United States v. Aldin Two Moons ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 26 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-30228
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00118-JDS-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ALDIN RAY TWO MOONS SR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 8, 2012
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI,
    District Judge.**
    Defendant Aldin Ray Two Moons, Sr. (“Two Moons”) appeals his sentence
    of fifty-seven months of imprisonment for two counts of domestic assault by a
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for
    the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
    habitual offender, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1153
    (a) and 117(a).1 We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de
    novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Ocampo, 
    664 F.3d 1275
    , 1277 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (per curiam). We apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to a district court’s
    findings of fact. United States v. McEnry, 
    659 F.3d 893
    , 896 (9th Cir. 2011).
    “There is an intracircuit conflict as to whether the standard of review for
    application of the Guidelines to the facts is de novo or only for abuse of
    discretion[.]” 
    Id.
     at 896 n.5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
    conflict, however, does not affect the outcome of this case because we would reach
    the same result under either standard.
    First, Two Moons argues that the district court’s imposition of a two-level
    enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”)
    § 2A6.2(b)(1)(D) for a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening,
    harassing, or assaulting the same victim constituted impermissible double counting
    because the Government relied on the same underlying incidents in the
    1
    The district court sentenced Two Moons to concurrent terms of fifty-seven
    months of imprisonment for Count 1 and eleven months of imprisonment for
    Count 2, for a total sentence of fifty-seven months.
    2
    indictment.2 Two Moons, however, concedes that the district court applied the
    appropriate guideline, USSG § 2A6.2, and that the imposition of a two-level
    enhancement pursuant to § 2A6.2(b)(1)(B) for the infliction of bodily injury was
    warranted. Even assuming arguendo that, in applying § 2A6.2(b)(1)(D), the
    district court considered the same prior assaults that the Government relied upon in
    the Indictment, this was not impermissible double counting. See United States v.
    Pham, 
    545 F.3d 712
    , 717 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[t]here is nothing wrong with double
    counting when it is necessary to make the defendant’s sentence reflect the full
    extent of the wrongfulness of his conduct” (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted) (alteration in Pham)). Two Moons’ pattern of assaulting Tonya Russette
    could be used to enhance his sentence pursuant to § 2A6.2(b)(1)(D) because the
    base offense level set in § 2A6.2(a) did not take that pattern into account and did
    not capture the full extent of the wrongfulness of Two Moons’ behavior. See
    United States v. Reese, 
    2 F.3d 870
    , 895-96 (9th Cir. 1993). We therefore affirm
    the district court’s imposition of the two-level enhancement pursuant to
    § 2A6.2(b)(1)(D) for “a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening,
    2
    Although § 117(a) does not require that the victim in the prior offenses be
    the same person as the victim in the charged offense, both counts of the Indictment
    alleged that Two Moons “intentionally assaulted a person with whom the
    defendant has cohabitated and shares children in common, after having been
    convicted of at least two prior separate assaults against said person[.]” [Excerpts
    of Record (“ER”) at 22-23.]
    3
    harassing, or assaulting the same victim[.]”
    Second, Two Moons challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level
    enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. According to
    the Presentence Report (“PSR”), on or before May 3, 2011, Two Moons mailed
    two envelopes containing three letters he wrote to Russette. He addressed one
    envelope to Russette and the other to their five-year-old daughter. Also, on or
    before May 17, 2011, Two Moons mailed Russette a copy of her written statement
    to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated October 13, 2010, with Two Moons’
    handwritten comments on it. [PSR at ¶¶ 21-25.] The district court found that these
    letters were “more or less . . . a threat” and that Two Moons intended to affect
    Russette’s testimony. [ER at 14.] Based on the history of abuse in their
    relationship and the specific content of the letters, the district court’s finding was
    not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court’s imposition of the
    two-level obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM Two Moons’ sentence.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-30228

Judges: Silverman, Murguia, Kobayashi

Filed Date: 6/26/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024