Miguel Sifuentes v. P. Brazelton , 815 F.3d 490 ( 2016 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MIGUEL GALINDO SIFUENTES,                       No. 13-17603
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                        4:09-cv-02902-PJH
    P. D. BRAZELTON,
    Respondent-Appellant.                  OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 12, 2015
    Submission Vacated June 24, 2015
    Resubmitted February 10, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Filed February 18, 2016
    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Sandra S. Ikuta,
    Circuit Judges and James A. Teilborg,* Senior District
    Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Ikuta
    *
    The Honorable James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    2                   SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    SUMMARY**
    Habeas Corpus
    The panel reversed the district court’s judgment granting
    a habeas corpus petition in a case in which California state
    prisoner Miguel Galindo Sifuentes challenged the
    prosecutor’s decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors
    in his trial for first degree murder of a police officer.
    Applying the doubly deferential standard for reviewing a
    determination under Batson v. Kentucky, the panel held that
    the California Court of Appeal’s decision that Sifuentes had
    not carried his burden of showing the prosecutor acted in a
    purposefully discriminatory way was not based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel also held
    that the trial court’s decision to preclude Sifuentes from
    responding to the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for
    his strikes was harmless.
    The panel remanded with instructions to dismiss the
    petition.
    COUNSEL
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Dane R.
    Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
    Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peggy S. Ruffra,
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General, John H. Deist
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     3
    (argued), Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco,
    California, for Respondent-Appellant.
    Denis P. Riordan, Donald M. Horgan (argued), Riordan &
    Horgan, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner-Appellee.
    OPINION
    IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal raises the question whether the California
    Court of Appeal made an unreasonable determination of the
    facts in affirming the trial court’s application of Batson v.
    Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
     (1986). On trial for first degree
    murder of a police officer, Miguel Sifuentes challenged the
    prosecutor’s decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors.
    The trial court concluded that Sifuentes had not carried his
    burden of showing the prosecutor acted in a purposefully
    discriminatory way, and the California Court of Appeal
    affirmed. Applying the doubly deferential standard for
    reviewing a Batson determination, see Briggs v. Grounds,
    
    682 F.3d 1165
    , 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), we conclude that the
    California Court of Appeal’s decision was not based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d). We also conclude that the trial court’s decision to
    preclude Sifuentes from responding to the prosecutor’s race-
    neutral explanation for his strikes was harmless. We
    therefore reverse the district court’s grant of habeas relief.
    I
    On December 11, 1998, Sifuentes, Ruben Vasquez, and
    Hai Minh Le robbed an Outback Steakhouse in Dublin,
    4                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    California. Sifuentes entered the restaurant by himself, and
    asked for a table. He told the server he was waiting for
    friends and ordered a soda. About a half hour later, when
    Sifuentes declined to place an order, he was presented with a
    bill. He told the server that he needed to get some money
    from his car, and headed for the exit.
    As soon as Sifuentes approached the door, Vasquez and
    Le entered. Le pulled out a pellet gun and forced a departing
    customer to return to the restaurant. Sifuentes was also
    armed with a pellet gun. Brandishing their weapons,
    Vasquez, Sifuentes and Le spread out through the restaurant
    and forced the customers and employees into the kitchen. In
    the kitchen, Vasquez demanded money and fired his nine
    millimeter semiautomatic pistol into a fryer. The manager
    led Vasquez into his office, where Vasquez stuffed his
    pockets with money from the cash drawer. An employee
    managed to call 911, but had to hang up before reporting the
    robbery. When the restaurant phone rang, Vasquez ordered
    the manager to tell the police that everything was OK, or
    Vasquez would shoot him. The manager did as ordered.
    Then Vasquez, Sifuentes, and Le began forcing the
    employees and customers into the restaurant’s walk-in
    refrigerator. Before being shut into the refrigerator, an
    employee activated a security device.
    Deputy Sheriff Angela Schwab responded to the 911 call
    and went into the restaurant to confirm the manager’s
    statement that there was no problem at the restaurant. Once
    she entered, she was surprised by Vasquez, who pointed his
    gun at her, hit her in the face, and took her gun. Le put a gun
    to her back, and he and Sifuentes walked her to the back of
    the restaurant. Sheriff Deputy John Monego arrived at the
    scene shortly thereafter. As he entered the restaurant,
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                           5
    Vasquez shot him. Monego fell to the ground, and Vasquez
    shot him multiple times where he lay, killing him. Vasquez,
    Sifuentes, and Le fled the scene and were apprehended
    shortly afterwards.
    The three defendants were tried jointly. The prosecutor
    charged Sifuentes and Le with first degree felony murder.
    
    Cal. Penal Code § 189
     (felony murder includes a murder that
    is committed by the defendant or an accomplice during the
    commission of a specified dangerous felony). During voir
    dire, the prosecutor focused on the potential jurors’ views on
    the death penalty, and specifically whether they felt they
    could sentence a defendant to death if the defendant did not
    “actually commit the shooting.” The prosecutor used
    peremptory strikes to remove thirty-three jurors, nine of
    whom were black. The empaneled jury included one black
    juror and one black alternate. The prosecutor stated for the
    record that he would have accepted a black female juror
    excused by the defense, as well as a black male juror, but that
    juror had failed to appear in court.
    Sifuentes and his co-defendants made three objections
    during jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    (1986), and the analogous California case, People v. Wheeler,
    
    22 Cal. 3d 258
     (1978), based on the prosecutor’s use of
    peremptory challenges to remove nine black jurors.1 After
    each Batson motion, the trial judge determined that the
    1
    We refer to the motions as being made under Batson, although the
    defendants also relied on the analogous California case, People v.
    Wheeler, 
    22 Cal. 3d 258
     (1978). Because it is the procedural equivalent
    of a Batson objection, a Wheeler motion serves as an implicit objection
    under Batson. McDaniels v. Kirkland, — F.3d —, 
    2015 WL 9461515
    , at
    *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2015) (en banc).
    6                 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    defendant had made a prima facie case of discrimination, and
    asked the prosecutor for an explanation. As explained in
    more detail below, after Sifuentes’s first Batson motion,
    challenging the prosecutor’s strike of Jackson, Norman, and
    Jasper, and second Batson motion, challenging the
    prosecutor’s strike of Webster and Massey, the trial court did
    not permit defense counsel to respond to the prosecutor’s
    explanation. The trial court did permit rebuttal for the third
    Batson motion, during which Thompson, Gibson, Barnes, and
    Skruggs were excluded. After each challenge, the court
    determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing each
    juror were race neutral and not discriminatory.
    Sifuentes and his two co-defendants were each convicted
    of first degree murder, and Sifuentes was sentenced to 26
    years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal
    affirmed his conviction in January 2006, and the California
    Supreme Court summarily denied review in May 2006. In
    2007, Sifuentes petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
    federal court on several grounds, including that the state court
    unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting his Batson
    challenge to nine prospective jurors, and that the state court
    unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in precluding
    him from rebutting the prosecutor’s explanation for his
    strikes. After a number of stays and refilings, the district
    court granted Sifuentes relief on his claim as to two jurors,
    Thompson and Gibson, and denied Sifuentes’s other claims.
    The state timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
     and 2253.
    II
    On appeal, the state claims that the district court erred in
    its analysis of Sifuentes’s Batson claim with respect to jurors
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                       7
    Thompson and Gibson. Sifuentes argues that the district
    court did not err, and that, even if it did, the habeas petition
    should be granted because the peremptory strikes of six other
    jurors involved purposeful racial discrimination.
    Alternatively, Sifuentes argues that we can affirm the district
    court because the state court violated Batson in preventing
    him from rebutting the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations.
    Our analysis of these arguments requires an understanding of
    both the applicable Batson framework and the framework for
    evaluating a habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    .
    A
    We begin with the applicable Batson framework. As
    Batson explains, “the State’s privilege to strike individual
    jurors through peremptory challenges . . . is subject to the
    commands of the Equal Protection Clause,” which “forbids
    the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account
    of their race.” Batson, 
    476 U.S. at 89
    ; see also Davis v.
    Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. 2187
    , 2208 (2015). “[A]s in any case
    alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,” the key
    question is “whether the defendant had met his burden of
    proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State.”
    Batson, 
    476 U.S. at 90
    .
    To answer that question, Batson adopted a burden-shifting
    approach similar to that used in other civil rights cases. 
    Id.
     at
    94 & n.18. First, the defendant must “make out a prima facie
    case of purposeful discrimination” by providing some
    evidence, such as the disproportionate exclusion of jurors of
    a certain race, that a peremptory challenge has been exercised
    on the basis of race. 
    Id.
     at 93–94. “Once the defendant
    makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to
    8                 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    come forward with a neutral explanation” for striking the
    juror. 
    Id. at 97
    . “Third, in light of the parties’ submissions,
    the trial court must determine whether the defendant has
    shown purposeful discrimination” on the part of the
    prosecutor. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U.S. 322
    , 328–29
    (2003) (Miller-El I) (citing Batson, 
    476 U.S. at 98
    ). “The
    opponent of the strike bears the burden of persuasion
    regarding racial motivation.” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2199
    .
    The trial court’s determination whether the prosecutor has
    intentionally discriminated “turn[s] on evaluation of
    credibility.” Batson, 
    476 U.S. at
    98 n.21. This type of
    credibility determination relies on the trial court’s “evaluation
    of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and
    credibility,” and is a “pure issue of fact” that lies “peculiarly
    within a trial judge’s province.” Hernandez v. New York,
    
