United States v. Kenneth Door , 917 F.3d 1146 ( 2019 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,            No. 17-30165
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                  3:12-cr-05126-RBL-1
    KENNETH RANDALE DOOR,
    Defendant-Appellant.              OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 7, 2018
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed March 12, 2019
    Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and M. Margaret
    McKeown and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Christen
    2                    UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    SUMMARY*
    Criminal Law
    Vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing, the
    panel held that, in setting the defendant’s base offense level
    under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), his prior Washington State
    conviction for felony harassment qualified as a crime of
    violence but his prior conviction for second degree assault did
    not.
    Consistent with United States v. Werle, 
    877 F.3d 879
     (9th
    Cir. 2017), the panel held that the defendant’s 1997
    conviction for felony harassment, in violation of Wash. Rev.
    Code §§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) and (2)(B), qualified as a crime
    of violence, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Applying the
    categorical approach, the panel held that the conviction
    qualified as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)’s force
    clause because it necessarily entailed the threatened use of
    violent physical force.
    The panel held that the district court erred in concluding
    that the defendant’s 2002 conviction for second degree
    assault, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(c),
    qualified as a crime of violence. Under United States v.
    Robinson, 
    869 F.3d 933
     (9th Cir. 2017), the conviction did
    not qualify under the force clause of § 4B1.2(a). The panel
    held that second degree assault also did not qualify as a crime
    of violence under § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause because the
    offense, in the ordinary case, does not present a serious
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                      3
    potential risk of physical injury to another, and it is not
    similar in kind to the crimes listed in the enumerated offenses
    clause.
    The panel therefore vacated the sentence and remanded
    for resentencing. The panel addressed other issues in a
    concurrently-filed memorandum disposition.
    COUNSEL
    Carlton Gunn (argued), Pasadena, California, for Defendant-
    Appellant.
    Helen J. Brunner (argued), First Assistant United States
    Attorney; Annette L. Hayes, United States Attorney; United
    States Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-
    Appellee.
    OPINION
    CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant Kenneth Randale Door appeals the sentence
    the district court imposed after he was convicted of several
    offenses in 2014. At his 2017 sentencing hearing, the district
    court determined that Door’s base offense level should be 24
    pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.)
    § 2K2.1(a)(2) after concluding that Door’s prior Washington
    state convictions for second-degree assault and felony
    harassment qualify as crimes of violence. Door contends
    these offenses do not constitute crimes of violence and that
    his offense level was thus calculated incorrectly. Consistent
    4                   UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    with United States v. Werle, 
    877 F.3d 879
    , 884 (9th Cir.
    2017), we hold that Door’s 1997 conviction for felony
    harassment, in violation of the Revised Code of Washington
    (Wash. Rev. Code) §§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) and (2)(b), qualifies
    as a crime of violence. Door’s argument to the contrary
    disregards that the framework for the “crime of violence”
    analysis differs depending on whether the prior offense is
    alleged to constitute a crime of violence pursuant to the force
    clause, the enumerated offenses clause, or the residual clause
    of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The district court did err, however,
    in concluding that Door’s 2002 conviction for second-degree
    assault, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code. § 9A.36.021(1)(c),
    qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v.
    Robinson, 
    869 F.3d 933
    , 941 (9th Cir. 2017); see also United
    States v. Vederoff, 
    914 F.3d 1238
    , 1244–46 (9th Cir. 2019).
    Accordingly, we vacate Door’s sentence and remand for
    resentencing.1
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A search of Door’s home in 2011 led to the discovery of
    two handguns, some magazines loaded with ammunition, two
    military grade ballistic vests (body armor), an explosive
    device known as a “seal bomb,” two digital scales, drug
    packaging materials, and two drug pipes containing
    methamphetamine residue. These discoveries led to Door’s
    indictment in 2012; he was charged with being a Felon in
    1
    Door also contends that he was improperly convicted of possessing
    body armor, challenges the application of an enhancement for possessing
    a firearm in connection with another felony, and argues that his case
    should be reassigned if remanded. In a concurrently filed memorandum
    disposition, we affirm the body armor conviction and sentencing
    enhancement, and decline to reassign the case on remand.
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                       5
    Possession of a Firearm, a Violent Felon in Possession of
    Body Armor, and a Felon in Possession of an Explosive. In
    2014, a jury convicted Door of each count. Door received a
    300-month sentence, but for reasons not pertinent to this
    appeal, we vacated Door’s sentence and remanded for
    resentencing.
