Cassandra McNair-stepney v. Toyota Motor Corp. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUN 04 2018
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: TOYOTA MOTOR CORP.                         No.   16-55327
    UNINTENDED ACCELERATION
    MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES,                       D.C. No.
    AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY                            8:10-ml-02151-JVS-FMO
    LITIGATION,
    ------------------------------                    MEMORANDUM*
    CASSANDRA MCNAIR-STEPNEY,
    Movant-Appellant,
    v.
    TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, a
    Japanese Corporation / a foreign
    corporation, DBA Toyota Motor North
    America, Inc.; TOYOTA MOTOR
    SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California
    corporation / a foreign corporation,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Page 2 of 4
    Argued and Submitted November 9, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: LINN,** BERZON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cassandra McNair-
    Stepney’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    60(b). McNair-Stepney contends that both her right to due process and Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 23 were violated because neither she nor her attorney
    received actual notice of the class action settlement, thereby depriving her of an
    opportunity to opt out. But neither due process nor Rule 23 require that each
    individual class member receive actual notice. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
    
    844 F.3d 1121
    , 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2017); Silber v. Mabon, 
    18 F.3d 1449
    , 1453–54
    (9th Cir. 1994). Due process instead requires notice “reasonably calculated, under
    all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
    afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central
    Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 314 (1950); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
    23(c)(2)(B). Here, that standard was met.
    **
    The Honorable Richard Linn, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Page 3 of 4
    The claims administrator mailed individual notices to more than 22 million
    class members. The notice sent to McNair-Stepney’s attorney contained a
    typographical error in the address, but the notice was not returned as undeliverable,
    so there was no reason for the claims administrator to take additional steps to
    ensure that the notice was actually delivered. The claims administrator did take
    additional steps to send notice to the roughly one million class members whose
    notices were returned as undeliverable. But with a class of more than 22 million
    members, it would simply not have been feasible for the claims administrator to
    independently verify that every one of the individual notices had in fact reached its
    intended recipient.
    The notice program approved by the district court provided adequate
    protection against the isolated failure of an individual notice to reach its intended
    recipient, due to mistake or otherwise. In addition to mailing notices, Toyota
    planned and executed a comprehensive notice-by-publication campaign, which
    included settlement advertisements in 1,300 newspapers, at least ten national
    consumer magazines, and internet banners on popular and highly trafficked
    websites. As the district court noted, given the widespread publicity surrounding
    the class action litigation and the publication notice actually provided, “it is
    difficult to believe that an attorney involved in this massive litigation would not
    Page 4 of 4
    have learned of the proposed settlement and opportunity to opt-out, even if notice
    was not sent to his postal address.”
    Because the notice provided to the class was constitutionally adequate,
    McNair-Stepney’s due process rights were not violated. The notice also comported
    with the requirements of Rule 23. The district court therefore permissibly
    exercised its discretion by denying her motion to opt out of the settlement long
    after final judgment had been entered.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-55327

Filed Date: 6/4/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/4/2018