    500 U.S. 352
    , 364–65 (1991). Recognizing that “peremptory
    challenges are often the subjects of instinct, and that
    race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke
    a juror’s demeanor,” the Court has explained that “[a] trial
    court is best situated to evaluate both the words and the
    demeanor of jurors who are peremptorily challenged, as well
    as the credibility of the prosecutor who exercised those
    strikes.” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2201
     (internal quotation marks
    and citations omitted). Determining “whether a peremptory
    challenge is based on an impermissible factor” is difficult,
    because peremptory challenges “are often based on subtle
    impressions and intangible factors.” 
    Id. at 2208
    . “[T]hese
    determinations of credibility and demeanor lie peculiarly
    within a trial judge’s province,” 
    id. at 2201
    , because “a
    reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from
    voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make
    credibility determinations.” Miller-El I, 
    537 U.S. at 339
    ; see
    also Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2201
     (“Appellate judges cannot on
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      9
    the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s
    decision about likely motivation.” (citing Rice v. Collins, 
    546 U.S. 333
    , 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring))). On direct
    appeal, therefore, the reviewing court must uphold the trial
    court’s credibility determination “unless it is clearly
    erroneous,” Felkner v. Jackson, 
    562 U.S. 594
    , 598 (2011),
    meaning that the trial court’s decision leaves the reviewing
    court with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been committed,” Hernandez, 
    500 U.S. at 370
     (quoting
    United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
    333 U.S. 364
    , 395 (1948)).
    On direct appeal, a reviewing court may evaluate the trial
    court’s credibility finding by considering evidence indicating
    that the prosecutor’s rationale was pretextual. An inference
    of pretext may arise when the prosecutor’s reasons are not
    supported by the record, such as when a prosecutor
    “mischaracterizes a juror’s testimony in a manner completely
    contrary to the juror’s stated beliefs,” Aleman v. Uribe,
    
    723 F.3d 976
    , 982 (9th Cir. 2013), or when the reasons given
    by the prosecutor are implausible or fantastic, Purkett v.
    Elem, 
    514 U.S. 765
    , 768 (1995). In Miller-El v. Dretke
    (Miller-El II), the Court noted that when a prosecutor gives
    a race-neutral reason for striking a proposed juror, but has
    allowed jurors with similar characteristics to be empaneled,
    such inconsistent conduct raises the inference that the race-
    neutral reason is pretextual. 
    545 U.S. 231
    , 241 (2005).
    Under this comparative juror analysis, “[i]f a prosecutor’s
    proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as
    well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to
    serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful
    discrimination.” 
    Id.
    The Supreme Court has not created any bright line rule
    holding that Batson is necessarily violated when “prospective
    10               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    jurors of different races provide similar responses and one is
    excused while the other is not.” See Burks v. Borg, 
    27 F.3d 1424
    , 1429 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, the Court recognized that
    “a retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold
    appellate record may be very misleading when alleged
    similarities were not raised at trial.” Snyder v. Louisiana,
    
    552 U.S. 472
    , 483 (2008). A trial court can reasonably
    conclude that the prosecutor had excused a prospective juror
    based on the prosecutor’s assessment of that person’s
    credibility “tak[ing] into account tone, demeanor, facial
    expression, emphasis—all those factors that make the words
    uttered by the prospective juror convincing or not.” Burks,
    
    27 F.3d at 1429
    . Similarly, a trial court can reasonably credit
    a prosecutor’s reasons when there is some evidence of
    sincerity, such as that the prosecutor “did not know which
    jurors were Latinos,” Hernandez, 
    500 U.S. at
    369–70, or that
    “the prosecutor did accept minorities on the jury,” Burks, 
    27 F.3d at 1429
    . In short, “[w]here there are two permissible
    views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them
    cannot be clearly erroneous.” Hernandez, 
    500 U.S. at 369
    (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 574
    (1985)).
    As the Supreme Court has explained, this is the standard
    on direct review; on federal habeas review, the standard is
    even more deferential. Felkner, 
    562 U.S. at 598
    ; see also
    Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2199
     (“Under AEDPA, even more must
    be shown.”).
    B
    Because we are not reviewing the California Court of
    Appeal’s decision directly, but through the lens of collateral
    review, we now turn to our standard for reviewing state court
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                          11
    decisions under AEDPA, which “imposes a highly deferential
    standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that
    state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
    Felkner, 
    562 U.S. at 598
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We first delineate the standard of review for this collateral
    challenge to the state court’s decision. Because the district
    court’s determination whether the prosecutor’s strikes were
    purposefully discriminatory is a “pure issue of fact,” AEDPA
    § 2254(d)(2) applies.2 Hernandez, 
    500 U.S. at
    365–66. That
    section precludes a federal court from granting habeas relief
    to “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
    court . . . with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
    the merits in State court proceedings” unless that state-court
    adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
    evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(2). In considering a state court’s Batson
    determination, “[a] federal habeas court must accept a state
    2
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d) states:
    (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
    of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
    State court shall not be granted with respect to any
    claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
    proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
    involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
    established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
    Court of the United States; or
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
    evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
    12                   SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    court finding unless it was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
    in the State court proceeding.” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2199
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(2)). As we have explained this standard, “a federal
    court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding
    process unless, after review of the state-court record, it
    determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but
    actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 
    366 F.3d 992
    , 999
    (9th Cir. 2004); see also Miller-El I, 
    537 U.S. at 340
     (“[A]
    decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based
    on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual
    grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the
    evidence presented in the state-court proceeding,
    § 2254(d)(2).”).     And “[s]tate-court factual findings,
    moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden
    of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing
    evidence.’” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at
    2199–2200 (quoting Collins,
    
    546 U.S. at
    338–39, citing 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1)).3 “The
    3
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e) states that, in a habeas proceeding, “a
    determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed
    to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of
    rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
    evidence.” In the context of deciding Batson claims, the Supreme Court
    has noted that “[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed
    correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,” Miller-El
    I, 
    537 U.S. at 340
    . The Supreme Court’s most recent word on this subject,
    Davis v. Ayala, affirms the applicability of the presumption in § 2254(e).
    235 S. Ct. at 2199–2200. The Court has previously indicated, however,
    that it is an open question whether this presumption is applicable, see
    Collins, 
    546 U.S. at 339
    ; see also Wood v. Allen, 
    558 U.S. 290
    , 300–01
    (2010). In an abundance of caution, and “because our view of the
    reasonableness of the state court’s factual determination in this case does
    not turn on any interpretive difference regarding the relationship between
    these provisions,” Wood v. Allen, 
    558 U.S. at 300
    , we review the state
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                         13
    upshot is that even if reasonable minds reviewing the record
    might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, on habeas
    review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s
    credibility determination.” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2201
     (internal
    quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing Collins,
    
    546 U.S. at
    341–42).
    When we apply this deferential AEDPA standard in the
    Batson context, we end up with a standard of review that is
    “doubly deferential,” Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170, because the
    federal court defers to the state reviewing court’s
    determination of the facts, and the reviewing court defers to
    the trial court’s determination of the prosecutor’s credibility.
    This doubly deferential standard means that “unless the state
    appellate court was objectively unreasonable in concluding
    that a trial court’s credibility determination was supported by
    substantial evidence, we must uphold it.” Id. at 1170.
    We apply this doubly deferential standard in two steps.
    Jamerson v. Runnels, 
    713 F.3d 1218
    , 1225 (9th Cir. 2013).
    First, because § 2254(d)(2) ultimately requires us to
    determine whether the state court’s decision was “based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
    evidence” in the record, we must review the relevant portions
    of the record and use ordinary analytic tools to evaluate the
    prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. Mitleider v. Hall,
    