    On remand, the probation officer recommended a base
    offense level of 24 because the officer concluded that Door’s
    prior Washington state convictions for second-degree assault
    and felony harassment constitute crimes of violence. See
    U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) (providing that a base offense level of
    24 applies “if the defendant committed any part of the instant
    offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony
    convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
    substance offense”). A total offense level of 32 and Door’s
    criminal history category of VI yielded a guideline
    imprisonment range of 210 to 262 months. The probation
    officer recommended 276 months of imprisonment due to
    Door’s extensive criminal history. This represented the
    maximum sentence for each count, served consecutively.
    Door argued that his prior convictions for second-degree
    assault and felony harassment were not “crime[s] of violence”
    as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, and thus his base offense
    level should only be 14.
    At the resentencing hearing held in 2017, the district court
    ruled that Door’s prior convictions for second-degree assault
    and felony harassment qualified as crimes of violence
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The court concluded that Door
    had a total offense level of 32 and imposed a sentence of
    276 months.
    6                 UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    ANALYSIS
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . “We
    review de novo whether a state-law crime constitutes a crime
    of violence under the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines.”
    Robinson, 869 F.3d at 936.
    To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
    crime of violence, we apply the categorical approach first
    outlined in Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
     (1990). The
    categorical approach requires courts to compare the elements
    of the statute of conviction with the federal definition of
    “crime of violence” to determine whether the statute of
    conviction criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the
    federal definition captures. United States v. Edling, 
    895 F.3d 1153
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 2018). The 2013 Sentencing Guidelines
    define the term “crime of violence” as follows:
    [A]ny offense under federal or state law,
    punishable by imprisonment for a term
    exceeding one year, that—
    (1) has as an element the use, attempted
    use, or threatened use of physical
    force against the person of another
    [known as the force clause or the
    elements clause], or
    (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
    extortion, involves use of explosives
    [known as the enumerated offenses
    clause], or otherwise involves conduct
    that presents a serious potential risk of
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                             7
    physical injury to another [known as
    the residual clause].
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2013).2
    When determining whether a prior conviction constitutes
    a crime of violence, the precise inquiry differs depending on
    whether the offense is alleged to qualify as a crime of
    violence pursuant to the force clause, the enumerated offenses
    clause, or the residual clause. See, e.g., Edling, 895 F.3d at
    1156–58 (determining whether prior convictions qualified as
    crimes of violence pursuant to the force clause and the
    enumerated offenses clause); United States v. Adkins,
    
    883 F.3d 1207
    , 1213–15 (9th Cir. 2018) (determining
    whether prior convictions qualified as crimes of violence
    pursuant to the residual clause). An offense constitutes a
    “crime of violence” if it qualifies under any one of the three
    clauses. See Edling, 895 F.3d at 1155. Throughout this
    analysis, we “presume that the conviction ‘rested upon
    [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts’ criminalized” by
    the statute of conviction. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
    569 U.S. 184
    ,
    191–92 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v.
    United States, 
    559 U.S. 133
    , 137 (2010)).
    2
    The relevant Sentencing Guidelines are those in effect on the date
    of the defendant’s first sentencing hearing. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (g)(1).
    Door’s first sentencing hearing occurred when the 2013 Guidelines were
    in effect. Although the residual clause was later omitted from the
    Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence, we do not apply the
    amendment retroactively because it substantively changed the Guidelines.
    United States v. Adkins, 
    883 F.3d 1207
    , 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2018).
    8                 UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    A. Applying the Categorical Analysis to the
    Sentencing Guidelines’ Force Clause, Enumerated
    Offenses Clause, and Residual Clause
    To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies
    pursuant to the force clause, the question is whether the crime
    of conviction “has as an element the use or threatened use of
    physical force against the person of another, with ‘physical
    force’ understood to mean in this context ‘violent force—that
    is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
    person.’” Edling, 895 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Johnson,
    
    559 U.S. at 140
    ). If the crime of conviction necessarily
    entails the use or threatened use of violent physical force, it
    is considered a categorical match for a crime of violence
    pursuant to the force clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1), and the inquiry
    ends. See id.; see also Stokeling v. United States, 
    139 S. Ct. 544
    , 554–55 (2019).
