Custom Homes by Via, LLC v. Bank of Oklahoma, Na , 637 F. App'x 356 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FEB 18 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CUSTOM HOMES BY VIA, LLC, an                     No. 14-15011
    Arizona limited liability company and
    NORTHGATE, LLC, an Arizona limited               D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01017-FJM
    liability company,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,            MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    BANK OF OKLAHOMA, NA, an
    Oklahoma corporation,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    CUSTOM HOMES BY VIA, LLC, an                     No. 14-15107
    Arizona limited liability company and
    NORTHGATE, LLC, an Arizona limited               D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01017-FJM
    liability company,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    BANK OF OKLAHOMA, NA, an
    Oklahoma corporation,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    CUSTOM HOMES BY VIA, LLC, an                     No. 14-16209
    Arizona limited liability company and
    NORTHGATE, LLC, an Arizona limited               D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01017-FJM
    liability company,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    BANK OF OKLAHOMA, NA, an
    Oklahoma corporation,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Frederick J. Martone, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 11, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SILVERMAN, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. (“Bank”) appeals and Plaintiffs Custom
    Homes by Via, LLC (“Custom Homes”) and Northgate, LLC (“Northgate”) cross-
    appeal, from the judgment following a bench trial in this diversity action involving
    a loan agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
    1.     The Bank first challenges the district court’s order granting Custom
    Homes’s motion, made in the middle of the bench trial, to add Northgate as a
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    plaintiff. We review for an abuse of discretion. See Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc., 
    779 F.3d 973
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2015). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 expressly
    provides that a district court may “at any time” add or drop a party. See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 21. Given the relationship between the Plaintiffs, the identity of their
    claims, and the lack of any cognizable prejudice to the Bank, the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in adding Northgate as a plaintiff. See Pan Am. World
    Airways, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Calif., 
    523 F.2d 1073
    , 1079-80 (9th
    Cir. 1975) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20’s substantive standard in
    the context of Rule 21).
    2.     The Bank next challenges the district court’s factual finding that the
    Bank’s breach of the loan agreement was a substantial contributing factor to
    Plaintiffs’ damages. We review a district court’s factual findings following a
    bench trial for clear error. See Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    514 F.3d 989
    , 1000
    (9th Cir. 2008) (“We review a district court’s findings of both cause-in-fact and
    proximate cause for clear error.”). The district court did not clearly err in finding
    that the Bank’s breach of the loan agreement was a substantial contributing factor
    in the Plaintiffs losing the Enclave development and, as a result of that loss, losing
    their collateral property.
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    3.     The Bank argues that the district court erred in (1) failing to offset the
    Plaintiffs’ damages award by their loan obligation to the Bank and (2) including
    the loan fees and interest paid by Plaintiffs under the loan agreement in the
    damages award. The district court did not err in declining the Bank’s request for
    an offset because the Bank’s failure to fully perform under the loan agreement
    rendered the funds it had disbursed to Plaintiffs worthless. The loan fees and
    interest paid by Plaintiffs under the loan agreement were properly included in the
    damages award as Plaintiffs sought reliance damages. See Restatement (Second)
    of Contracts § 344(b) (defining a party’s reliance interest as the “interest in being
    reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a
    position as he would have been in had the contract not been made”).
    4.     Finally, the Bank argues that the district court erred by awarding
    Plaintiffs prejudgment interest. We review the district court’s decision to award
    prejudgment interest under state law for an abuse of discretion. Champion
    Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 
    342 F.3d 1016
    , 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiffs prejudgment
    interest as the Plaintiffs were entitled to such interest under Arizona law as a matter
    of right. See Precision Heavy Haul, Inc. v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 
    228 P.3d 895
    ,
    896 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (under Arizona law a “party with a liquidated claim is
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    entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right”); see also John C. Lincoln
    Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa Cty., 
    96 P.3d 530
    , 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)
    (“A claim is liquidated if the plaintiff provides a basis for precisely calculating the
    amounts owed.”).
    5.    In their cross-appeal, the Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred
    in granting the Bank summary judgment on their wrongful foreclosure claim. We
    review de novo. See Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 
    24 F.3d 1127
    , 1130
    (9th Cir. 1994). The district court properly granted the Bank summary judgment as
    to the Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure claim because Plaintiffs failed to obtain an
    injunction preventing the trustee’s sale. See A.R.S. § 33-811(C); see also Morgan
    AZ Fin., LLC v. Gotses, 
    326 P.3d 288
    , 290-91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (“[A] trustor
    who fails to enjoin a trustee’s sale waives his claims to title of the property upon
    the sale’s completion . . . and also waives any claims that are dependent on the
    sale.”).
    We deny both parties’ requests under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 for attorney’s fees
    on appeal because success on appeal was shared. See Huey v. Honeywell, Inc., 
    82 F.3d 327
    , 334 (9th Cir. 1996). The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED.
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