United States v. Chang Ru Meng Backman , 817 F.3d 662 ( 2016 )


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  •                    FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 14-10078
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                   1:12-cr-00015-RVM-1
    CHANG RU MENG BACKMAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.                OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern Mariana Islands
    Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    February 11, 2016—University of Hawaii Manoa,
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Filed March 30, 2016
    Before: Susan P. Graber, Jay S. Bybee,
    and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Graber
    2                 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    SUMMARY*
    Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed a conviction and sentence for sex
    trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 1591(a).
    The panel held that because § 1591(a) does not require
    commission of a sex act, the district court correctly did not
    give an instruction requiring the jury to find that the alleged
    coercion was the but-for cause of the victim’s commercial
    sex acts. The panel held that the commerce element in
    § 1591(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement, and that the
    district court therefore correctly did not give an instruction
    requiring the jury to find that the defendant knew her actions
    affected interstate or foreign commerce.
    The panel held that sufficient evidence supported the
    jury’s finding of an effect on interstate commerce.
    The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to admit, under
    Fed. R. Evid. 412, evidence that the victims engaged in
    prostitution after the indictment period, where the motion did
    not specify the evidence sought to be admitted. The panel
    held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying the defendant an eleventh-hour opportunity to amend
    the Rule 412 motion. The panel held that exclusion of the
    proffered evidence was within constitutional bounds because
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                      3
    the exclusion was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
    purposes of the notice requirement, in that the district court
    could not conduct the in camera review and hearing
    mandated by Rule 412 without knowledge of the identity of
    the victims and the nature of the evidence.
    The panel held that the district court correctly applied a
    vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.
    § 3A1.1(b)(1).
    COUNSEL
    David G. Banes (argued), O’Connor Berman Dotts & Banes,
    Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Garth R. Backe (argued) and Ross K. Naughton, Assistant
    United States Attorneys, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    OPINION
    GRABER, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant Chang Ru Meng Backman appeals her
    conviction and sentence on one count of sex trafficking by
    force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).
    The jury convicted Defendant of forcing into prostitution a
    Chinese woman who had been tricked into flying to Saipan
    on promises of a work visa and a legal job, when in fact the
    victim received only a tourist visa, was effectively
    imprisoned, and was told repeatedly that she had nowhere to
    turn and must engage in prostitution. On appeal, Defendant
    4              UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    argues that, under two recent Supreme Court decisions, the
    jury instructions were improper; that there was insufficient
    evidence to support the conviction; that the district court
    erred in denying her motion under Federal Rule of Evidence
    412 to admit evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct after the
    indictment period; and that the district court erred by
    applying a sentencing enhancement for a “vulnerable victim”
    under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
    (“TVPA”) criminalizes, among other acts, sex trafficking by
    force, fraud, or coercion. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The 2012
    version of the statute, which applies here, provides:
    Whoever knowingly—
    (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign
    commerce, or within the special maritime and
    territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
    recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
    obtains, or maintains by any means a person;
    or
    (2) benefits, financially or by receiving
    anything of value, from participation in a
    venture which has engaged in an act described
    in violation of paragraph (1),
    knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact,
    that means of force, threats of force, fraud,
    coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any
    combination of such means will be used to
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                       5
    cause the person to engage in a commercial
    sex act, [is guilty of a crime].
    18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012). At trial, the government
    introduced evidence that the victim was tricked into flying
    from China to Saipan on promises of a work visa and a legal
    job but that, upon arrival, she was taken to Defendant’s
    brothel, had her travel documents taken from her, and was
    coerced into prostitution by Defendant. A jury acquitted
    Defendant on two counts concerning two other alleged
    victims. But the jury convicted her on the count pertaining to
    the victim discussed in this opinion.
    At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence
    report’s calculated Guideline range, 188 to 235 months, and
    imposed a high-end sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment.
    Defendant timely appeals.
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    We review for plain error challenges to the jury
    instructions raised for the first time on appeal. United States
    v. Moreland, 
    622 F.3d 1147
    , 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2010). We
    review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence. United States
    v. Garcia, 
    768 F.3d 822
    , 827 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
    