    A prior offense constitutes a crime of violence pursuant
    to the enumerated offenses clause if the elements of one of
    the generic federal crimes listed in that clause fully subsume
    the elements of the crime of conviction. See Mathis v. United
    States, 
    136 S. Ct. 2243
    , 2248 (2016); United States v.
    Peterson, 
    902 F.3d 1016
    , 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2018). A generic
    federal crime is defined by looking to the common law, the
    Model Penal Code, treatises, and the laws of other states. See
    Vederoff, 914 F.3d at 1245; United States v. Esparza-
    Herrera, 
    557 F.3d 1019
    , 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2009). If the
    crime of conviction falls within the generic federal
    definition—meaning it does not punish a broader range of
    conduct than the generic offense—the conviction qualifies as
    a crime of violence. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                        9
    We use a two-part test to assess whether an offense is
    categorically a crime of violence pursuant to the residual
    clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Adkins, 883 F.3d at 1213. “First, the
    ‘conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the
    ordinary case, must present a serious potential risk of
    physical injury to another.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
    Park, 
    649 F.3d 1175
    , 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2011)). “Second, the
    prior offense must be ‘roughly similar, in kind as well as in
    degree of risk posed’” to the crimes listed in the enumerated
    offenses clause. 
    Id.
     (quoting Park, 
    649 F.3d at 1178
    ). To
    determine whether the offense is “similar in kind” to the
    listed crimes, we consider “whether the predicate offense
    involves ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.’” 
    Id.
    (quoting Begay v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 137
    , 145 (2008)).
    Both criteria must be satisfied for a prior offense to constitute
    a crime of violence pursuant to the residual clause of
    § 4B1.2(a)(2). Id.
    If the statute of conviction does not qualify as a
    categorical match pursuant to the force clause, the
    enumerated offenses clause, or the residual clause, the court
    considers whether the statute of conviction’s elements are
    divisible. See, e.g., Edling, 895 F.3d at 1156, 1159; Adkins,
    883 F.3d at 1215; Robinson, 869 F.3d at 938. A statute is
    divisible if it “list[s] elements in the alternative, and thereby
    define[s] multiple crimes.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. If the
    statute of conviction is not a categorical match and is
    indivisible, it is not a crime of violence. See id. at 2248–49.
    If the statute of conviction is not a categorical match and is
    divisible, then the court applies the modified categorical
    approach and “looks to a limited class of documents (for
    example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement
    and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements,
    a defendant was convicted of.” Id. at 2249 (citing Shepard v.
    10                   UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 26 (2005)). We then apply the
    force clause, the enumerated offenses clause, or the residual
    clause analysis to the specific crime of conviction to
    determine whether it is a crime of violence. See 
    id.
    B. Door’s Prior Conviction for the Washington
    Crime of Felony Harassment Qualifies as a Crime
    of Violence Pursuant to the Force Clause.
    Door was convicted in 1997 of felony harassment in
    violation of Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) and
    (2)(b) for “threatening to kill” a person.3 We previously
    3
    At the time of Door’s conviction in 1997, the Washington
    harassment statute provided the following:
    (1) A person is guilty of harassment if:
    (a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly
    threatens:
    (i) To cause bodily injury in the future to the
    person threatened or to any other person; or
    (ii) To cause physical damage to the property
    of a person other than the actor; or
    (iii) To subject the person threatened or any
    other person to physical confinement or
    restraint; or
    (iv) Maliciously to do any other act which is
    intended to substantially harm the person
    threatened or another with respect to his or her
    physical or mental health or safety; and
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                             11
    analyzed this statute in Werle, and held that a conviction
    pursuant to the “threat to kill” subsection of the statute
    constitutes a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause of
    § 4B1.2(a)(1).4 Werle, 877 F.3d at 883–84. Because a
    conviction pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020(2)(b)
    requires that a defendant be found guilty of knowingly
    threatening to kill a person, this offense necessarily entails
    the threatened use of violent physical force against another
    person, as required by § 4B1.2(a)(1). Id. Thus, Door’s
    (b) The person by words or conduct places the
    person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat
    will be carried out.
    (2) A person who harasses another is guilty of a gross
    misdemeanor punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW,
    except that the person is guilty of a class C felony if
    either of the following applies:
    (a) The person has previously been convicted in
    this or any other state of any crime of harassment,
    as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim
    or members of the victim’s family or household or
    any person specifically named in a no-contact or
    no-harassment order; or
    (b) the person harasses another person under subsection
    (1)(a)(i) of this section by threatening to kill the
    person threatened or any other person.
    Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020.
    4
    In Werle, we assessed the amended version of Wash. Rev. Code
    § 9A.46.020. 877 F.3d at 882. Although Door’s conviction occurred prior
    to the statutory amendment, the relevant language in the earlier version of
    the felony harassment statute is substantially the same as the amended
    version reviewed in Werle.
    12                UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    conviction for the Washington crime of felony harassment
    qualifies as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes.
    Door contends that we are not bound by Werle’s holding,
    observing that in Werle, the defendant never argued his prior
    Washington felony harassment conviction failed to qualify as
    a crime of violence on account of Washington’s version of
    aiding and abetting, which is broader than the federal
    definition of aiding and abetting. As Door’s argument goes,
    because every Washington criminal statute incorporates
    aiding and abetting, all Washington criminal statutes are
    overbroad, and therefore all Washington state convictions fail
    to qualify as crimes of violence—an argument inspired by
    United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 
    876 F.3d 1201
     (9th Cir.
    2017). Door’s argument, however, overlooks the analytical
    difference between the force clause and the enumerated
    offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
    In Valdivia-Flores, this court assessed whether a
    conviction for violating a Washington drug-trafficking law,
    
    Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401
    , constituted an “aggravated
    felony” for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    (INA). Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d at 1206. Applying
    Taylor’s categorical approach, we considered “whether the
    state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically
    fit[] within the generic federal definition of a corresponding
    aggravated felony.” Id. (quoting Roman-Suaste v. Holder,
    
    766 F.3d 1035
    , 1038 (9th Cir. 2014)). Valdivia-Flores’s
    crime of conviction was overbroad because: (1) aiding and
    abetting is included in every Washington criminal statute;
    (2) Washington defines aiding and abetting more broadly than
    federal law because it merely requires knowledge, whereas
    federal law requires a mens rea of specific intent; and
    (3) accomplice and principal liability are indivisible under
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                      13
    Washington law. 
    Id.
     at 1207–10. Concluding that Valdivia-
    Flores’s prior offense did not qualify as an “aggravated
    felony,” we observed that it may be that “no Washington state
    conviction can serve as an aggravated felony at all.” 
    Id.
     at
    1209–10.
    Door’s reliance on Valdivia-Flores is misplaced. The
    categorical analysis in Valdivia-Flores involved comparing
    the elements of the Washington drug trafficking crime with
    the generic federal offense of drug trafficking because “drug
    trafficking” is listed in the INA as an “aggravated felony.”
    See 
    id.
     at 1206–07. In other words, the categorical analysis
    employed in Valdivia-Flores mirrors the inquiry under the
    enumerated offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
    Werle, on the other hand, held that a prior conviction for
    Washington felony harassment constitutes a crime of violence
    pursuant to the force clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1). Because a
    conviction for violating Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020(2)(b)
    necessarily entails the threatened use of violent physical
    force, it qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to the force
    clause, and our inquiry ends there. We need not compare the
    elements of the crime of conviction with the elements of the
    generic federal crime when analyzing whether an offense
    qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause
    of § 4B1.2(a). Compare Peterson, 902 F.3d at 1016,
    1021–22, with Edling, 895 F.3d at 1156–58. Valdivia-Flores
    is consistent with Werle.
    14                   UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    C. Door’s Prior Conviction for the Washington
    Crime of Second-Degree Assault Does Not Qualify
    as a Crime of Violence.
    Door was convicted in 2002 of second-degree assault in
    violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(c).5 In
    Robinson, we held that Washington’s crime of second-degree
    assault did not qualify as a crime of violence pursuant to the
    5
    At the time of Door’s conviction in 2002, the Washington second-
    degree assault statute provided the following:
    (1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if
    he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault
    in the first degree:
    (a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby
    recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; or
    (b) Intentionally and unlawfully causes substantial
    bodily harm to an unborn quick child by
    intentionally and unlawfully inflicting any injury
    upon the mother of such child; or
    (c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or
    (d) With intent to inflict bodily harm, administers
    to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any
    other destructive or noxious substance; or
    (e) With intent to commit a felony, assaults
    another; or
    (f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by
    design causes such pain or agony as to be the
    equivalent of that produced by torture.
    Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1).
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                            15
    force clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).6 869 F.3d at 937–38.
    However, Robinson did not address whether second-degree
    assault constitutes a crime of violence pursuant to the residual
    clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2).7
    Applying the two-part residual clause test, we hold that
    Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1) is not a crime of violence
    because the offense, in the ordinary case, does not “present a
    serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Adkins,
    883 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Park, 
    649 F.3d at
    1177–78). The
    Washington second-degree assault statute encompasses
    assault with intent to commit a felony. Wash. Rev. Code
    § 9A.36.021(1)(e). This includes the intent to commit any
    non-violent felony offense. The “assault” may also be non-
    violent because Washington defines assault broadly to
    include “an intentional touching . . . that is harmful or
    offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to
    the person.” State v. Smith, 
    154 P.3d 873
    , 875 (Wash. 2007)
    (en banc); see also Robinson, 869 F.3d at 938 n.7. Thus, a
    defendant may violate Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(e) in
    6
    In Robinson, we assessed the amended version of Wash. Rev. Code
    § 9A.36.021(1). 869 F.3d at 937 n.6. The statute was amended after
    Door’s conviction to include a seventh subsection, (1)(g) which prohibits
    “[a]ssaults . . . by strangulation or suffocation.” Id.
    7
    Robinson also did not address the enumerated offenses clause. To
    the extent the government argues that second-degree assault qualifies as
    a crime of violence pursuant to the enumerated offenses clause, we decline
    to address this argument, raised for the first time on appeal. See United
    States v. Fomichev, 
    899 F.3d 766
    , 770 (9th Cir. 2018), as amended by
    
    909 F.3d 1078
     (9th Cir. 2018). Further, the argument is foreclosed by
    Vederoff. See Vederoff, 914 F.3d at 1246.
    16                  UNITED STATES V. DOOR
    a way that poses no serious risk of physical injury to others.8
    Because Door “could have been convicted on the basis of
    conduct that did not present a serious risk of physical injury
    to another,” a prior conviction for Washington second-degree
    assault does not qualify as a crime of violence. See United
    States v. Simmons, 
    782 F.3d 510
    , 519 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
    United States v. Kelly, 
    422 F.3d 889
    , 893 (9th Cir. 2005)); see
    also United States v. Lee, 
    821 F.3d 1124
    , 1128–29 (9th Cir.
    2016) (holding that California’s crime of battery committed
    against a custodial officer does not qualify as a crime of
    violence pursuant to the residual clause because “the least
    touching may constitute battery” (quoting People v. Mesce,
    
    60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745
    , 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
    Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1) also fails to satisfy the
    second part of the residual clause test because it is not
    “similar in kind” to the crimes listed in the enumerated
    offenses clause, which typically involve “purposeful, violent,
    and aggressive conduct.” Adkins, 883 F.3d at 1213 (quoting
    Begay, 
    553 U.S. at 145
    ). As discussed, the Washington crime
    of second-degree assault can be committed by offensive
    touching, see Smith, 154 P.3d at 875, which would not
    involve “violent” or “aggressive” conduct.
    The Washington second-degree assault statute is
    indivisible, thus the modified categorical approach is
    inapplicable. Robinson, 869 F.3d at 941. The district court
    erred by concluding that Door’s prior second-degree assault
    conviction qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to the
    residual clause.
    8
    For example, a defendant may be convicted of assault with intent to
    commit a felony for touching a minor’s body in a sexual manner. See
    Robinson, 869 F.3d at 938 n.7.
    UNITED STATES V. DOOR                    17
    D. Remand is Required
    The Sentencing Guidelines direct that a base offense level
    of 24 applies if the defendant has two or more felony
    convictions that qualify as a “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G.
    § 2K2.1(a)(2). A mistake in calculating the Guidelines
    sentencing range generally requires us to remand for
    resentencing. United States v. Bankston, 
    901 F.3d 1100
    , 1107
    (9th Cir. 2018). Door’s conviction for the Washington crime
    of felony harassment qualifies as a crime of violence, but the
    district court erred in holding that Door’s conviction for the
    Washington crime of second-degree assault constitutes a
    crime of violence. Because Door only had one conviction
    that qualified as a crime of violence, his base offense level
    should have been 20. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The
    district court therefore erred in calculating Door’s base
    offense level and remand is required.
    Sentence VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing.