Nw. Ctr. for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Usdhs ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 20 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NORTHWEST CENTER FOR                            No.    21-35751
    ALTERNATIVES TO PESTICIDES; et. al.,
    D.C. No. 3:20-cv-01816-IM
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
    SECURITY; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 7, 2022
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: OWENS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,** District
    Judge.
    Plaintiffs Northwest Center for Alternatives to Pesticides, Willamette
    Riverkeeper, Cascadia Wildlands, Neighbors for Clean Air, and 350PDX
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
    the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    (collectively “NCAP”) appeal the district court’s grant of Defendants’ (U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas,
    collectively “DHS”) motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we dismiss this appeal as moot.1
    NCAP alleges that DHS violated the National Environmental Policy Act
    (“NEPA”) by not preparing an environmental analysis for Operation Diligent
    Valor, which deployed additional law enforcement personnel to Portland and used
    various riot control agents, including tear gas and other chemical agents, for crowd
    control. DHS argues that NCAP’s sole claim is moot because Operation Diligent
    Valor has ended. Although NCAP does not concede that Operation Diligent Valor
    is over, NCAP does not assert that DHS is continuing to use tear gas and other
    chemical agents in Portland.
    The end of DHS’s use of tear gas and other chemical agents in Portland
    during Operation Diligent Valor renders NCAP’s claim moot unless “the violation
    complained of may have caused continuing harm and . . . the court can still act to
    remedy such harm by limiting its future adverse effects.” Feldman v. Bomar, 
    518 F.3d 637
    , 643 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). NCAP argues that belated NEPA
    analysis would limit future adverse effects because (1) chemicals used by DHS
    entered the Willamette River, and if these chemicals were analyzed, any pollution
    1
    DHS’s motion to supplement the record (Dkt. No. 29) is granted.
    2
    they are causing could be better addressed, (2) NCAP’s members have ongoing
    injuries that may be better treated if they can identify the type and quantity of
    chemicals they were exposed to, (3) DHS may decide, based on the results of
    belated analysis, not to use the same type or quantity of chemicals in the future,
    and (4) DHS may itself take action to mitigate any environmental harms that it
    caused.
    We find that NCAP’s arguments are too speculative. Contrary to NCAP’s
    contention, this case is unlike Columbia Basin, in which the offending power lines
    were still in operation and could be moved. See Columbia Basin Land Prot. Ass’n
    v. Schlesinger, 
    643 F.2d 585
    , 591 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981). The possibility that a belated
    NEPA analysis would improve mitigation or change DHS conduct in the future is
    too remote and speculative under our precedent. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth,
    Inc. v. Bergland, 
    576 F.2d 1377
    , 1379 (9th Cir. 1978).
    As for the possibility that DHS’s use of chemical agents is capable of
    repetition and would otherwise evade review, Spencer v. Kemna, 
    523 U.S. 1
    , 17
    (1998), NCAP has not met its burden to invoke this exception. Specifically, NCAP
    did not establish that DHS regularly causes the injuries alleged here, let alone that
    DHS is likely to inflict the same injuries on NCAP in the future. See Sample v.
    Johnson, 
    771 F.2d 1335
    , 1342 (9th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases “placing the burden
    for showing a likelihood of recurrence firmly on the plaintiff”).
    3
    Because we find NCAP’s claim moot, we decline to reach DHS’s other
    arguments.
    DISMISSED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-35751

Filed Date: 1/20/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/20/2023