Shawn Desautel v. Anita Dupris , 490 F. App'x 914 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            NOV 26 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SHAWN LAWRENCE DESAUTEL; et                      No. 11-35926
    al.,
    D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00301-EFS
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM *
    ANITA B. DUPRIS; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 13, 2012 **
    Before:        CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    Shawn Lawrence DesAutel, Tamara Desautel Davis and Tonia Rene
    Desautel, adopted members of the Colville Confederated Tribes, appeal pro se
    from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging that defendants
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    violated their First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during
    proceedings in which plaintiffs challenged their enrollment status before the
    Colville Tribal Courts. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review
    de novo, Rhoades v. Avon Prods., 
    504 F.3d 1151
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2007), and we
    affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction because the allegations that defendants failed to follow the
    provisions of the Colville Tribal Code in addressing the plaintiffs’ challenge to
    their enrollment status would impermissibly require the court to evaluate the merits
    of the tribe’s membership determinations. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
    
    436 U.S. 49
    , 72 n.32 (1978) (the right to define membership “for tribal purposes
    has long been recognized as central to [a tribe’s] existence as an independent
    political community” and federal courts should avoid “intrud[ing] on these delicate
    matters”); Lewis v. Norton, 
    424 F.3d 959
    , 961 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]ribal immunity
    bars suits to force tribes to comply with their membership provisions, as well as
    suits to force tribes to change their membership provisions.”).
    The district court properly concluded that, in the alternative, the action was
    subject to dismissal because the causes of action failed to state a claim as a matter
    of law. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 
    464 F.3d 1044
    , 1048 (9th Cir. 2006)
    2                                     11-35926
    (“
    18 U.S.C. §§ 241
     and 242 . . . are criminal statutes that do not give rise to civil
    liability.”); Evans v. McKay, 
    869 F.2d 1341
    , 1347 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]ctions
    under section 1983 cannot be maintained in federal court for persons alleging a
    deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.”); Caldeira v. County
    of Kauai, 
    866 F.2d 1175
    , 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he absence of a section 1983
    deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the
    same allegations.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     11-35926