Rockin Artwork, LLC v. Bravado Int'l Group Merch. ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROCKIN ARTWORK, LLC, a Nevada Nos. 17-35151
limited liability company, 17-35263
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01492-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BRAVADO INTERNATIONAL GROUP
MERCHANDISING SERVICES, INC, a
California Corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 6, 2018**
Seattle, Washington
Before: BYBEE and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
Appellant Rockin Artwork, LLC (“Rockin”) contests the district court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction and appeals discovery-related orders and awards of
sanctions to defendants Authentic Hendrix, LLC; Experience Hendrix, LLC; and
Bravado International Group Merchandising Services, Inc. (“Bravado”). Rockin
also appeals the district court’s denial of Rockin’s motion to amend its complaint
and grant of Bravado’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
As a preliminary matter, Rockin has not shown that the district court lacked
jurisdiction. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Rockin’s
Lanham Act claim because it presented a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims, 28
U.S.C. § 1367. Even if the district court had allowed Rockin to dismiss its Lanham
Act claim, the district court could have retained jurisdiction over the state law
claims. Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“The decision whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed lies within the district
court’s discretion.” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rockin’s motion to
amend. Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 1987). While
leave to amend should be “freely given” absent “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
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amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment,” the district court did
not err in finding that Rockin’s actions were a bad-faith attempt to engage in forum
shopping. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Ferens v. John Deere Co.,
494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990).
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Bravado and find the court did not abuse its discretion with regard to the contested
discovery-related orders and awards of sanctions against Rockin. See R & R Sails,
Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 673 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating the standard
of review for discovery rulings and sanctions). Under the circumstances of this
case, the court also acted in its discretion by requiring the disclosure of Rockin’s
damages expert and expert report before the close of discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(d)(3)(A) (stating “methods of discovery may be used in any sequence”). Since
Bravado’s motion to compel was granted in full, the court also did not commit
legal error in declining to apportion fees awarded to Bravado. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
37.
The remainder of Rockin’s arguments were not adequately raised in its
opening brief and are summarily rejected. Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington,
350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that this court “review[s] only issues
which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”).
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AFFIRMED.
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