    391 F.3d 1039
    , 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2004). We consider
    whether a prosecutor’s justifications are contrary to the
    evidence in the record, such as being “implausible or
    fantastic,” Purkett, 
    514 U.S. at 768
    , based on
    mischaracterizations of a prospective juror’s testimony,
    Miller-El II, 
    545 U.S. at 244
    , or belied by a comparative juror
    court’s findings under the standard established in § 2254(d)(2).
    14                  SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    analysis.4 Conversely, we consider whether evidence in the
    record shows that at least some of the prosecutor’s reasons
    were “permissible and plausible.” Collins, 
    546 U.S. at 341
    .
    Second, having reviewed the prosecutor’s explanations in
    light of the evidence in the record, we turn to the state
    appellate court’s decision. The pertinent question is not
    whether the prosecutor was credible, or even whether the trial
    court’s conclusion to that effect was clearly erroneous.
    Rather, the pertinent question is whether the state appellate
    court was objectively unreasonable in upholding the trial
    court’s determination. Even if we would have reached a
    different conclusion regarding the prosecutor’s credibility, we
    must give the state appellate court the benefit of the doubt,
    Felkner, 
    562 U.S. at 598
    , and may not grant the habeas
    petition unless the state court’s decision was “not merely
    wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor, 
    366 F.3d at 999
    .
    III
    We now apply these principles in determining whether the
    California Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the trial court’s
    determination that the prosecutor’s justifications were not
    purposefully discriminatory was objectively unreasonable.
    As noted above, the district court granted Sifuentes relief with
    respect to Thompson and Gibson, but not as to the other six
    jurors.
    4
    We must conduct a comparative juror analysis in the first instance if
    the state reviewing court has not done so. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1225.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      15
    A
    We begin by reviewing the relevant portions of the record
    as to Thompson. Thompson stated in his juror questionnaire
    that he was active in the Baptist faith, but that his religious
    beliefs would not interfere with his ability to serve as a juror.
    He stated that he volunteered in his church’s food programs
    weekly. Where the questionnaire asked whether he could
    follow the law, Thompson answered “yes,” explaining that
    “[t]he laws [were] made to govern the land. Our job is to
    obey those laws.” When it asked for his general feelings
    about the death penalty, he stated “[i]t’s there as a tool . . .
    [b]ut not to be exploited.” When it asked him to rank his
    views of the death penalty on a five-step scale from “strongly
    in favor” to “strongly against,” he chose “moderately in
    favor.” He also stated that his views about the penalty had
    not changed in the last few years, and that he would vote to
    retain the death penalty if it were on the ballot in California.
    At voir dire, the trial judge asked Thompson to state
    whether he was able to impose the death penalty as “a
    philosophical question.” He responded:
    I guess you could say it’s a gray-line answer
    there. I’ve always been taught to obey the
    laws of the land, and because this is the land
    that I live in, yes, I would have to, I guess,
    obey at that particular time. But I guess, yes,
    depending on the circumstances.
    The trial judge followed up on this inquiry, asking whether
    Thompson could ever vote to execute somebody “if [he] felt
    it was appropriate.” Thompson responded, “Yeah, I could.”
    16                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    The prosecutor’s first question targeted Thompson’s
    response that he was “taught to obey the laws of the land,”
    asking: “You said to the judge that you were taught to follow
    the law. Could you elaborate a little bit about what kind of
    upbringing you had that led you to that?” Thompson
    responded:
    Well, I am a minister, I am faith based, I am a
    Christian, and in some religious aspects, they
    try to tell you that you are not supposed to
    judge anyone, that we don’t have the right to
    judge anyone, but at the same time, you are
    also taught to obey the laws of the land. So
    basically I can’t hold judgment on anyone, but
    at the same time I do have to hold to account
    what the laws of the land are.
    Following up on Thompson’s explanation of his faith, the
    prosecutor asked whether he heard correctly that Thompson
    was a minister in his religion, and Thompson replied that he
    was. The prosecutor then confirmed Thompson’s statement
    “that your religious beliefs teach you to not judge other
    people,” and Thompson responded: “Right. But at the same
    time, it also teaches us to obey the laws of the land. What I
    mean by not judge people, the Bible says that you are not to
    judge one another, but at the same time it tells you in there to
    obey the laws of the land.” The prosecutor asked whether
    Thompson’s religious beliefs would make this case a difficult
    problem for him, and Thompson responded that it would not.
    The prosecutor then asked: “Why not? If your religious
    beliefs tell you not to judge people and you’re going to be
    placed in a moral position to make a judgment about
    somebody, I’m trying to reconcile those two.” Thompson
    responded:
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     17
    Well, the reconciliation is the fact that it’s my
    job to carry out the laws of the land. Okay?
    No, I can’t per se condemn someone, because
    everyone has shortfalls, everyone has things
    they have done in their past or whatever. I
    can’t just say you’re a bad person just because
    you did this, that, that. What I’m saying is
    that even after everything is taken into
    account, the laws of the land still prevail.
    The trial judge then observed that this seemed like a situation
    that the Bible describes as “render unto Caesar that which is
    Caesar’s, render unto God that which is God’s,” with this
    being a case where Caesar’s rules applied, and Thompson
    replied, “Exactly.”
    Next, the prosecutor questioned Thompson on his views
    regarding the felony murder rule, describing the facts of this
    case and asking how Thompson felt about two of the
    defendants being charged with murder for their participation
    in a robbery in which someone was killed, even though they
    did not kill anyone. Thompson responded: “That’s just the
    law. That’s being an accessory to a crime. I mean, I might
    not have robbed a bank, as an example, but I was with
    someone who did rob a bank, so I’m just as guilty as that
    individual.” The prosecutor asked more specifically: “How
    do you feel about that principle, just as a person? Not as
    a—as something that’s part of the law, but just you as a
    person and knowing your background as a minister in your
    religion, that sort of thing.” Thompson answered:
    Well, the principle in itself, I mean, should I
    be held accountable, should I be—how should
    I put it?—lumped in or grouped with someone
    18               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    who does something wrong. Well, if I know
    the individual, I’m caught, I’m caught. I
    mean, the principle is basically what it is. It’s
    really not how I feel about it. It’s not like it’s
    either right or either wrong. The fact is I was
    somewhere where I shouldn’t have been.
    The prosecutor tried again, explaining the felony murder rule
    and asking:
    Q. Knowing who you are based on your
    philosophical beliefs, your religious beliefs,
    your ethical beliefs, do you think that the
    death penalty is a viable option for somebody
    who actually didn’t do any killing?
    A. It depends on the preponderance of the
    evidence, it depends on the special
    circumstances at the time, it depends on the
    evidence that’s presented. Right now, just
    saying that one person shot another individual
    and the other two people were in another area
    of the restaurant or whatever, it’s hard to say
    that those individuals would be eligible for it,
    but at that particular time, after listening to all
    the evidence, they may all three be eligible for
    it. It all depends on what actually was going
    on in the restaurant.
    THE COURT: You haven’t eliminated the
    death penalty with respect to the guys that
    didn’t kill anybody.
    A: Right.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                    19
    The prosecutor attempted one final confirmation:
    Q. The special circumstance that you
    would have found as to those two defendants
    would have made them eligible for the death
    penalty or life in prison without the possibility
    of parole because they were major participants
    and they were involved in reckless
    indifference to human life during the course
    of that crime. Okay?
    A. Um-hum.
    Q. They don’t have to have an intent to
    kill anybody. In fact, as the factual scenario
    indicates, they didn’t kill anybody.
    A. Um-hum.
    Q. Knowing that, do you think it’s
    reasonable that—or is the death penalty still
    on the table in terms of a realistic option for
    two of these defendants who didn’t kill
    anybody, who actually did not fire the gun?
    A. Yes, because it was accessory to a
    crime.
    The defense asked no questions, and the court found
    Thompson qualified to serve. The judge later denied a
    challenge for cause.
    Sifuentes brought a Batson challenge after Thompson and
    three other black jurors (Gibson, Barnes and Skruggs) were
    20               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    excused. The trial court held that Sifuentes had made a prima
    facie case, and thus the burden shifted to the prosecutor to
    justify the strikes of those four jurors.
    The prosecutor provided two reasons for striking
    Thompson: his views of the death penalty and his religious
    beliefs. The prosecutor explained his reasoning:
    [Thompson] was the one who was active
    in his Baptist church, involved in church
    programs weekly, and he expressed extreme
    reservations about the death penalty.
    There was a question asked: “Could you
    do something like that?” Page 7386: “I guess
    you could say it’s a gray-line answer there.
    I’ve always been taught to obey the law.”
    And then he says he’s equivocal. He was
    talking about his duty. He understands his
    duty. And I think he was confusing duty with
    how he felt about these penalties: “Well,
    because it’s the law, I can do my duty.” But
    that didn’t mean he could impose the death
    penalty.
    He also said at 7397 that he was a
    minister, and he said, “So basically I can’t
    hold judgment on anyone. But I do have to
    hold account to the laws of the land.”
    So he said because of his religious beliefs,
    he wasn’t in a position to make a judgment on
    anybody, and he repeated that several times.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                  21
    THE COURT: How about the next one?
    MR. GOODFELLOW: At 7398, he also
    said, “I can’t say you’re a bad person.” And
    then the judge: “Okay.”
    I asked him a lot of questions, and he
    never really would answer the questions about
    how do you feel about that principle. He kept
    talking about duty, but he would never answer
    the questions. He avoided answering any
    questions about what he felt about them
    personally. He kept going back to his duty.
    And based upon that, there were no
    questions by the defense, obviously, because
    they knew he was never going to come to
    death, it was so obvious. He wasn’t facing the
    issue.
    So based on everything in his
    questionnaire and all of the answers that he
    gave in court and his demeanor in terms of
    being unable to really answer the questions
    and being evasive to the types of tough
    questions I was asking him about putting
    himself in that position, it’s clear to me he
    couldn’t impose the death penalty on
    anybody.
    And besides that, I had many more better
    jurors after him that were much more
    pro-death-penalty. And I’m trying to get a
    pro-death-penalty jury.
    22                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    The trial court found that the prosecutor’s reasons for
    striking Thompson and the other three jurors “were racially
    neutral and that they were valid, there was justification,
    there’s a good, cogent reason to excuse every one of these
    jurors, and that they were facially neutral.” The California
    Court of Appeal upheld this determination based on the
    prosecutor’s explanation of his concerns, namely that
    Thompson was active in the Baptist church and gave
    “equivocal” responses regarding the death penalty. The
    California Court of Appeal did not conduct a comparative
    juror analysis.
    In evaluating the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion,
    we begin by reviewing the record. First, the prosecutor’s
    characterization of Thompson’s statements was not contrary
    to the evidence. Thompson testified that he was a Baptist
    minister, and he stated that his religion taught him not to
    judge others but that he could “obey the laws of the land.”
    The record also shows that Thompson’s statements regarding
    his willingness to impose the death penalty could be
    characterized as equivocal, because he consistently couched
    his ability to impose the death penalty in terms of his duty to
    obey the law. The prosecutor’s concern that a Baptist
    minister who gave equivocal answers about the death penalty
    and qualified his views with his understanding of the law
    might be hesitant to impose the death penalty in a felony
    murder case was not “implausible or fantastic.” See Purkett,
    