    135 S. Ct. 1189
    (2015). We review de novo the interpretation
    of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but we review for abuse of
    discretion the district court’s exclusion of evidence. United
    States v. Torres, 
    794 F.3d 1053
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2015), petition
    for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Oct. 27, 2015) (No.
    15-6793).
    “There is an intracircuit split as to whether the standard of
    review for application of the Guidelines to the facts is de
    6              UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    novo or abuse of discretion.” United States v. Tanke,
    
    743 F.3d 1296
    , 1306 (9th Cir. 2014). “There is no need to
    resolve this split where, as here, the choice of the standard
    does not affect the outcome of the case.” 
    Id. DISCUSSION Defendant
    challenges (A) the jury instructions; (B) the
    sufficiency of the evidence; (C) the exclusion of evidence
    under Federal Rule of Evidence 412; and (D) the district
    court’s application of a “vulnerable victim” sentencing
    enhancement. We reject each of Defendant’s arguments.
    A. Jury Instructions
    Defendant argues that the jury instructions were
    erroneous because (1) the instructions did not require “but-for
    causation” pursuant to Burrage v. United States, 
    134 S. Ct. 881
    (2014); and (2) the instructions did not require
    knowledge of an effect on interstate or foreign commerce
    pursuant to Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 646
    (2009). Because Defendant did not object to the instructions
    before the district court, we review for plain error. 
    Moreland, 622 F.3d at 1165
    –66. We conclude at step one of the plain-
    error inquiry that there was no error. Accordingly, we do not
    reach the other prongs, such as whether the error was “plain.”
    1. But-for Causation
    In 
    Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 885
    , 892, the Supreme Court
    held that a statute criminalizing drug distribution when “death
    or serious bodily injury results from the use of such
    substance” required proof of but-for causation. Here, the
    statute requires that the defendant harbor a person (or take
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                      7
    another specified action) “knowing, or in reckless disregard
    of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud,
    coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination
    of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in
    a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis
    added). Defendant asserts that, under the reasoning of
    Burrage, the district court erred by not giving an instruction
    requiring the jury to find that the alleged coercion was the
    but-for cause of the victim’s commercial sex acts.
    The district court did not err by declining to apply
    Burrage here. Causation is not an element in a § 1591(a)
    prosecution, because a commercial sex act need not even
    occur: “Case law makes clear that ‘commission of a sex act
    or sexual contact’ is not an element of a conviction under
    18 U.S.C. § 1591.” United States v. Hornbuckle, 
    784 F.3d 549
    , 553 (9th Cir. 2015). “What the statute requires is that
    the defendant know in the sense of being aware of an
    established modus operandi that will in the future coerce a
    prostitute to engage in prostitution.” United States v. Brooks,
    
    610 F.3d 1186
    , 1197 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Because the statute does not require
    commission of a sex act, the court correctly refused to require
    the jury to find that Defendant caused a sex act to occur.
    2. Knowledge of an Effect on Interstate Commerce
    In 
    Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 647
    , the Supreme Court
    considered a criminal statute punishing a person who
    “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
    authority, a means of identification of another person.”
    (Emphasis omitted.) The Court held that the adverb
    “knowingly” applies to “means of identification of another
    person” so that a conviction requires that the defendant knew
    8              UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    that the identification belonged to another person. 
    Id. at 657.
    The Court reached its conclusion primarily because of “strong
    textual reasons”: “As a matter of ordinary English grammar,
    it seems natural to read the statute’s word ‘knowingly’ as
    applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime.”
    
    Id. at 650.
    Here, the statute requires proof that Defendant
    “knowingly—(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign
    commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial
    jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors,
    transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a
    person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added). Defendant
    asserts that, under the reasoning of Flores-Figueroa, the
    district court erred by not giving an instruction requiring the
    jury to find that Defendant knew that her actions affected
    interstate or foreign commerce. In essence, Defendant argues
    that, for every criminal statute, the word “knowingly” must
    apply to all subsequent phrases in the statutory text.
    We previously have rejected that general argument. In
    United States v. Stone, 
    706 F.3d 1145
    , 1146–47 (9th Cir.
    2013), the defendant argued that Flores-Figueroa required
    that we apply the adverb “knowingly” to the commerce
    element of a firearm statute. We disagreed: “[T]he Court in
    Flores-Figueroa did not announce an ‘inflexible rule of
    construction.’ Rather, statutory interpretation remains a
    contextual matter.” 
    Stone, 706 F.3d at 1147
    (citation
    omitted). Because of the firearm statute’s context and the
    fact that the interstate commerce element is purely
    jurisdictional, we held that the adverb “knowingly” did not
    apply to the commerce element of the firearm statute. 
    Id. UNITED STATES
    V. BACKMAN                      9
    Here, it is most natural to read the adverb “knowingly” in
    § 1591(a) to modify the verbs that follow: “recruits, entices,
    harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains.” The
    phrase “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce”
    describes the nature or extent of those actions but,
    grammatically, does not tie to “knowingly.” See United
    States v. Jefferson, 
    791 F.3d 1013
    , 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (holding that Flores-Figueroa does not apply to a criminal
    statute because the “statutory text and structure are not
    parallel to that of” the statute analyzed by the Supreme Court
    in Flores-Figueroa), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W.
    ___ (U.S. Feb. 3, 2016) (No. 15-8101); United States v.
    Castagana, 
    604 F.3d 1160
    , 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
    that, because the grammatical structure of the criminal statute
    at issue differed from the statute at issue in Flores-Figueroa,
    “Flores-Figueroa is simply not a useful model for
    construing” the statute at hand).
    Moreover, we agree with and adopt the Seventh Circuit’s
    persuasive explanation for rejecting the argument that the
    reasoning of Flores-Figueroa applies specifically to the
    commerce element in § 1591(a). United States v. Sawyer,
    
