William Tezak v. Geoffrey Glass ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM TEZAK, individually, No. 14-56899
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:13-cv-01566-JFW-PJW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GEOFFREY T. GLASS, individually and in
his official capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
William Tezak appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Tezak’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Tezak’s claims constitute a de facto appeal of
prior state court judgments. See id. at 1163-65 (Rooker-Feldman bars de facto
appeals of a state court decision and constitutional claims “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court decision); see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto appeal is one in which “the
adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the
district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tezak leave to
amend his complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be
futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2 14-56899