    514 U.S. at 768
    .
    Because the California Court of Appeal did not conduct
    a comparative juror analysis, we conduct this analysis in the
    first instance to determine if it gives rise to an inference that
    the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual. Jamerson, 713 F.3d
    at 1225. As the district court pointed out, the seated jurors
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     23
    had some characteristics similar to Thompson regarding their
    willingness to impose the death penalty. Thompson’s juror
    questionnaire responses and his voir dire statements showed
    that he had not eliminated the possibility of imposing the
    death penalty on non-shooters. His questionnaire response
    also indicated that he was “moderately in favor” of the death
    penalty. This statement was more favorable toward the death
    penalty than seven of the seventeen selected jurors (including
    those seated and alternates), all seven of whom stated that
    they were “neutral” toward the death penalty. The other ten
    selected jurors stated either that they were “moderately in
    favor” or “strongly in favor” of the death penalty. The two
    black jurors that were selected reported that they were
    “neutral” toward the death penalty. Additionally, during voir
    dire, eight of the selected jurors expressed some level of
    uncertainty regarding whether they could impose the death
    penalty on a non-shooter.
    Nevertheless, the seated jurors were distinguishable from
    Thompson in several key ways. The record shows that the
    jurors who initially responded equivocally regarding the
    death penalty later stated unequivocally that they could
    impose the death penalty. For example, Juror 1's first answer
    was: “Under certain circumstances, I believe I could” vote to
    execute someone. The juror later stated definitively, “Oh,
    yes, I could, yeah,” when asked whether the juror could
    impose the death penalty. Similarly, Juror 2 first stated: “I’ve
    never—I’ve never been in that situation. I guess the only way
    I can answer that question is I would have to listen to all of
    the facts. . . .” Each time the court or prosecutor subsequently
    asked if Juror 2 could impose the death penalty, including
    when the prosecutor confronted the juror with the earlier
    statement that the juror had not thought about it before, Juror
    2 unequivocally responded “yes.”
    24                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    Moreover, the seated jurors expressed their personal
    willingness to impose the death penalty in an appropriate
    case. For example, when asked, “Knowing who you are, do
    you think that you are capable of making that call even if it
    happens to be the death penalty, the hard call?” Juror 1
    responded, “Oh, yes, I do.” Juror 11 stated, “[‘I believe so’]
    means that if I feel that—after hearing the evidence, that I
    believe that I could, in fact, vote for a death penalty.” Juror
    12 stated, “Just personally I think I would probably lean more
    towards the death penalty, but I can’t say that I completely
    eliminated life without the possibility of parole.” And
    Alternate Juror 2 stated, “If I feel the death penalty is
    warranted by the action, I would vote for it.”
    By contrast, Thompson avoided expressing his personal
    views and couched his answers to similar questions in terms
    of objective legal requirements. For instance, when
    repeatedly asked by the prosecutor how he felt as a person on
    the topic, Thompson gave answers like: “I can’t hold
    judgment on anyone, but at the same time I do have to hold
    to account what the laws of the land are,” and “I mean, the
    principle is basically what it is. It’s really not how I feel
    about it.”
    Some of the seated jurors also had characteristics similar
    to Thompson regarding their religious faith. Four of the
    seated jurors identified themselves as Catholic and two other
    jurors discussed their religious beliefs. In addition, the record
    shows that the prosecutor asked Thompson more questions
    about religion than other prospective jurors. The prosecutor
    did not ask the four Catholic jurors, or a prospective Catholic
    juror (later excused by one of the defendants), about whether
    their religious beliefs affected their attitudes about the death
    penalty. The prosecutor briefly questioned two other
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     25
    prospective jurors, both of whom were black, about their
    religious beliefs. Thompson differed from these prospective
    jurors in that he identified himself as a minister in his faith
    and made equivocal remarks about the effect of his faith on
    imposing the death penalty. None of the seated jurors
    expressed Thompson’s sentiment that his religion forbade
    him from judging others, but he could nevertheless follow the
    law.
    Reading the voir dire transcript as a whole, the prosecutor
    made persistent efforts to draw out Thompson’s personal
    views about imposing the death penalty. The prosecutor’s
    explanation for the strike indicates his concern about
    Thompson’s nonresponsive answers, and his conclusion that
    Thompson would not actually vote for the death penalty.
    Having conducted this review of the record, we now turn
    to the state appellate court’s ruling. The California Court of
    Appeal concluded that the trial court properly deemed the
    prosecutor’s reasons regarding Thompson’s religious activity
    and equivocal responses regarding the death penalty credible.
    Applying our doubly deferential standard, and giving the state
    court the benefit of the doubt, this is not an objectively
    unreasonable determination of the facts.
    On the one hand, the record reflects that the seated jurors
    had some similarities to Thompson, and Sifuentes does not
    need to show “there is an exactly identical white juror” to
    prevail on a Batson challenge. Miller-El II, 
    545 U.S. at 291
    .
    But the record also shows material differences regarding
    Thompson’s persistent equivocation about his willingness to
    impose the death penalty. Although Sifuentes argues that the
    prosecutor’s failure to question other jurors about their
    26                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    religious beliefs as persistently raises the inference that his
    concerns about Thompson’s faith were pretextual, the record
    reasonably supports a conclusion that the prosecutor’s key
    concern was Thompson’s couching his views on the death
    penalty in terms of following the law.
    Based on our review of the voir dire transcript, the trial
    court could have reasonably concluded that the prosecutor did
    not believe that Thompson would actually impose the death
    penalty, “tak[ing] into account tone, demeanor, facial
    expression, emphasis—all those factors that make the words
    uttered by the prospective juror convincing or not.” Burks,
    