    733 F.3d 228
    (7th Cir. 2013). The longstanding presumption
    is that the jurisdictional element of a criminal statute has no
    mens rea. 
    Id. at 229
    (citing United States v. Feola, 
    420 U.S. 671
    , 676 n.9 (1975)). Nothing in the statute’s text or
    legislative history suggests that Congress meant to upend that
    presumption in this statute. 
    Id. at 229
    –31; cf. United States
    v. Maciel-Alcala, 
    612 F.3d 1092
    , 1101 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (“These practical considerations [about the application of the
    criminal statute at issue] are markedly different from those
    10                 UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    involved in Flores-Figueroa.”). We hold that the commerce
    element in § 1591(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement.1
    B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient on the
    interstate or foreign commerce element. We must ask
    “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319
    (1979) (emphasis omitted). Here, sufficient evidence
    demonstrated an effect on both foreign and interstate
    commerce. “[A]ny individual instance of conduct regulated
    by the TVPA need only have a de minimis effect on interstate
    commerce.” United States v. Walls, 
    784 F.3d 543
    , 548 (9th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    136 S. Ct. 226
    (2015). “[A]n act or
    transaction that is economic in nature and affects the flow of
    money in the stream of commerce to any degree affects
    interstate commerce.” 
    Id. at 548–49
    (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Here, Defendant knew that the victim had
    flown, in foreign commerce, from China to Saipan. Also, one
    of the victim’s customers paid for the sex acts by checks
    drawn on an out-of-state bank. Sufficient evidence therefore
    supported the jury’s finding of an effect on interstate or
    foreign commerce.
    1
    In addition to the Seventh Circuit, at least one other circuit has reached
    the same conclusion, albeit in a pre-Flores-Figueroa case. United States
    v. Evans, 
    476 F.3d 1176
    , 1180 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007). No circuit has
    reached the opposite conclusion.
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                   11
    C. Exclusion of Evidence under Federal Rule of
    Evidence 412
    Defendant argues that the district court erred by denying
    her motion to admit, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412,
    evidence that the victims engaged in prostitution after the
    indictment period. As relevant here, Rule 412 states:
    (a) Prohibited Uses. The following
    evidence is not admissible in a civil or
    criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
    misconduct:
    (1) evidence offered to prove that a victim
    engaged in other sexual behavior; or
    (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s
    sexual predisposition.
    ....
    (c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
    (1) Motion. If a party intends to offer
    evidence under Rule 412(b), the party
    must:
    (A) file a motion that specifically
    describes the evidence and states the
    purpose for which it is to be offered;
    (B) do so at least 14 days before trial
    unless the court, for good cause, sets a
    different time;
    12             UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    ....
    (2) Hearing. Before admitting evidence
    under this rule, the court must conduct an in
    camera hearing and give the victim and
    parties a right to attend and be heard. Unless
    the court orders otherwise, the motion, related
    materials, and the record of the hearing must
    be and remain sealed.
    On April 10, 2013, the district court presided over a
    hearing on the admissibility of certain evidence. At the end
    of the hearing, the court noted that trial was set for May 20,
    and the court turned to the issue of when any Rule 412
    motions would be due. The court noted that, under Rule
    412(c)(1)(B), the deadline is 14 days before trial “unless the
    Court for cause sets a different time.” The court then
    explained that, for scheduling reasons, the due date for a Rule
    412 motion was set at April 29, instead of May 6. The court
    gave the government until May 3 to file an opposition to any
    Rule 412 motion filed by Defendant. Finally, the court
    reaffirmed that a pretrial motions hearing would be held on
    May 8.
    Defendant filed a terse Rule 412 motion on May 3—four
    days too late. The motion did not provide any details about
    the proffered evidence, other than stating that Defendant
    sought “to introduce evidence of the alleged victims’ sexual
    conduct after the indictment period.” The motion refers to an
    attached declaration of counsel. That declaration is not much
    more specific, but it does note unspecified “sexual
    commercial activities [that] occurred while [the victims] were
    under the protection of the government.” The declaration
    also states that “these sexual commercial activities also
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                     13
    occurred immediately after [the victims] first left Defendant’s
    premises on March, 2009, and as described by [a named
    witness] in his deposition dated March 06, 2013.” That
    nearly 100-page deposition covered many topics and spanned
    a time period of many months. Significantly, the deposition
    did not refer to any of the victims’ names.
    As scheduled, the district court presided over the pretrial
    motions hearing on May 8. In response to the court’s
    questioning, Defendant’s lawyer confessed that he had
    remembered the due date as May 3, not April 29. The court
    imposed a fine of $100 on Defendant’s lawyer for the
    untimeliness but stated that the court would not hold the
    untimeliness against Defendant.
    Turning to the merits of the motion, the government’s
    lawyer raised the issue of specificity: “[W]e don’t have
    specific evidence, Your Honor, the specifics. Whether it’s in
    the form of testimony, whether it’s the form of another
    witness coming forward. We have vague references to [the
    named witness’] testimony but what testimony?” The court
    agreed:
    Rule 412 requires more details than the
    allegation that there’s some other sexual
    conduct[.] [E]ven in the declaration that you
    submitted . . . in support of the motion and
    notice is very vague. Vague as to who. We
    have three victims in this case and in regards
    to what particular instances we are dealing
    with a period from August of 2008 to March
    of 2009. So you need more particular
    information even if we were to consider it.
    14             UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    The court held that the “Rule 412 motion has failed to
    comply with Rule 412(c)(1)(A) that requires that the party
    must file a motion that specifically describes the evidence.”
    Defendant’s lawyer then moved to amend the motion, which
    the government lawyer “vehemently oppose[d].” The court
    ruled: “I am denying the defendant’s motion for [Rule] 412
    admission for any sexual conduct of the alleged victims
    pursuant to Rule [412(c)] for failing to specifically describe
    the evidence and your request to amend your motion because
    it is untimely and given the lack of opportunity that will be
    given to the Government, is denied.” The court elaborated:
    A lot of the contents in your motion, as
    well as the declaration, are more conclusory
    and general reference. Again, we are dealing
    with three victims. When we discussed the
    issue of the Rule 15 deposition, I myself
    pointed out the only names I heard that [the
    witness] referenced were, I believe, [two
    common first names] and no one ever
    attached those names to any of the three
    victims that were actually named in the
    indictment.
    So your declaration doesn’t even help me
    pinpoint this information as to which victim
    and how this is relevant to the case. So on the
    face of your own motion and declaration, this
    is far short of the notice requirement to give
    the Government an opportunity to properly
    respond by any particular arguments of fact or
    law.
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                     15
    We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Defendant’s motions. The Rule
    requires that the party “file a motion that specifically
    describes the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(c)(1)(A). That
    requirement makes sense in light of another of the Rule’s
    procedural requirements—this one imposed on the
    court—that, “[b]efore admitting evidence under this rule, the
    court must conduct an in camera hearing and give the victim
    and parties a right to attend and be heard.” Fed. R. Evid.
    412(c)(2). Because Defendant’s Rule 412 motion specified
    neither the precise evidence sought to be admitted nor the
    particular victims at issue, the court was unable to comply
    with the Rule’s procedural requirements. Given all the
    circumstances, including that trial was scheduled for less than
    two weeks from the date of the hearing and that consideration
    of an amended motion would require a response from the
    government and an additional hearing involving the parties
    and the victims, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
    Defendant an eleventh-hour opportunity to amend the Rule
    412 motion.
    We also conclude that the exclusion of the proffered
    evidence was within constitutional bounds, because the
    exclusion was “neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
    purposes of the notice requirement.” LaJoie v. Thompson,
    
