Epifania Nicolas v. City of Riverside ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                NOV 14 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    EPIFANIA NICOLAS,                                No. 11-55253
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:09-CV-01737-DMG-
    PJW
    v.
    CITY OF RIVERSIDE, California; et al.,           MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 9, 2012**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges, and SINGLETON,
    Senior District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James K. Singleton, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for Alaska, sitting by designation.
    Epifania Nicolas appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
    Defendant-Appellees City of Riverside, California, Jim Brandt, Michael Medici,
    and Russ Leach (collectively, “the City”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    The district court correctly granted summary judgment to the City. Even if
    Nicolas’s claim for violations of her Fourth Amendment rights under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     were not barred by collateral estoppel, the uncontroverted facts establish that
    there was probable cause to arrest Nicolas. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324 (1986). Though Nicolas claimed to dispute several of the City’s facts in
    her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, neither her asserted facts nor
    any of the evidence cited controverted the facts on which the district court relied.
    From these undisputed facts, the district court found the evidence revealed Nicolas
    had potential motives to murder Shirazi and had close connections to the men
    ultimately convicted of Shirazi’s murder. This, in combination with her actions at
    the time of and following the murder, established much more than mere suspicion
    or “mere propinquity.” United States v. Hillison, 
    733 F.2d 692
    , 697–98 (9th Cir.
    1984); Ybarra v. Illinois, 
    444 U.S. 85
    , 91 (1979). As this evidence was sufficient
    under the totality of the circumstances to “lead a [person] of ordinary care and
    prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion
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    that [Nicolas was] guilty of a crime,” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 
    485 F.3d 463
    , 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted), the district
    court did not err in finding the City met its burden of producing evidence to show
    probable cause existed to arrest Nicolas, see Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 
    266 F.3d 959
    , 965 (9th Cir. 2001).
    AFFIRMED.
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