United States v. Dwayne Brooks ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FEB 15 2023
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   21-30122
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    2:19-cr-00093-JLR-1
    v.
    DWAYNE BROOKS,                                   MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted January 23, 2023
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD, RAWLINSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
    Dwayne Brooks (Brooks) appeals his conviction and sentence after a jury
    convicted him of four counts of bank fraud and two counts of attempted bank fraud
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1344
     and 2, two counts of access-device fraud in
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1029
    (a)(2), and two counts of aggravated identity theft in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    . “We
    review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. . . .”
    United States v. Obendorf, 
    894 F.3d 1094
    , 1098 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
    We “review de novo whether a jury instruction misstated an element of a statutory
    crime.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). If the defendant failed to raise a constructive
    amendment or variance issue before the district court, we review for plain error.
    See United States. v. Ward, 
    747 F.3d 1184
    , 1188 (9th Cir. 2014). “Plain error is
    (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. . . .” United States
    v. Bautista, 
    989 F.3d 698
    , 701-02 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). Plain error affects substantial rights if there is “a reasonable
    probability” that the outcome would have been different. 
    Id. at 702
    . “We review a
    district court’s construction and interpretation of the Guidelines de novo . . .”
    United States v. Simon, 
    858 F.3d 1289
    , 1293 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation and
    alteration omitted). We review a district court’s findings regarding relevant
    conduct for clear error. See United States v. Daychild, 
    357 F.3d 1082
    , 1103 (9th
    Cir. 2004). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without
    support in the record.” United States v. Sanmina Corp., 
    968 F.3d 1107
    , 1116 (9th
    2
    Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
    1.     The district court did not abuse its discretion when admitting the
    credit union dispute log as a business record. See ABS Ent., Inc. v. CBS Corp., 
    908 F.3d 405
    , 425-26 (9th Cir. 2018). Alaska USA Federal Credit Union employees
    created the log “at or near” the time of each entry. The log was made in the
    ordinary course of Alaska USA’s business, and was established as trustworthy.
    See S.E.C. v. Jasper, 
    678 F.3d 1116
    , 1122-24 (9th Cir. 2012). Neither did
    admission of the dispute log violate the Confrontation Clause. This business
    record had an administrative purpose and was not testimonial. See Melendez-Diaz
    v. Massachusetts, 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 324 (2009).
    2.     Under plain error review, the evidence at trial and jury instruction for
    Count 3 (attempted bank fraud) did not constructively amend the indictment. See
    United States v. Pang, 
    362 F.3d 1187
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). A constructive
    amendment to the indictment occurs when the indictment charged the defendant
    with one crime, and the defendant is tried for a different crime. See 
    id.
     Whether
    the financial institution was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    or by the National Credit Union Administration was not an element of the charged
    offense. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 20
     (1)-(2) (financial institution defined); see also 
    18 U.S.C. § 1344
    (2) (bank fraud defined). Because Brooks was not tried for a
    3
    different crime than the one with which he was charged, there was no constructive
    amendment of the indictment, and no plain error occurred. See Pang, 
    362 F.3d at 1194
    ; see also United States v. Singh, 
    995 F.3d 1069
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2021).
    A variance exists when “the indictment and the proof involve . . . a . . .
    materially different[] set of facts.” United States v. Adamson, 
    291 F.3d 606
    , 615
    (9th Cir. 2002). Because the facts in the indictment (federally insured by the
    FDIC) and proof at trial (federally insured by the NCUA) were not “materially
    different,” there was no variance and no plain error. See id.
    3.     Under plain error review, the evidence and jury instruction did not
    constructively amend Count 7 (using unauthorized access devices, “to wit:
    Discover credit cards”). The evidence presented and the jury instructions
    permitted the jury to find Brooks guilty of violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 1029
    (2) as
    charged. See Pang, 
    362 F.3d at 1194
    ; see also Singh, 995 F.3d at 1079. The
    government conceded that there was a variance in proof due to the admission of
    evidence involving additional credit cards. However, the variance did not affect
    Brooks’ substantial rights because there was no material difference between the
    indictment and the evidence presented. See Adamson, 
    291 F.3d at 615
    .
    4.     Under our precedent, the instruction defining intent to defraud as “an
    intent to deceive or cheat” was erroneous. See United States v. Saini, 
    23 F.4th 4
    1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that the statute required intent to “deceive
    and cheat”) (emphasis in the original). However, the evidence overwhelmingly
    established Brooks’ intent to “deceive and cheat.” 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the error did
    not affect Brooks’ substantial rights. See 
    id. at 1165-66
    .
    5.     The district court did not clearly err at sentencing by declining to
    consider the vehicle theft and eluding police state charges as relevant conduct. See
    United States v. Marler, 
    527 F.3d 874
    , 879 (9th Cir. 2008). These were entirely
    different crimes resulting from different “discrete, identifiable illegal acts.” 
    Id.
    (alteration omitted).
    6.     “[T]he cumulative effect of multiple errors may prejudice a defendant
    even if no single error in isolation is sufficient to establish prejudice. . . .”
    Williams v. Filson, 
    908 F.3d 546
    , 570 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). However,
    there are no multiple errors in this case and thus no cumulative error. See 
    id.
    AFFIRMED.
    5