Breeona Osteen v. Bayer Corp. ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 11 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BREEONA OSTEEN, as an individual,               No.    16-56381
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:15-cv-05993-R-PJW
    v.
    BAYER CORPORATION; et al.,                      MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 4, 2018**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: FISHER and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District Judge.
    Breeona Osteen appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in her
    action against Bayer Corporation alleging injuries arising from her consumption of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
    the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
    aspirin. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
    We affirm.
    Osteen concedes that if she consumed the amount of aspirin she stated in her
    interrogatory responses and at her deposition – which was well below the
    maximum recommended dose – she is unable to show that Bayer is liable.
    Osteen’s bald assertion that, given her poor memory of the events leading up
    to her hospitalization, she may have consumed an amount of aspirin at or near the
    maximum recommended dose is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
    fact and defeat summary judgment. See FTC v. Stefanchik, 
    559 F.3d 924
    , 929 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (“In order to avoid summary judgment, a non-movant must show a
    genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury
    could find in [her] favor. A non-movant’s bald assertions or a mere scintilla of
    evidence in [her] favor are both insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”
    (citations omitted)).
    We are also unpersuaded by Osteen’s argument that, even if she overdosed,
    Bayer is liable for failing to provide adequate warnings because it is foreseeable
    that consumers would misuse the aspirin and take more than the maximum
    recommended dose. Viewing the expert and medical evidence in Osteen’s favor,
    she took a large overdose, not an amount just above the maximum recommended
    dose. It is obvious that that there is a risk of serious harm for taking far more than
    2
    the recommended dose of aspirin without the guidance of a doctor. See Johnson v.
    Am. Standard, Inc., 
    179 P.3d 905
    , 911-12 (Cal. 2008) (“California law . . .
    recognizes the obvious danger rule, which provides that there is no need to warn of
    known risks under either a negligence or strict liability theory.”).
    The district court’s invocation of the “sham affidavit” rule is irrelevant. See
    Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 
    577 F.3d 989
    , 998-99 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing
    sham affidavit rule). As explained above, even considering all of the evidence,
    Osteen has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
    AFFIRMED.1
    1
    Bayer’s opposed motion for leave to file a sur-reply (Dkt. No. 54) is denied.
    3
    FILED
    JUN 11 2018
    Breeona Osteen v. Bayer, A.G., et al., No. 16-56381
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    MOLLOY, District Judge for the District of Montana, concurring in the judgment:
    Summary judgment requires that “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be
    believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in h[er] favor.” Anderson v.
    Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986). Where, as here, the non-movant
    carries the burden of proof, the question is not whether she has a good case, but if
    she can establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to an essential element of
    that case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a). Accordingly, “[t]he proscription against fact-finding on summary judgment
    is a deceptively difficult mandate.” Easley v. City of Riverside, No. 1655941, ___
    F. 3d ___ , *5 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018) (Pratt, J. dissenting).
    This case presents a close call. It is undisputed that Osteen had a toxic level
    of aspirin byproduct in her bloodstream. Less clear is the number of pills she took
    in the days prior to her injury. However, that dispute matters on summary
    judgment only if it is material. While Osteen asserts she may have taken at or near
    the recommended dosage, that assertion is belied by the medical evidence—
    Osteen’s salicylate level of 58.2 mg/dL at the time of admission and the testimony
    of the medical experts—and likely does not create an issue of material fact. In my
    view close calls should probably go to the plaintiff, but I am not so persuaded here
    that it merits reversal.