Orville Meaux v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 490 F. App'x 58 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JUL 31 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ORVILLE MEAUX,                                   No. 11-15480
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 4:04-cv-04444-CW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., a
    Delaware corporation and ASSOCIATION
    OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-
    COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
    AMERICA,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Claudia A. Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 19, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: TASHIMA, CLIFTON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Orville Meaux appeals the district court’s denial of his
    request for a continuance brought pursuant to former Rule 56(f)1 of the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure and its denial of his motion to vacate the judgment
    brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both of
    these rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kitsap
    Physicians Serv., 
    314 F.3d 995
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (Rule 56(f)); Cmty. Dental
    Servs. v. Tani, 
    282 F.3d 1164
    , 1167 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (Rule 60(b)(6)). He also
    appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee
    Northwest Airlines (“NWA”) on Meaux’s claim for discriminatory termination,2
    which we review de novo. Russell Country Sportsmen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    668 F.3d 1037
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Because the procedural and factual history of this
    case is familiar to the parties, we recount it only to the extent necessary to explain
    our decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    1
    When the district court decided this case, Rule 56(f) governed
    continuances on motions for summary judgment. Effective December 1, 2010, the
    rules were amended so that former Rule 56(f) now appears as Rule 56(d). See
    Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 
    660 F.3d 1156
    , 1169 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting this
    change).
    2
    At oral argument, Meaux’s attorney stated that he did not intend to bring
    such a claim. Nonetheless, we construe Meaux’s opening brief as having
    successfully appealed the district court’s discriminatory termination ruling.
    2
    “Under [Rule] 56(f), a trial court may order a continuance on a motion for
    summary judgment if the party requesting a continuance submits affidavits
    showing that, without Rule 56 assistance, it cannot present facts necessary to
    justify its claims.” Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
    Corp., 
    525 F.3d 822
    , 827 (9th Cir. 2008). Relief may be denied, however, where
    the moving party has not acted diligently in pursing discovery before summary
    judgment. 
    Id. at 828
    . Because the record shows Meaux did not diligently conduct
    discovery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his Rule 56(f)
    motion. Additionally, contrary to Meaux’s suggestion, the district court’s decision
    not to explain why it denied his request is not dispositive; this Court may affirm on
    any basis supported by the record. See, e.g., Dougherty v. City of Covina, 
    654 F.3d 892
    , 900 (9th Cir. 2011).
    Next, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to NWA on
    Meaux’s discriminatory termination claim. NWA claims that it terminated Meaux
    because Meaux wrote an inappropriate letter to the employer of a passenger who
    complained to NWA about Meaux’s treatment of him during a trans-Pacific flight.
    Meaux has not adduced sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of material
    fact as to pretext. See Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 
    424 F.3d 1027
    ,
    1037 (9th Cir. 2005).
    3
    Finally, we affirm the district court’s denial of Meaux’s Rule 60(b)(6)
    motion, which sought to vacate the judgment and reinstate Meaux’s claim against
    NWA for discriminatory demotion. The district court did not clearly err by
    declining to find that Meaux’s counsel acted with gross negligence, as counsel’s
    representation did not amount to a virtual abandonment of Meaux’s interests. See
    Tani, 
    282 F.3d at
    1170–71. Even if counsel’s conduct was grossly negligent, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a voluntary dismissal
    cannot support the grant of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Latshaw v. Trainer
    Wortham & Co., 
    452 F.3d 1097
    , 1103 (9th Cir. 2006).
    AFFIRMED.
    4