United States v. Kenneth Kirkland , 909 F.3d 1049 ( 2018 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                          No. 16-10514
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                           1:15-cr-00322-
    DAD-BAM-1
    KENNETH WILLIAM KIRKLAND,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 10, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Filed November 28, 2018
    Before: D. Michael Fisher, * Paul J. Watford,
    and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Watford
    *
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2                 UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND
    SUMMARY **
    Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed the defendant’s convictions and
    sentence for being a felon in possession of a destructive
    device in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possessing
    an unregistered destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C.
    § 5861(d).
    The defendant contended that the definition of
    “destructive device” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(C) requires
    possession of every component necessary to construct a
    functional weapon, and that he would be entitled to a
    judgment of acquittal because the government did not
    introduce any evidence to establish that he possessed the
    eight C-cell batteries needed for the device in question to
    operate.
    The panel held that § 921(a)(4)(C) requires only that the
    defendant possess a combination of parts from which a
    functional device “may be readily assembled”; that the
    requirement does not categorically exclude situations in
    which the assembly process entails the acquisition and
    addition of a new part; and that the “readily assembled”
    element can still be met so long as the defendant could
    acquire the missing part quickly and easily, and so long as
    the defendant could incorporate the missing part quickly and
    easily. The panel concluded that because the defendant
    could have quickly and easily obtained the missing batteries
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND                    3
    assuming he did not have them lying around the house
    already, and because he could have quickly and easily
    incorporated them into his partially constructed bomb to
    render it functional, ample evidence supports the conclusion
    that a functional explosive device could be readily
    assembled from the combination of parts the defendant
    possessed.
    COUNSEL
    Carlton F. Gunn (argued), Pasadena, California, for
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Angela Scott (argued) and Christopher D. Baker, Assistant
    United States Attorneys; Camil A. Skipper, Appellate Chief;
    United States Attorney’s Office, Fresno, California; for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.
    OPINION
    WATFORD, Circuit Judge:
    When executing a search warrant at Kenneth Kirkland’s
    home, police officers discovered a partially constructed
    homemade bomb concealed inside a shoe box. The device
    contained: a battery box designed to hold eight C-cell
    batteries, which served as the device’s power source; a radio
    frequency receiver to pick up the radio signal that would
    detonate the device; a detonator; wires to conduct electricity
    from the batteries to the detonator; and shotgun shells that
    served as the explosive main charge. All of the components
    necessary for the device to function were present except for
    the eight C-cell batteries. An explosives expert testified at
    4              UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND
    trial that to render the device functional, Kirkland simply had
    to insert the batteries into the battery box and connect the
    detonator to the power source. That process, the expert said,
    would take “a matter of minutes.”
    Based on Kirkland’s possession of this homemade
    bomb, the jury convicted him of being a felon in possession
    of a destructive device in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
    and possessing an unregistered destructive device in
    violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). On appeal, Kirkland
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
    convictions, on the ground that the device he possessed does
    not qualify as a “destructive device.” He also argues that his
    sentence should not have been enhanced under the
    “destructive device” provision of the Sentencing Guidelines,
    U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B), as that enhancement turns on the
    same definition of “destructive device.” (We resolve his
    remaining contentions in an unpublished memorandum
    disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.)
    Both of the statutes under which Kirkland was convicted
    prohibit the unlawful possession of a “firearm,” which is
    defined to include a “destructive device.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 921(a)(3)(D); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(8). Both statutes—one
    a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968, the other a
    provision of the National Firearms Act—define the term
    “destructive device” in almost identical language. 18 U.S.C.
    § 921(a)(4); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). We will refer throughout
    to the definition found in the Gun Control Act, but our
    analysis applies equally to the definition provided in the
    National Firearms Act. See United States v. Lussier,
    
    128 F.3d 1312
    , 1314 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997).
