Murray v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance , 650 F. App'x 461 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 23 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIFFANY MURRAY, No. 14-15635
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00936-APG-
NJK
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL MEMORANDUM*
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 12, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Tiffany Murray appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment for her insurer, State Farm. Murray was injured in a car accident and
collected $210,000 from various insurers in relation to injuries sustained in the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
accident. She contends she is also entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits
from State Farm because her damages from the accident exceeded $210,000. The
district court determined that no reasonable jury could find that Murray’s damages
exceeded $210,000. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Murray did not provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that she is entitled to more than $210,000. In her opposition to
summary judgment, Murray provided medical bills and reports, deposition
testimony, and interrogatory responses that indicated she underwent medical
treatment after the accident. But read in the light most favorable to Murray, this
evidence substantiated only $23,072 in past and future medical expenses and
$22,464 in lost wages. After responding to State Farm’s summary judgment
motion, Murray attempted to “present additional medical billing” evidence by
filing an application for oral argument, which the district court denied. A district
court “has the discretion, when considering a motion for summary judgment, to
determine whether or not to hold an oral hearing.” Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244
F.3d 675, 684 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). Holding a hearing to ensure all of Murray’s
medical evidence was before the court at summary judgment may have been
advisable, but we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by denying
Murray’s request for a hearing.
2
No reasonable jury could find that Murray is entitled to more than $210,000
in damages based on the evidence she provided in opposition to summary
judgment. Once State Farm demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, Murray had the burden of “produc[ing] specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.”
Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)). She failed to meet that burden. The evidence of past medical care,
future medical care, and lost wages did not come close to meeting the $210,000
threshold. And though determining the amount of pain and suffering generally
“falls peculiarly within the province of the jury,” Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 686 P.2d 925, 932 (Nev. 1984) (quoting Brownfield v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
248 P.2d 1078, 1079–81 (Nev. 1952)), here Murray did not provide sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could award pain and suffering damages
sufficient to bridge that gap, see Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 n.6 (9th Cir.
1990) (observing that even where an issue is “ordinarily a question of fact” for the
jury, if “no ‘reasonable jury could return a verdict for [plaintiff],’ . . . summary
judgment [is] appropriate” (first alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))).
AFFIRMED.
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