Eric Schroeder v. Diamond Parking, Inc. , 646 F. App'x 505 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC SCHROEDER, No. 13-17122
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00378-HG-RLP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DIAMOND PARKING, INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2016**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Eric Schroeder appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection
with a parking ticket. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument and denies Schroeder’s request for oral argument, set forth
in his opening brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Gant v. County of Los Angeles,
772 F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Schroeder’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim because Schroeder failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
he was deprived of any process that was due. See Ulrich v. City & County of San
Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (elements of procedural due process
claim).
The district court properly dismissed Schroeder’s First Amendment
retaliation claim because Schroeder failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendant Kema’s actions would “chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness
from future First Amendment activities.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino
County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Kema’s motion for
simple joinder. See D. Haw. R. 7.9 (simple joinder); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d
391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review for application of local
rules).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, see Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009),
2 13-17122
nor do we consider “facts [that were] not presented to the district court.” United
States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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