    Section 921(a)(4) defines “destructive device” in
    relevant part as follows:
    UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND                 5
    (4) The term “destructive device” means—
    (A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison
    gas—
    (i) bomb,
    (ii) grenade,
    (iii) rocket having a propellant charge
    of more than four ounces,
    (iv) missile having an explosive or
    incendiary charge of more than one-
    quarter ounce,
    (v) mine, or
    (vi) device similar to any of the
    devices described in the preceding
    clauses;
    (B) any type of weapon (other than a
    shotgun or a shotgun shell which the
    Attorney General finds is generally
    recognized as particularly suitable for
    sporting purposes) by whatever name
    known which will, or which may be
    readily converted to, expel a projectile by
    the action of an explosive or other
    propellant, and which has any barrel with
    a bore of more than one-half inch in
    diameter; and
    6              UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND
    (C) any combination of parts either
    designed or intended for use in
    converting any device into any
    destructive   device    described   in
    subparagraph (A) or (B) and from which
    a destructive device may be readily
    assembled.
    The term “destructive device” shall not
    include any device which is neither
    designed nor redesigned for use as a
    weapon . . . .
    Subsections (A) and (B) cover fully assembled weapons;
    subsection (C) generally applies to a combination of parts
    that has not yet been assembled into a functional weapon.
    
    Lussier, 128 F.3d at 1315
    . At trial, the government
    proceeded against Kirkland solely under subsection (C), so
    we will confine our discussion to that provision.
    Kirkland does not dispute that the parts he possessed
    were designed for use as one of the weapons described in
    subsection (A)—namely, an explosive bomb. He challenges
    only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
    finding that he possessed a combination of parts “from
    which” an explosive bomb could be “readily assembled.” In
    his view, a conviction under subsection (C) requires proof
    that the defendant possessed every component necessary to
    construct a functional weapon. Under Kirkland’s reading of
    the statute, he would be entitled to a judgment of acquittal
    because the device in question needed eight C-cell batteries
    to operate, and the government did not introduce any
    evidence establishing that he possessed such batteries.
    UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND                    7
    We do not think the statute can be read in the manner
    urged by Kirkland. Nothing in the text of § 921(a)(4)(C)
    states that a defendant must possess every component
    necessary to render a partially constructed device capable of
    detonating. The statute requires only that the defendant
    possess a combination of parts from which a functional
    device “may be readily assembled.” As used in this
    provision, the term “readily” means quickly and easily: The
    combination of parts possessed by the defendant must be
    capable of being assembled into a functional device within a
    short period of time and with little difficulty—measures that
    may depend on the expertise of the defendant constructing
    the device. That requirement does not categorically exclude
    situations in which the assembly process entails the
    acquisition and addition of a new part. Thus, if the defendant
    lacks a part necessary to render the device functional, the
    “readily assembled” element can still be met so long as the
    defendant could acquire the missing part quickly and easily,
    and so long as the defendant could incorporate the part into
    the device quickly and easily. See United States v. Sheehan,
    
    838 F.3d 109
    , 125 (2d Cir. 2016) (upholding a conviction
    even though the device lacked a piece of tape needed to
    connect the wires to the battery); United States v. Russell,
    
    468 F. Supp. 322
    , 329–30 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (same where the
    device lacked a 1.5-volt battery).
    Ample evidence supports the conclusion that a
    functional explosive device could be readily assembled from
    the combination of parts Kirkland possessed. As noted
    above, Kirkland had assembled a nearly complete
    homemade bomb; only the eight C-cell batteries were
    missing. The testimony at trial confirmed that those batteries
    are common household items “readily available to an
    ordinary consumer.” Thus, Kirkland could have quickly and
    easily obtained the missing batteries, assuming he did not
    8              UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND
    have them lying around the house already. The jury also
    heard expert testimony that it would have taken only a matter
    of minutes to install the batteries and connect the detonator
    to the power source. Thus, once he obtained the batteries,
    Kirkland could have quickly and easily incorporated them
    into his partially constructed bomb to render it functional.
    This evidence is more than sufficient to satisfy the “readily
    assembled” element.
