Fortino Avila-Canchola v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             OCT 07 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FORTINO AVILA-CANCHOLA,                          No. 09-71353
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A030-507-770
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted October 5, 2010
    San Francisco, California
    Before: RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LEIGHTON, District
    Judge.**
    Fortino Avila-Conchola (Avila), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
    review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed
    the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) finding Avila removable and ineligible
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton, United States District Judge for
    the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    for relief from removal based on his prior commission of an aggravated felony.
    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1) and deny the petition for review.
    Assuming that Avila exhausted his claim that the BIA erred in initially
    remanding his case to the IJ, the argument fails because Gonzales v. Duenas-
    Alvarez, 
    549 U.S. 183
     (2007), was an intervening change in the law that
    undermined the basis of the IJ’s decision which was based on Penuliar v. Ashcroft,
    
    395 F.3d 1037
     (9th Cir. 2005). In the circumstances, remand for further
    factfinding was not inappropriate. See Rafaelano v. Wilson, 
    471 F.3d 1091
    , 1098
    n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Avila’s further argument that the IJ erred in admitting the plea colloquy on
    remand is, however, unexhausted. Counsel neither objected before the IJ, nor did
    Avila’s briefing to the BIA raise the issue. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to
    consider this claim. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1); Rashtabadi v. INS, 
    23 F.3d 1562
    ,
    1567 (9th Cir. 1994).
    Employing the modified categorical approach, see Penuliar v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 603
    , 611-612 (9th Cir. 2008), we conclude that Avila’s conviction for theft
    under 
    Cal. Veh. Code § 10851
    (a) constitutes an aggravated felony under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(G). The judicially noticeable evidence admitted by the IJ, including
    2
    the criminal complaint and plea colloquy transcript, “clearly and unequivocally”
    establishes that Avila’s conviction “was based on all of the elements of a
    qualifying predicate offense.” United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 
    367 F.3d 903
    ,
    908 (9th Cir. 2004). Avila was charged as a principal and pleaded guilty as
    charged, admitting that he was the principal actor in the theft of a vehicle in
    violation of 
    Cal. Veh. Code § 10851
    (a). Cf. Penuliar, 528 F.3d at 613.
    PETITION DENIED.
    3