United States v. William Poff ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 13 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-30295
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00160-JLR-3
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    WILLIAM S. POFF,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 9, 2011 **
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GUY,*** McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    William S. Poff appeals his conviction on six counts of promotional money
    laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
     and his conviction on six counts of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge
    for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
    transactional money laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1957
    . Because the parties are
    familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we repeat only those
    facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    Poff’s sole argument on appeal is that his conviction on six counts of
    “transactional” money laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1957
     violates the Double
    Jeopardy Clause because he was also convicted on six counts of “promotional”
    money laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1)(A)(i), largely on the same
    evidence. Because Poff failed to raise this argument in the district court, we
    review for plain error. United States v. Davenport, 
    519 F.3d 940
    , 943 (9th Cir.
    2008).
    Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
    statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether they are two
    offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
    which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 
    234 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1931).
    The elements of the offenses are determinative, even if there is a substantial
    overlap in their proof. Albernaz v. United States, 
    450 U.S. 333
    , 338 (1981). “The
    fact that a defendant violates by a single transaction several regulatory controls
    devised by Congress . . . does not make the several different regulatory controls
    2
    single or identic.” 
    Id. at 338
     (quoting Gore v. United States, 
    357 U.S. 386
    , 389
    (1958)).
    Further, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the “same conduct”
    analysis which Poff now advocates. United States v. Dixon, 
    509 U.S. 688
     (1993)
    (expressly overruling Grady v. Corbin, 
    495 U.S. 508
     (1990), which had held a
    subsequent prosecution must satisfy a “same-conduct” test to avoid the double
    jeopardy bar). In Dixon, the Court made clear that the Blockburger test is the
    appropriate test for determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes
    additional punishment or successive prosecutions. Id. at 704.
    In this case, § 1956 requires proof of “intent to promote the carrying on of
    specific unlawful activity,” while § 1957 does not. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1)(A)(i).
    Conversely, § 1957 requires proof that the defendant engaged in a monetary
    transaction “in criminally deprived property of a value greater than $10,000,”
    whereas § 1956 does not. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1957
    (a). In addition, based on the charges
    against Poff, to establish a violation of § 1957, the government was required to
    prove that he conducted his activities in the United States. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1957
    . This
    proof was not required for the § 1956 charges. Finally, we have noted previously
    the elements that differentiate §§ 1956 and 1957. See United States v. Rutgard,
    
    116 F.3d 1270
    , 1291 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting five elements of § 1956 that
    3
    differentiate it from § 1957). Neither offense is a lesser-included offense of the
    other, and Congress enacted separate penalties for each offense.
    Poff’s conviction on six counts of transactional money laundering under
    § 1956 and six counts of promotional money laundering under § 1957 does not
    violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-30295

Judges: Guy, McKEOWN, Tallman

Filed Date: 12/13/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024