    27 F.3d at 1429
    . Ambiguity as to whether a juror would be
    able to give appropriate consideration to imposing the death
    penalty is a legitimate and reasonable basis for striking a
    juror. White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. ___, 
    136 S. Ct. 456
    , 461
    (2015). Even if “[r]easonable minds reviewing the record
    might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility,” this is an
    insufficient basis for habeas relief. See Jamerson, 713 F.3d
    at 1224.
    The state appellate court therefore did not unreasonably
    determine that the trial court’s credibility finding was
    supported by substantial evidence, so no habeas relief is
    warranted on the basis of the prosecution’s peremptory
    challenge of Thompson. See Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170. In
    holding otherwise, the district court failed to apply the doubly
    deferential standard, and therefore we reverse on this point.
    B
    We now review the relevant portions of the record with
    respect to juror Gibson. Gibson’s juror questionnaire stated
    that she was 49 years old, had a 33-year-old son, and had
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     27
    been a substitute teacher from 1992 to 1995. It also reported
    that she had gone to law school and was a member of the
    California bar, although she had never practiced. She also
    stated that she had applied to work at a DA’s office after law
    school but had not been hired. When asked her views of the
    criminal justice system, she stated “I believe the criminal
    justice system serves us; however, it could improve.” Her
    brother, her son, her brothers-in-law, and her cousins had
    served time in prison. Gibson also stated that she was
    “moderately in favor” of the death penalty, would vote to
    retain it in an election, and believed that “the death penalty
    has its place in the penal system.” She explained that she had
    “a better understanding and appreciation for the death penalty
    than [she] did when [she] was younger.”
    During voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether Gibson
    felt this case was serious enough to warrant the death penalty.
    She responded, “I think I could consider that as an option. I
    don’t know if I could impose it without going through the
    whole experience of the trial.”
    The prosecutor’s questions regarding why her views of
    the death penalty had changed gave rise to the following
    exchange:
    A. Well, I never thought that the death
    penalty should be a viable option, because I
    didn’t think that anyone had that right or
    authority to impose that upon another person,
    even though someone could murder a person
    and, in essence, that’s the death penalty. But
    for a jury to then turn around and decide that
    the defendant should die, I never thought that
    was quite right.
    28               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    So, you probably want to know what’s
    changed.
    Q. Yeah.
    A. Really what’s changed is that I’m
    actually a Christian and Christian principles,
    the death penalty is a viable option. And so I
    would say that’s really what changed my
    views.
    Defense counsel later followed up on this issue, and asked
    her “what about [her] Christian philosophy has now allowed
    [her] to allow for the death penalty.”
    A. Well, Christianity allows for—to have
    two or three witnesses. So, if you have the
    evidence and you have witnesses, then you
    can really consider it, consider the
    punishment.
    Q. Uh-huh.
    A. But, even before I was born again, my
    views had started changing on the death
    penalty.
    Q. Politically or philosophically or just
    religiously?
    A. Well, if we have to put a label on it, I
    would probably say I just became more
    conservative as I got older.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                   29
    Q. All right.
    A. And had a better idea of—or a
    different understanding of why we have these
    kind of laws.
    Q. Okay. When you say that—and I got
    the impression that you’re not ascribing to the
    eye for an eye of the Old Testament. When
    you say if you have two or three witnesses,
    that can allow for the option of the death
    penalty, what does that mean?
    A. Well, an eye for an eye is more
    revenge.
    Q. Exactly.
    A. And so we’re not really talking about
    revenge. But I think when the judge was
    questioning me also, what I said was
    Christians were supposed to follow the law.
    Q. Uh-huh.
    A. And so, if the law allows for a death
    penalty, and our law allows for the death
    penalty, and we have witnesses to prove
    that—
    Q. An act?
    30               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    A. An act and the guilt and go through all
    of that, then I don’t have any adversity to
    imposing the death penalty.
    Q. Okay. That’s where I’m at right now
    with you.
    Now, because of that religious belief, it
    allows you to consider it.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Does it tell you that if you get to that
    point that you have to impose it?
    A. No.
    Q. Okay. So, basically you get to that
    point, then it is not an eye for an eye, but it’s
    an option?
    A. It’s an option because the law allows
    it and so the law also allows life without
    parole.
    The prosecutor also asked about her views of the felony
    murder rule and whether she had any “philosophical beliefs
    about that concept.”
    A. Well, not philosophically. What I
    believe is that if the law is on the books, then
    that’s what we have to go by. And if it needs
    to change, then that’s up to the legislature.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                    31
    But if that’s the law, then that’s what we have
    to apply and follow.
    Q. Okay. If you were in charge, would
    we have that kind of a law?
    A. Well, that, you know, I don’t know. I
    never aspired to be a legislator, so I don’t
    know. I mean I can’t tell you.
    You’re asking me if I agree with the law?
    Q. If you agree with the concept that
    somebody could be—
    A. Well I mean I can see—I can
    understand why we would have that type of a
    law. If you know that you’re doing something
    that is so dangerous that, you know, you could
    kill someone, then you should be responsible
    if someone dies. I mean I can understand the
    law. So I can’t say that I have a philosophical
    difference with it.
    Q. Okay. I mean but I’m not sure
    that—do you think that concept is a fair
    concept?
    A. I understand the concept. I don’t say
    it’s unfair, so—
    The trial court then asked her whether she could follow the
    law if selected as a juror, and she stated she could. She also
    32                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    stated that the death penalty was an option for her in an
    appropriate case.
    Next, the prosecutor asked about her background,
    including her application to work at the DA’s office and her
    family members that had been in prison. When asked
    whether her brother had been treated fairly, she said
    “Probably he was treated fairly, based on, you know, the little
    bit I knew about it.” She said the same of her son’s
    treatment.
    The prosecutor provided six reasons for striking Gibson:
    Gibson, she was a 49-year-old lawyer
    working for SBC. She has a son who is 33, so
    she had a son when she was 16. I find that a
    problem. She was a school teacher in 1992 to
    1995, indicates fairly liberal. She has a
    doctorate; she’s a lawyer. I don’t want a
    lawyer on my jury. I’ve never liked having
    lawyers on juries. They’re know-it-alls, they
    inject themselves into the case, they think
    they can do a better job.
    She said with respect to the criminal
    justice system, “It serves us. However, it
    could improve.”
    In addition, page 7, she had numerous
    relatives that have served time in the
    penitentiary. In the late ‘60s, her [brother]
    served time in Santa Rita, brother-in-law and
    cousins who also served time. A lot of the
    criminal element in her family. I just can’t
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     33
    have somebody on my jury that has those
    kinds of problems.
    The trial judge then noted that in a recent Los Angeles case,
    a jury verdict had been overturned because there were
    allegations that a lawyer on the jury “sort of took over the
    jury and was making false representations as to the law . . . so
    that’s always a problem with a lawyer upstairs.” The
    prosecutor responded, “It is a problem. That’s precisely why
    I don’t want lawyers on my juries.” The prosecutor
    continued:
    At page 6992, she said when she was
    younger she never thought the death penalty
    should be an available option because she
    didn’t think that anyone had the right or
    authority to impose death. She also said that
    she was–6993–a born-again Christian and her
    Christian beliefs would influence the way she
    thinks.
    When asked about the felony murder rule,
    she wouldn’t directly answer the question
    about how she felt about it; she dodged it.
    Page 7005, she went back to Christian
    beliefs: you have to have two to three
    witnesses, then you can consider punishment.
    I emphasize the word “consider.” That
    doesn’t mean it’s really on the table,
    especially given her other answers.
    THE COURT: Okay. I think I’ve heard
    enough.
    34                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    The trial court held that all of the prosecutor’s justifications
    were “racially neutral and . . . valid” and were “good, cogent
    reason[s].”
    We evaluate the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation in
    light of the evidence in the record. The prosecutor’s
    statements that Gibson was a single mother, had a legal
    education, was a school teacher and had relatives with
    criminal histories are all consistent with the record. Given
    Gibson’s statements that she had earlier opposed the death
    penalty but had changed her mind after becoming a born
    again Christian based on her reading of the Bible, her views
    that the Bible required two or three witnesses before
    imposing the death penalty, and her nonresponsive answers
    to questions regarding her position on the felony-murder rule,
    the prosecutor’s statement that Gibson’s Christian beliefs
    might affect her decision on the death penalty are supported
    by the record.
    The California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative
    juror analysis, and determined that, unlike Gibson, none of
    the seated jurors had attended law school. Although several
    of the seated jurors had relatives with prior criminal histories,
    none had multiple relatives with criminal histories, as did
    Gibson. Finally, none of the seated jurors expressed concerns
    with the death penalty or qualified their willingness to apply
    the death penalty, as did Gibson with the requirement that
    there be “two or three witnesses.” Based on our review of the
    voir dire testimony, the California Court of Appeal’s
    comparative juror analysis was not an unreasonable
    determination of the facts.
    We now turn to the state appellate court’s ruling. The
    California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      35
    determination based on the prosecutor’s explanation of his
    concern: (i) that Gibson’s Christian beliefs and statement that
    she could consider the death penalty on the evidence of two
    or three witnesses could impact her decision whether to
    impose the death penalty; (ii) that Gibson’s legal training
    would cause problems, based on the prosecutor’s experience
    with lawyers on juries; and (iii) that Gibson had numerous
    relatives with criminal histories.
    The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the
    trial court properly assessed the credibility of the prosecutor’s
    statements regarding Gibson was not objectively
    unreasonable. Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170. Rather than
    expressing straightforward personal views about imposing the
    death penalty, Gibson provided an unusual faith-based
    explanation that she had overcome her prior opposition to the
    death penalty when she became a Christian, because
    Christians could consider imposing the death penalty on the
    evidence of “two or three witnesses.” The prosecutor could
    have reasonably believed that such responses made Gibson
    appear unpredictable and raised the question whether Gibson
    would require evidence (such as eyewitness statements)
    beyond what the law requires before considering a vote for
    the death penalty. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for
    the state court of appeal to conclude that the prosecutor was
    genuinely “uncomfortable” with Gibson’s responses.
    The state court could reasonably determine that the
    prosecutor’s explanation that Gibson’s legal training would
    cause problems, based on the prosecutor’s experience with
    lawyers on juries, was not pretextual. Sifuentes argues that
    the prosecutor’s willingness to accept two other highly
    educated jurors (an MIT graduate and a person with
    undergraduate legal training) shows that the prosecutor’s
    36               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    concerns with Gibson’s legal training were pretext. He also
    points out that she had never actually practiced law. But
    unlike Gibson, the two seated jurors had not graduated from
    law school or become members of the bar, and while Gibson
    never practiced law, the prosecutor may have reasonably been
    concerned that a person with legal training would exhibit the
    behaviors on a jury that the prosecutor feared.
    The state court also held that the prosecutor’s explanation
    that Gibson had numerous relatives with a criminal history
    was not pretextual. Sifuentes argues that the fact that the
    prosecutor retained white jurors who had family members
    with criminal histories demonstrates his dismissal of Gibson
    for the same reason was pretext. But even though the white
    jurors had closely related family members who had
    committed grave crimes, none of the seated jurors had
    multiple family members with criminal backgrounds, and
    therefore the trial court could determine that the prosecutor’s
    greater concern regarding Gibson’s view of the criminal
    justice system was genuine.
    Sifuentes argues that the weakness of the prosecutor’s
    other reasons, such as the prosecutor’s explanation that
    Gibson had been a single mother and a school teacher, were
    so weak that they raise the inference that the prosecutor
    struck her on discriminatory grounds. We disagree. There is
    no evidence the prosecutor viewed white single mothers
    differently from black ones. None of these less persuasive
    reasons is discriminatory and there is no evidence that these
    less persuasive reasons “motivated in substantial part” the
    prosecutor’s decision. See Cook v. LaMarque, 
    593 F.3d 810
    ,
    815 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Snyder, 
    552 U.S. at 485
    );
    Collins, 
    546 U.S. at
    340–41. Even when a prosecutor relies
    on one impermissible reason for striking a juror, there is no
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      37
    Batson violation if “[t]he prosecutor provided a number of
    other permissible and plausible race-neutral reasons.”
    Collins, 
    546 U.S. at
    340–41. Applying our doubly deferential
    standard, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the
    trial court properly assessed the credibility of the prosecutor’s
    statements as to Gibson was not objectively unreasonable.
    The district court erred in holding otherwise.
    C
    Because we can affirm the trial court on any basis
    supported by the record, see Moreno v. Baca, 
    431 F.3d 633
    ,
    638 (9th Cir. 2005), Sifuentes argues that even if we disagree
    with the district court’s rulings regarding Thompson and
    Gibson, we should affirm the district court’s grant of the
    habeas petition on the ground that the state appellate court
    unreasonably determined the facts in upholding the trial
    court’s Batson determination with regard to six other jurors.
    We consider each of the jurors in turn.
    1. We first consider juror Jackson. A review of the
    record shows that Jackson expressed concerns about the death
    penalty. In his questionnaire, he stated that he was not sure
    if he would vote for the death penalty, stating, “[a]s more
    [and] more new methods of investigation show the old flaws,
    I am becoming less inclined toward it.” During voir dire, he
    stated that he would be hesitant to impose the death penalty
    because he doubted the fairness of the criminal justice
    system. In striking Jackson, the prosecutor referred to
    Jackson as a “resident of Berkeley, . . . a hotbed of anti-death-
    penalty people.” The prosecutor also expressed concern that
    Jackson had “problems with the system with respect to the
    fairness of the death penalty”; for instance, he stated “‘I don’t
    know if I can consciously end someone’s life.’” The trial
