Alberto Pineda Melgar v. William Barr ( 2019 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 25 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALBERTO PINEDA MELGAR,                          No.    18-72653
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A200-116-746
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an
    Order of the Immigration Judge
    Submitted September 18, 2019**
    Before:      FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Alberto Pineda Melgar, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
    review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.31
    (a)
    that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Honduras, and is
    thus not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual
    findings, Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 
    828 F.3d 829
    , 836 (9th Cir. 2016), and we
    deny the petition for review.
    Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Pineda Melgar
    failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in Honduras on account
    of a protected ground. See Ayala v. Holder, 
    640 F.3d 1095
    , 1097 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must
    still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such
    group” (emphasis in original)); Molina-Morales v. INS, 
    237 F.3d 1048
    , 1052 (9th
    Cir. 2001) (harm based on personal retribution is not persecution on account of a
    protected ground).
    Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Pineda Melgar
    failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or
    acquiescence of the government if returned to Honduras. See Andrade-Garcia,
    828 F.3d at 836 (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to
    investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).
    Finally, we do not consider the materials referenced in Pineda Melgar’s
    opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79
    2                                   18-
    72653 F.3d 955
    , 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (court’s review is limited to the
    administrative record).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    3                                     18-72653
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-72653

Filed Date: 9/25/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/25/2019