    217 F.3d 663
    , 670 (9th Cir. 2000). As just noted, the district
    court did not deny the motion on timeliness grounds (even
    though the motion was late); instead, the court denied the
    motion because it was vague as to the precise nature of the
    evidence and because it failed to identify the victims.
    Without knowledge of the identity of the victims and the
    nature of the evidence, the court could not conduct the in
    camera review and hearing mandated by the Rule.
    16              UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    Moreover, this case is unlike LaJoie in an important
    respect. There, the government “conceded that [the
    proffered] evidence was relevant.” 
    Id. at 671.
    Here, by
    contrast, to the extent that we can discern the nature of
    Defendant’s proffered evidence, its relevance, if any, is slight.
    We doubt that evidence that the victim engaged in
    commercial sex acts after she had been coerced into
    prostitution has a bearing on whether Defendant earlier took
    coercive actions. But, even assuming some relevance, the
    court’s exclusion of the vaguely and insufficiently described
    evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
    purposes behind Rule 412's procedural requirements.
    D. “Vulnerable Victim” Enhancement
    The district court imposed a two-level sentencing
    enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1): “If the
    defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the
    offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels.” The
    district court found that the victim qualified as a vulnerable
    victim for many reasons: She was tricked into arriving on the
    false promise of a work visa, when all she actually had was
    a tourist visa that prevented her from working legally; she
    “had no ties or family or friends on Saipan”; she “did not
    speak or read or understand any English whatsoever”; she
    needed to earn money for “her son, due to an injury he
    sustained”; “she was effectively under lock and key, in that
    she was limited in her movement, when and where she could
    go [and she] was always accompanied by [Defendant] or her
    agent”; and “she was repeatedly informed of the fact that she
    had nowhere else to turn to, and that if she did not comply,
    she would not be able to earn any other income, because of
    her illegal Immigration status.” See United States v. Peters,
    
    962 F.2d 1410
    , 1417 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that, in
    UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN                       17
    determining vulnerability under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1,             the
    sentencing court may consider “the characteristics of         the
    defendant’s chosen victim, the victim’s reaction to           the
    criminal conduct, and the circumstances surrounding           the
    criminal act”).
    The Guideline “applies to offenses involving an unusually
    vulnerable victim in which the defendant knows or should
    have known of the victim’s unusual vulnerability.” U.S.S.G.
    § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2. Vulnerability is not measured against the
    general population. United States v. Castellanos, 
    81 F.3d 108
    , 110 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, an “unusually vulnerable
    victim is one who is less able to resist than the typical victim
    of the offense of conviction.” United States v. Castaneda,
    
    239 F.3d 978
    , 980 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Here, the offense of conviction is “[s]ex trafficking . . . by
    force, fraud, or coercion,” and the statute is part of the
    Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Defendant correctly
    points out that, in 
    Castaneda, 239 F.3d at 982
    –83, we held
    that victims of a Mann Act sex-trafficking crime were not
    unusually vulnerable because “indebtedness, low income, and
    lack of financial resources or other options that would permit
    [the victims] to support themselves or pay for their passage
    back to the Phillippines if they left the club” do not
    “distinguish them from the typical victims of a Mann Act
    violator.” We also acknowledge that, in enacting the TVPA,
    Congress recognized that victims of sex trafficking often have
    some of the same vulnerabilities that the district court found
    here. 22 U.S.C. § 7101. We nevertheless conclude that the
    vulnerability enhancement was proper—both because of the
    high number of vulnerabilities and the depth of the individual
    vulnerabilities. For example, the victim was not only
    18             UNITED STATES V. BACKMAN
    estranged from her home community, she had no ties at all on
    the geographically remote island of Saipan. Similarly, she
    did not merely have poor English skills; she “did not speak or
    read or understand any English whatsoever,” and she was
    illiterate in her native language as well. (Emphasis added.)
    And she had more than typical indebtedness because of her
    injured son. Viewing all the circumstances, the district court
    correctly applied the vulnerability enhancement.
    AFFIRMED.