Hock Huat Yap v. Deutsche Bank National Trust ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 2 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HOCK HUAT YAP,                                  No. 19-15210
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00229-RM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
    COMPANY, trustee of J.P. Morgan
    Acquisition Trust 2001-HE1, Asset Backed
    Pass - Through Certificates, Series 2007-
    HE1; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 18, 2019**
    Before:      CANBY, TASHIMA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Hock Huat Yap appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
    and dismissal orders in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. Accordingly, we deny appellant’s request for oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo. Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 
    665 F.3d 1076
    , 1083 (9th Cir.
    2011) (summary judgment); Marder v. Lopez, 
    450 F.3d 445
    , 448 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6)). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Yap’s claim
    alleging a violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) under
    
    12 U.S.C. § 2605
    (k)(1)(D) because Yap failed to raise a genuine dispute of
    material fact as to whether he suffered actual damages from the defendants’
    allegedly inadequate responses to his request for information under § 2605. See 
    12 U.S.C. § 2605
    (k)(1)(D) (requiring servicers of federally related mortgages to
    respond within ten business days to a request from a borrower to provide contact
    information for the owner or assignee of the loan); § 2605(f)(1)(A) (limiting
    recovery to “actual damages” for noncompliance with the requirements of § 2605).
    The district court properly dismissed Yap’s claims under RESPA regulations
    and the Truth In Lending Act, and Yap’s claim alleging a break in the chain of
    title, because Yap failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for
    relief. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 1641
    (f)(2) (providing that upon written request by the
    borrower, the servicer must provide the borrower “with the name, address, and
    telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer”); 12
    2                                     19-
    15210 C.F.R. § 1024.35
     (discussing servicing error resolution procedures under RESPA);
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must
    contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Yap leave to amend
    to allege a claim under the Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-420 because amendment
    would have been futile. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 
    512 F.3d 522
    ,
    532 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that the district
    court may deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile); see also 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-420
    (A) (prohibiting false recordation of an “interest in, or a lien or
    encumbrance against, real property”); Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 
    311 P.3d 237
    , 241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that an assignment of the deed of
    trust is covered by 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-420
    (A), and claims under 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-420
    (A) are governed by the general four-year statute of limitations).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    All requests set forth in the opening brief are denied.
    3                                   19-15210
    Yap’s motion to file a substitute or corrected reply brief (Docket Entry No.
    42) is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                   19-15210
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-15210

Filed Date: 12/2/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/2/2019