United States v. Melvin James ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-10294
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
3:19-cr-08019-DLR-1
v. 3:19-cr-08019-DLR
MELVIN JAMES,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 7, 2023**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Melvin James appeals the district court’s judgment and
commitment order, seeking vacatur of his conviction and sentence. James’ plea
agreement included an appeal waiver, but he argues that his plea was involuntary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
because his relationship with his court-appointed counsel broke down. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo whether a defendant has waived the right to appeal.
United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016). An agreement to
waive appellate rights is enforceable so long as the agreement covers the grounds
of appeal and the waiver is knowing and voluntary. United States v. King, 985
F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2021). “To be voluntary, a plea must be one in which the
defendant is permitted to choose between pleading guilty and undergoing a trial
that comports with the fundamental principles the Constitution imposes.” United
States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 626 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other
grounds by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). James argues that his plea
was involuntary because the district court left him with the unconstitutional choice
“to plead guilty or proceed to trial with an attorney with whom he had become
embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict.” We disagree.
“When the court has appointed an attorney for an indigent defendant, the
defendant, like all criminal defendants, has a constitutional right to effective
counsel. But he does not have the right to the counsel of his choice.” United
States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). When a district court refuses to substitute
counsel, we review for abuse of discretion and consider three factors: “1) the
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timeliness of the motion; 2) the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the
defendant’s complaint; and 3) whether the asserted conflict was so great as to
result in a complete breakdown in communication and a consequent inability to
present a defense.” United States v. Prime, 431 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).
None of these factors favor James.
First, James did not request substitute counsel in a timely manner. Although
James filed his initial motion to relieve counsel in March 2020, more than seven
months before the scheduled trial, he told the court in a June 2020 hearing that he
had not requested another lawyer. James did not raise the issue again until October
2, 2020, a little more than three weeks before trial. He stated then that he wanted
to keep his appointed counsel. After James’ appointed counsel filed an additional
motion to withdraw on October 6, 2020, the court found the motion untimely
because the trial was less than three weeks away, the parties had already made
travel arrangements for witnesses, and prospective jurors had already completed
questionnaires.
Second, the district court engaged in an extensive inquiry regarding the
alleged breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, conducting several hearings
and providing James and his appointed counsel with multiple opportunities to
explain their concerns.
Third, any breakdown in James’ relationship with his appointed counsel was
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entirely James’ fault. In United States v. Roston, we held that the district court did
not err in declining to appoint new counsel where the defendant did not trust
appointed counsel and refused to communicate with him. 986 F.2d 1287, 1292–93
(9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, here, the district court did not err by declining to
appoint new counsel where James had refused to listen to, trust, or collaborate with
any of his three court-appointed lawyers.
The district court did not deny James’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel or
otherwise abuse its discretion by denying James a third opportunity to obtain a new
court-appointed lawyer. Thus, James knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to appeal by pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. Under these
circumstances, although we retain jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal, we give
preclusive effect to James’ plea agreement. See United States v. Jacobo Castillo,
496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
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