    38               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    court concluded that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for
    striking Jackson were credible. The California Court of
    Appeal conducted a comparative juror analysis. Based on its
    comparison of seated jurors, the state court rejected
    Sifuentes’s argument that the prosecutor’s explanations for
    striking Sifuentes were pretextual because other seated jurors
    lived in Berkeley and expressed similar concerns about the
    death penalty.
    We now evaluate the prosecutor’s race-neutral
    explanations in light of the evidence in the record. The
    prosecutor’s characterization of Jackson’s statements as
    showing reluctance to impose the death penalty was not
    contrary to the evidence. However, the prosecutor’s belief
    that Jackson lived in Berkeley and that he said “I don’t know
    if I can consciously end someone’s life” was an error: those
    were true about juror Jasper, not Jackson. Sifuentes argues
    that the prosecutor’s mistaken attribution of statements to
    Jackson that were made by another black juror demonstrates
    the prosecutor’s bias. While a prosecutor’s credibility may
    be questioned if the prosecutor “mischaracterizes a juror’s
    testimony in a manner completely contrary to the juror’s
    stated beliefs,” a prosecutor’s “mistake in good faith, such as
    an innocent transposition of juror information,” does not
    support a finding that the prosecutor is not credible. Aleman,
    723 F.3d at 982. Here, the state court found that the
    prosecutor’s error in attributing Jasper’s statements to
    Jackson’s was a “mistake in good faith,” because Jackson
    expressed similar reservations. Based on our review of the
    record, this conclusion was not an unreasonable
    determination of the facts. Accordingly, applying our doubly
    deferential standard, and giving the state court the benefit of
    the doubt, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     39
    the prosecutor was credible is not an objectively unreasonable
    determination of the facts.
    2. Based on our review of the record, Juror Norman
    expressed both religious and personal qualms with the death
    penalty, including stating that he was against it “for the most
    part” and would eliminate it in California if given the choice.
    He also stated that he could impose it as part of his “duty,” or
    “if [he] had to, yes,” prompting the court to step in several
    times to make sure he was actually eligible to serve as a juror
    in a death penalty case. The record also shows that Norman
    failed to appear in court twice.            The prosecutor’s
    characterization of Norman’s statements, and his failure to
    appear on two occasions, were not contrary to the evidence.
    The California Court of Appeal did not conduct a
    comparative juror analysis. Conducting this analysis in the
    first instance, we conclude that none of the seated jurors
    expressed the serious concerns about the death penalty stated
    by Norman; none of the seated jurors stated that they would
    have voted against retaining the death penalty if it were on
    the ballot; and none of the seated jurors failed to appear.
    Sifuentes argues that Norman was a probation supervisor
    and, from some of the trial court’s questions, there appeared
    to be initial concerns that he would be sympathetic to the
    prosecution. He acknowledges that Norman expressed
    several times his negative views of the death penalty, but
    points out that Norman also responded he could impose the
    penalty if warranted. Norman’s significant qualms about
    imposing the death penalty do not suggest the strike was
    pretextual, or that the trial judge and state appellate court
    were objectively unreasonable in accepting the prosecutor’s
    justification. Thus, applying our doubly deferential standard,
    the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial
    40                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    court did not err in concluding that the prosecutor’s reasons
    for striking Norman were genuine was not an unreasonable
    determination of the facts.
    3. The record shows that prospective juror Jasper
    expressed significant reservations about the death penalty.
    She stated that “I don’t know if I can consciously end
    someone’s life” and “I don’t know if I could live with
    thinking I’ve basically killed this person. That’s pretty
    tough.” When the trial judge questioned her, she said she had
    mixed feelings but could impose the death penalty “[i]f it’s
    justifiable.” Jasper also stated that she believed the criminal
    justice system “is biased toward those who do not have
    enough money to pay for a decent lawyer,” and that her
    brother’s friend had been charged with murder. Jasper also
    stated that she could serve as a juror without risking her job,
    and her employer’s request that she be allowed a
    postponement because of a co-worker’s maternity leave
    “really doesn’t matter for me.”
    In explaining his reasons for striking Jasper, the
    prosecutor expressed concerns about her “mixed feelings on
    whether or not killing someone is the right thing to do,” about
    her remarks that the criminal justice system is biased, and that
    her familiarity with her brother’s friend who was charged
    with murder would interfere with her ability to sit in a murder
    case. The prosecutor also remarked on the fact that she was
    a single mother with a six year old who came to court
    wearing leather pants. The prosecutor further noted Jasper’s
    remark about her co-worker’s maternity leave, and stated his
    view that she was not concerned about hardship to her
    employer. Finally, he stated that Jasper was not friendly to
    him.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                    41
    The California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative
    juror analysis regarding Jasper’s views on the death penalty
    and criminal justice system, and determined that her
    statements were more negative than Thompson and Gibson,
    and that none of the seated jurors identified by Sifuentes
    knew someone who was charged with murder. Based on our
    independent review of the record, the state court’s
    conclusions are not an unreasonable determination of the
    facts in the record. Nor did the prosecutor otherwise misstate
    the evidence.
    Sifuentes argues that the record shows that the
    prosecutor’s reasons for striking Jasper were pretextual. He
    claims that the prosecutor’s reference to her single-mother
    status and attire showed that the prosecutor stereotyped black
    women and relied on reasons unrelated to the case. Sifuentes
    also argues that the record does not reflect Jasper’s lack of
    interest in a career.
    Although the explanations based on Jasper’s appearance
    and personal characteristics are not persuasive, they are race
    neutral on their face. The trial court could reasonably
    determine that there was no Batson violation because “[t]he
    prosecutor provided a number of other permissible and
    plausible race-neutral reasons.” Collins, 
    546 U.S. at
    340–41.
    Finally, Sifuentes notes that the trial court made no findings
    that Jasper had an unfriendly demeanor. But there is no
    clearly established Supreme Court rule that “a
    demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did
    not observe or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor.” Thaler v.
    Haynes, 
    559 U.S. 43
    , 48 (2010). Applying our doubly
    deferential standard, the state appellate court’s conclusion
    that the trial court did not err in crediting the prosecutor’s
    reasons was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.
    42               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    4. The relevant portions of the record show that juror
    Webster expressed opposition to the death penalty. He stated
    in his questionnaire that “I hope some day it will be
    considered uncivilized,” and that he would vote against it if
    it were on the ballot. During voir dire, he said that he might
    be willing to impose the death penalty for people like
    “Charlie Manson,” but that it would be “very difficult” for
    him to do so. When asked how he felt about the death
    penalty “on a scale of 1 to 10, between Mother Theresa and
    Rambo,” he responded “Oh. 7.” In response to the court’s
    questioning, Webster stated that “it’s unlikely” he would vote
    to execute non-shooters, but that he’d “like to think it’s not
    impossible.” The trial judge denied a challenge for cause.
    In explaining why he struck Webster, the prosecutor
    expressed concern that Webster generally opposed the death
    penalty and would be unlikely to vote for it. He also called
    Webster “hostile and argumentative,” and noted that Webster
    had been treated for depression in 1995. The trial court
    concluded that the prosecutor’s reasons were racially neutral
    and valid.
    Reviewing the trial court’s conclusion in light of the
    evidence in the record, the prosecutor’s concerns about
    Webster’s strong opposition to the death penalty are
    supported by the evidence. Webster stated that he hoped the
    death penalty would one day be eliminated, that he had a high
    threshold for imposing it, and he would be unlikely to impose
    it. The California Court of Appeal did not conduct a
    comparative juror analysis, so we conduct one here in the first
    instance. None of the seated jurors expressed as strong
    opposition to the death penalty as Webster, and none stated
    they would have voted against retaining the death penalty if
    it were on the ballot. Therefore, a comparative juror analysis
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     43
    does not raise the inference that the prosecutor’s reasons were
    pretextual.
    Sifuentes argues that the prosecutor confused Webster
    with Massey when he stated that Webster was “hostile and
    argumentative.” The record indicates that any confusion
    between Webster and Massey was a “mistake in good faith,”
    Aleman, 723 F.3d at 982, and does not raise the inference that
    the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual.
    We now turn to the California Court of Appeal’s
    conclusion that the trial court properly accepted the
    prosecutor’s reasons. This determination was not an
    objectively unreasonable determination of the facts, because
    the trial court could reasonably determine that the
    prosecutor’s primary motivation in striking Webster was his
    opposition to the death penalty. See Cook, 
    593 F.3d at 815
    ;
    Collins, 
    546 U.S. at
    340–41.
    5. We next turn to juror Massey, and review the relevant
    portion of the record. In response to the jury questionnaire,
    Massey stated that his sister was the only family member who
    had been charged with a crime. The court later learned that
    Massey’s twin brother had a four-page rap sheet listing
    multiple arrests. In response to questioning, Massey insisted
    that he did not know of his brother’s arrests.
    Massey initially gave equivocal responses to the court’s
    question whether he could impose the death penalty, stating,
    “I’ve never really thought about that,” and that he did “not
    really” have “any feelings” about the death penalty. When
    the prosecutor asked whether he could make the “hard call”
    of imposing the death penalty, Massey responded, “I haven’t
    thought about that, because I’ve never had to do that.” When
    44               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    pressed further, Massey stated that he could see himself
    choosing to impose the death penalty on non-shooters
    because they were eligible for the death penalty under the
    law.
    The prosecutor gave several reasons for striking Massey.
    First, the prosecutor was concerned that Massey “obviously
    didn’t like [him].” He believed Massey was lying when he
    claimed he was unaware of his brother’s arrests, given that
    the record showed the twins lived at the same address. The
    prosecutor also noted that Massey was a postal worker, and
    “they’re lazy.” Finally, the prosecutor stated that Massey was
    “totally nonresponsive” to questions regarding the death
    penalty, and he “said they’re all eligible because the law says
    they are eligible, not that he’d ever do it.” The trial court
    concluded these were valid, race-neutral reasons. The
    California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative juror
    analysis and concluded that, while some of the seated jurors
    also gave short, “snippy” responses to the prosecutor’s
    questions, their answers did not raise red flags about the
    jurors’ inclination to impose the death penalty. The
    California Court of Appeal then concluded that the trial court
    properly accepted the prosecutor’s reasons.
    In evaluating this ruling, we first conclude that the
    prosecutor’s explanation about Massey’s lack of credibility
    and nonresponsive answers was consistent with the record.
    Although the prosecutor’s stereotype of postal workers is not
    persuasive, it is race neutral on its face, and the trial court
    could have reasonably determined that “[t]he prosecutor
    provided a number of other permissible and plausible race-
    neutral reasons.” Collins, 
    546 U.S. at
    340–41. Accordingly,
    the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial
    court’s credibility finding was supported by substantial
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                    45
    evidence is not an objectively unreasonable determination of
    the facts.
    6. Finally, we turn to juror Skruggs and review the
    relevant portions of the record. In response to the juror
    questionnaire, Skruggs stated that she was a 27-year-old with
    a seven-year-old son. She had a prior conviction for forgery
    for writing a series of fraudulent checks. During voir dire,
    Skruggs expressed equivocal views regarding the death
    penalty. While she stated that she could vote to execute a
    non-shooter, if, for example, “someone was egging him on,”
    she also stated that the death penalty was “not necessarily
    something that I would be able to place on someone that did
    not actually commit the shooting.”
    The prosecutor gave three reasons for striking Skruggs:
    she was a single mother who had a child at age 20, which
    “shows a lack of responsibility”; she wrote a series of
    fraudulent checks, which “indicates dishonesty”; and she
    expressed conflicting views of the death penalty. The trial
    court concluded that these reasons were valid and race
    neutral. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal conducted
    a comparative juror analysis. The court concluded that the
    one seated juror who expressed similar reservations about
    imposing the death penalty on a non-shooter was
    distinguishable from Skruggs, because that juror did not have
    a prior criminal history. The California Court of Appeal
    upheld the trial court’s determination that the prosecutor was
    credible in offering race-neutral reasons.
    Based on our review, the prosecutor’s explanations that
    he struck Skruggs because she had a prior conviction and
    gave conflicting views of the death penalty are supported by
    evidence in the record. Sifuentes argues that one of the
    46                SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    prosecutor’s reasons for striking Skruggs, that she was a
    single mother who was irresponsible, demonstrates the
    prosecutor’s negative stereotyping of black women. He also
    argues that the prosecutor’s statement that he struck Skruggs
    due to her equivocal views on the death penalty was
    pretextual, because other jurors had expressed similar views.
    But Skruggs’s prior conviction was a valid and race-neutral
    reason for striking her, and the California Court of Appeal
    could reasonably conclude that this conviction made her
    distinguishable from other seated jurors. Applying our
    doubly deferential standard, the California Court of Appeal
    did not make an objectively unreasonable determination of
    the facts in upholding the trial court’s ruling that the
    prosecutor’s reasons were genuine.
    D
    Applying the deference to the fact finder’s credibility
    determination required by Batson, the California Court of
    Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in
    determining that the prosecutor was credible. Based on our
    own review of the record, including conducting a
    comparative juror analysis in the first instance where the state
    appellate court has not done so, and applying our doubly
    deferential standard, we conclude that the California Court of
    Appeal’s decision was not based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts. Accordingly, we may not grant
    Sifuentes the writ of habeas corpus. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(2).
    IV
    Sifuentes argues that we can uphold the district court’s
    grant of the writ on the alternative ground that the trial court
    erred in precluding him from rebutting the prosecutor’s
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      47
    explanations for four of his strikes of prospective jurors, and
    this error was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson,
    
