
ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of the evidence). The ALJ properly considered all
medical records during the relevant period that were significant and probative of
Rangrej’s functional limitations. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that the ALJ is not required to discuss evidence that is neither
significant nor probative).
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The ALJ properly rejected Dr. Baldridge’s March 2011 opinion because it
predated the relevant period and relied on Rangrej’s self-reports. See Ghanim v.
Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ may properly reject a treating
physician opinion that is based to a large extent on a claimant’s self-reports);
Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that medical opinions predating the current period are of limited
relevance). The ALJ properly gave limited weight to Mr. Billing’s opinion
regarding limitations in standing and walking based on inconsistencies with the
medical record and its reliance on Rangrej’s self-reports. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at
1161-62. The ALJ properly gave substantial weight to Dr. Baldridge’s July 2012
opinion, Dr. Crites’s opinion, and Dr. Vestal’s opinion because they were
consistent with the medical evidence.
The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons to conclude that
Rangrej’s testimony was not credible. First, Rangrej’s testimony regarding the
severity of his functional limitations was inconsistent with objective medical
evidence showing only minimal degenerative changes in his lumbar spine. See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (including inconsistency with objective medical evidence
in reasons that the ALJ may properly rely upon to discredit claimant testimony).
Second, Rangrej’s testimony regarding the intensity of his pain was inconsistent
with objective medical records showing no acute distress despite complaints of
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severe pain. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113. Third, the medical evidence showed
that Rangrej was not receptive to recommended physical therapy and pain
management therapy, and Rangrej declined to meet with pain management
specialists. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113-14 (explaining that the ALJ reasonably
concluded that the claimant’s explanation for failure to comply with prescribed
treatment was not believable based on substantial evidence in the record).
The ALJ properly included all limitations supported by and consistent with
substantial evidence in the residual functional capacity assessment and in the
hypothetical to the VE. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174-76
(9th Cir. 2008).
Rangrej’s additional contentions are not supported by the record.
AFFIRMED.
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