Christine Baker v. Midland Funding, LLC ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTINE BAKER, No. 20-16218
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. Nos. 3:13-cv-08169-SPL
3:13-cv-08193-SPL
v.
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 14, 2021**
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Christine Baker appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review for an abuse of discretion. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal as a sanction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37); Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1984) (dismissal for
failure to prosecute). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Baker’s action
for failure to prosecute after Baker failed to attend her deposition. See Pagtalunan
v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth five-factor test to be
considered before dismissing for failure to prosecute); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (same five factors for dismissal under Rule 37);
see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although
“dismissal is a harsh penalty,” the district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed
absent “a definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of
judgment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In light of our disposition, we do not consider Baker’s challenge to the
district court’s interlocutory orders. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386
(9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after final judgment,
are not appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, whether the failure to
prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
2 20-16218