    507 U.S. 619
     (1993).
    A
    At trial, Sifuentes made three motions under Batson. In
    his first motion, he argued that the prosecutor’s strikes of
    prospective jurors Jackson, Norman, and Jasper were
    purposely discriminatory on the basis of race. He raised the
    same claim in his second motion with respect to the
    prosecutor’s strikes of prospective jurors Webster and
    Massey. The trial court held that Sifuentes had made out a
    prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and so the
    burden shifted to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral
    explanation. After the prosecutor provided race-neutral
    explanations, Sifuentes’s counsel asked the court for an
    opportunity to rebut the proffered reasons. The trial court
    denied the request, explaining, “This isn’t argument. I
    already made a prima facie finding. You put your statements
    on the record; now the district attorney has to justify his
    challenges. That’s the way it works.”
    On appeal, the California Court of Appeal indicated that
    the trial court had erred in failing to permit the defense
    counsel to address the prosecutor’s reasons. In reaching this
    conclusion, the court relied on the California Supreme
    Court’s decision in People v. Ayala, which held that it was
    error “as a matter of state law” for a trial court to conduct an
    ex parte hearing on a Batson motion, but that such error “was
    harmless under state law and that, if federal error occurred, it,
    too, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of
    federal law.” 
    24 Cal. 4th 243
    , 262, 264 (2000) (citing People
    v. Watson, 
    46 Cal. 2d 818
    , 836 (1956) and Chapman v.
    48                  SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 (1967), respectively).5 Relying
    on the reasoning in People v. Ayala, the California Court of
    Appeal concluded that the trial court’s error “was also
    harmless whether we apply Chapman or Watson standard,”
    because of “the trial court’s findings that the prospective
    African-American jurors were challenged for proper, race-
    neutral reasons.”
    B
    Under AEDPA, we must determine whether the
    California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Sifuentes’ claim
    “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
    as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1). As a threshold matter, the Supreme
    Court has expressly declined to decide whether a defendant’s
    constitutional rights are violated when the trial court declines
    to allow the defendant to participate in the trial court’s Batson
    colloquy with the prosecutor. Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2197
    .
    Instead, the Supreme Court assumed “for the sake of
    argument” that the habeas petitioner’s “constitutional rights
    were violated when the trial court heard the prosecution’s
    justifications for its strikes outside the presence of the
    defense.” 
    Id.
     Further, no Supreme Court case requires
    rebuttal during Batson hearings, and Batson explicitly
    declined “to formulate particular procedures to be followed,”
    5
    The subsequent history of People v. Ayala is significant here. On
    habeas review, we held that People v. Ayala was wrongly decided because
    the trial court’s error was not harmless, and granted defendant’s habeas
    petition. See Ayala v. Wong, 
    756 F.3d 656
    , 660 (9th Cir. 2013). Our
    decision was then reversed by the Supreme Court. See Davis v. Ayala,
    