    Kirkland contends that our reading of the statute will
    lead to intractable line-drawing problems as courts are
    forced to decide which components a defendant must
    possess in order to be convicted, and which he need not. We
    do not think that prediction will prove accurate. Whether a
    particular combination of parts may be “readily assembled”
    into an operable device is an inherently factbound issue that
    juries will have to resolve on a case-by-case basis. With one
    exception, mentioned below, no bright-line rules can be
    drawn declaring which components of a destructive device
    must be in the defendant’s possession in order for a
    conviction to be sustained. That will depend in every case
    on both the nature of the parts the defendant has already
    assembled and the ease with which the defendant could
    acquire and incorporate any missing parts. At the end of the
    day, regardless of which components are missing from the
    device, the ultimate question will be the same: Can the
    missing parts be obtained quickly and easily, and if so, can
    they quickly and easily be incorporated to render the device
    functional?
    The one exception involves the material necessary to
    bring a device within the coverage of § 921(a)(4).
    Subsection (A) covers any “explosive, incendiary, or poison
    gas” bomb, grenade, etc. At least two circuits have held that
    a conviction may not be sustained under subsection (C),
    UNITED STATES V. KIRKLAND                          9
    which tracks the coverage of subsection (A), unless the
    defendant possesses the explosive material necessary to
    construct an operable explosive weapon. See United States
    v. Blackburn, 
    940 F.2d 107
    , 110 (4th Cir. 1991); United
    States v. Malone, 
    546 F.2d 1182
    , 1184 (5th Cir. 1977). The
    same would be true of the incendiary material or poison gas
    necessary to construct a weapon of that ilk. This exception
    does not apply here, as Kirkland does not dispute that he
    possessed the necessary explosive material in the form of a
    detonator and shotgun shells. 1
    We reject Kirkland’s reading of the statute for the
    additional reason that it is at war with Congress’ purpose in
    enacting the “combination of parts” provision. Congress
    sought to protect the public from the danger posed by
    military-style weaponry and “the street variety of homemade
    instruments and weapons of crime and violence.” United
    States v. Peterson, 
    475 F.2d 806
    , 810 (9th Cir. 1973). That
    danger exists not only when a defendant possesses a fully
    assembled weapon, but also when a defendant who intends
    to construct such a weapon has gathered enough of the
    necessary components such that a functional weapon can be
    readily assembled. Reading the statute to require possession
    of every necessary component, even a single item that could
    be readily obtained, would defeat the flexibility Congress
    sought to build into the statutory scheme and “would foster
    easy evasion to thwart the Congressional intent.” United
    States v. Shafer, 
    445 F.2d 579
    , 583 (7th Cir. 1971). While
    1
    The court in Malone did state, as Kirkland points out, that “the
    defendant cannot be guilty of [possessing a destructive device] because
    he did not have in his possession all of the component parts from which
    a destructive device might be readily 
    assembled.” 546 F.2d at 1184
    . The
    court, however, explicitly limited its holding to the facts before it—
    namely, a “complete absence of explosive material.” 
    Id. 10 UNITED
    STATES V. KIRKLAND
    the ultimate harm that Congress sought to prevent occurs
    when the covered weapons are used, Congress chose to take
    the prophylactic measure of criminalizing the possession of
    such weapons—as well as the possession of parts that could
    readily become such weapons. Under Kirkland’s reading,
    an individual could render that prophylactic measure futile,
    avoiding criminal exposure for possession simply by
    refraining from adding some easily obtainable part to an
    otherwise fully assembled weapon until use of the weapon is
    imminent.
    This case provides a good illustration of the concerns
    that motivated Congress to enact the “combination of parts”
    provision. The evidence at trial showed that Kirkland’s
    explosive device lacked batteries because he was not yet
    ready to use it. In a post-arrest interview, Kirkland told the
    police that he had not added the batteries because he knew
    the device could explode inadvertently once he did. Because
    C-cell batteries could be readily obtained at any time, there
    was no need for Kirkland to add them in advance. If and
    when he was ready to deploy his weapon, he could acquire
    the batteries and insert them into the device right before
    doing so. The absence of the batteries does not make
    Kirkland less culpable from the standpoint of the statute’s
    prime objective—keeping inherently dangerous weapons
    out of the hands of those who are not permitted to possess
    them.
    AFFIRMED.