Lorena Espinoza Aguilar v. William Barr ( 2019 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 24 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LORENA ESPINOZA AGUILAR, AKA                    No.    17-70260
    Lorena Espinoza Andrade,
    Agency No. A208-309-187
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted December 11, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BOGGS,** BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Lorena Espinoza Aguilar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
    of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal
    from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of
    removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1) and deny the petition.
    1.     The IJ refused to review the documents that Espinoza proffered at her
    hearing, simply assuming that they only showed that “Mexico has a lot of crime.”
    We assume arguendo that Espinoza, who appeared pro se and was detained at the
    time of her hearing, was thereby denied a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
    on her behalf. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), (4)(B); Jacinto v. INS, 
    208 F.3d 725
    ,
    727-28 (9th Cir. 2000). But, even assuming a due process violation, Espinoza must
    establish prejudice from the exclusion of evidence to obtain relief. See Gomez-
    Velazco v. Sessions, 
    879 F.3d 989
    , 993 (9th Cir. 2018). Espinoza makes no argument
    about what the documents contained and never suggests what relevant fact they
    would have established had the IJ admitted them. “Although, to show prejudice, we
    do not always require an explanation of ‘exactly what evidence’ a petitioner would
    have presented, we do require at least some indication of what a petitioner would
    have sought to establish had she been allowed to fully present her case.” Garcia
    Apostol v. Gonzales, 126 F. App’x 818, 821 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Colmenar v.
    INS, 
    210 F.3d 967
    , 972 (9th Cir. 2000)).
    2.     Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that, on the record
    before the IJ, Espinoza failed to show that she faces persecution in Mexico on
    account of a protected ground. See Al-Harbi v. INS, 
    242 F.3d 882
    , 888 (9th Cir.
    2001) (stating that such a showing is required for a grant of asylum and withholding).
    2
    Espinoza testified that she and her family suffered mistreatment in Mexico by a gang
    because she “had a business and they came to extort [her] and [she] didn’t want to
    pay them.” Victimization for economic reasons does not establish persecution on
    account of a protected ground. See Barrios v. Holder, 
    581 F.3d 849
    , 855-56 (9th
    Cir. 2009).
    3.      Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Espinoza
    failed to demonstrate eligibility for CAT relief. The evidence does not compel the
    conclusion that Espinoza would more likely than not face torture if she returned to
    Mexico. See 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16
    (c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    3