    135 S. Ct. 2187
     (2015).
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      49
    
    476 U.S. at 99
    . However, we need not reach the question
    whether the trial court’s decision to preclude Sifuentes from
    rebutting the prosecutor’s explanation was contrary to or an
    unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
    Court precedent. Rather, we follow Ayala’s lead and assume
    for the sake of argument that the trial court’s conduct, which
    the California Court of Appeal identified as an error, was a
    federal constitutional error. Therefore, again like the
    Supreme Court in Ayala, we turn to the question whether any
    such error was prejudicial. See Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2197
    .
    C
    In Ayala v. Davis, the Supreme Court provided a
    framework for a federal court to address a habeas petitioner’s
    claim that a state court erred in determining that a
    constitutional error was harmless.
    The Court first noted that on direct appeal, “the
    harmlessness standard is the one prescribed in Chapman,”
    namely that a federal constitutional error is harmless if the
    court can declare “that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2197
     (quoting Chapman,
    
    386 U.S. at 24
    ); see also Deck v. Jenkins, No. 13-55130, slip
    op. at 62 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2016) (“even on direct review a
    constitutional trial error will not warrant reversal if it was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). By contrast, in a
    collateral proceeding, habeas petitioners “are not entitled to
    habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that
    it resulted in ‘actual prejudice’” under Brecht v. Abrahamson.
    Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2197
     (quoting Brecht, 
    507 U.S. at 637
    );
    see also Deck, No. 13-55130, slip op. at 62 (“In a collateral
    proceeding, the test is more forgiving to the prosecution.”).
    “The inquiry under Brecht is not whether the federal habeas
    50               SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    court could definitively say that there were no winning
    arguments that the defense could have made,” Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2203
    , but rather whether the evidence in the record
    raises “grave doubts about whether the trial judge would have
    ruled differently.” 
    Id.
     (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch,
    
    513 U.S. 432
    , 436 (1995)) (internal quotation marks and
    alteration omitted). A conclusion that such grave doubts exist
    “requires much more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the
    result of the hearing would have been different.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Brecht, 
    507 U.S. at 637
    ). Rather, “[t]he Brecht standard
    reflects the view that a State is not to be put to the arduous
    task of retrying a defendant based on mere speculation that
    the defendant was prejudiced by trial error; the court must
    find that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the error.”
    
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing
    Calderon v. Coleman, 
    525 U.S. 141
    , 146 (1998)).
    While a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief must meet
    the Brecht standard, “that does not mean, as the Ninth Circuit
    thought, that a state court’s harmlessness determination has
    no significance under Brecht.” Id. at 2198. Although in Fry
    v. Pliler, 
    551 U.S. 112
    , 120 (2007), the Supreme Court “held
    that the Brecht standard ‘subsumes’ the requirements that
    § 2254(d) imposes when a federal habeas petitioner contests
    a state court’s determination that a constitutional error was
    harmless under Chapman . . . . [t]he Fry Court did not
    hold—and would have had no possible basis for
    holding—that Brecht somehow abrogates the limitation on
    federal habeas relief that § 2254(d) plainly sets out.” Ayala,
    
    135 S. Ct. at 2198
    . Accordingly, “[w]hile a federal habeas
    court need not formally apply both Brecht and
    AEDPA/Chapman,” AEDPA nevertheless “sets forth a
    precondition to the grant of habeas relief.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks and alteration omitted).
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                     51
    After explaining the relationship between Brecht and
    AEDPA, Ayala then explained how federal courts must apply
    the AEDPA precondition subsumed in Brecht. AEDPA
    “demands an inquiry into whether a prisoner's ‘claim’ has
    been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court; if it has,
    AEDPA’s highly deferential standards kick in.” 
    Id.
     If a state
    court concludes that “any federal error was harmless beyond
    a reasonable doubt under Chapman,” such a decision
    “undoubtedly constitutes an adjudication of [the prisoner’s]
    constitutional claim ‘on the merits’” for purposes of AEDPA.
    
    Id.
     Under these circumstances, “a federal habeas court
    cannot grant [the prisoner] relief unless the state court's
    rejection of his claim (1) was contrary to or involved an
    unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or
    (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
    
    Id.
     Under this standard, a court may not overturn the state
    court’s decision “unless that court applied Chapman in an
    objectively unreasonable manner.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted); see also 
    id. at 2199
     (“When a Chapman
    decision is reviewed under AEDPA, a federal court may not
    award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness
    determination itself was unreasonable.”). Because “a
    state-court decision is not unreasonable if fairminded jurists
    could disagree on its correctness,” id. (quoting Harrington v.
    Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 101 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
    and alteration omitted), a habeas petitioner must show that
    the state court's harmless error determination “was so lacking
    in justification that there was an error well understood and
    comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
    fairminded disagreement.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Richter, 
    562 U.S. at 103
    ).
    In sum, a petitioner “necessarily cannot satisfy” the
    Brecht requirement of showing that he was “actually
    52                  SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON
    prejudiced” by the state court’s error in receiving the
    prosecution’s explanation for a challenged strike without the
    defense present “if a fairminded jurist could agree with the
    [state appellate court] that this procedure met the Chapman
    standard of harmlessness.” Id. at 2199. By the same token,
    if a petitioner does satisfy the Brecht requirement of showing
    that an error resulted in “actual prejudice,” then the petitioner
    necessarily must have shown that the state court’s
    determination that the error was harmless was objectively
    unreasonable. See Deck, No. 13-55130, slip op. at 63 (“A
    determination that the error resulted in actual prejudice
    necessarily means that the state court’s harmlessness
    determination was not merely incorrect, but objectively
    unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).6
    D
    With this framework in mind, we now consider whether,
    assuming that the trial court’s denial of Sifuentes’s request to
    rebut the prosecutor’s proffered reasons was a federal
    constitutional error, any such error was prejudicial. See
    Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2197
    . Because AEDPA “sets forth a
    precondition to the grant of habeas relief,” 
    id. at 2198
    , we
    begin by considering whether Sifuentes’s claim has been
    adjudicated on the merits. Here, the California Court of
    Appeal determined that the trial court’s error was harmless
    under Chapman. Because this constitutes an adjudication of
    the claim on the merits, “the highly deferential AEDPA
    standard applies, [and] we may not overturn the [state court’s]
    6
    Of course, because the Brecht standard subsumes the AEDPA analysis,
    an error could be objectively unreasonable under AEDPA and still not be
    actually prejudicial.
    SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON                      53
    decision unless that court applied Chapman in an objectively
    unreasonable manner.” 
    Id.
    Here a reasonable jurist could conclude that the California
    Court of Appeal’s application of Chapman was not
    objectively unreasonable. The prosecutor challenged each of
    the jurors for race-neutral reasons, and the trial court listened
    to and evaluated each of those reasons and determined that
    they were genuine. Sifuentes has not identified how an
    opportunity to respond to the prosecutor’s explanations for
    striking any of the potential jurors could have made any
    difference to the trial court and state appellate court’s
    acceptance of the prosecutor’s credibility. As in Ayala, there
    is “no support for the suggestion” that Sifuentes’s attorney, if
    allowed to participate, would have been able to convince the
    trial court that the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual. 
    Id. at 2205
    . We therefore conclude that the California Court of
    Appeal’s determination that any error was harmless beyond
    a reasonable doubt was not an unreasonable application of
    Chapman. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1). Because “a
    fairminded jurist could agree” with the state court’s Chapman
    determination, Sifuentes “necessarily cannot satisfy” the
    Brecht requirement of showing that he was “actually
    prejudiced” by the state court’s error. Id. at 2199. Moreover,
    there is no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have
    ruled differently had he allowed rebuttal, and therefore we do
    not have a “grave doubt” that Sifuentes was actually
    prejudiced. See Ayala, 
    135 S. Ct. at
    2197–98.
    REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to
    DISMISS the petition.