United States v. Peyton Adams ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 4 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-50275
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:16-cr-00313-MWF-1
v.
PEYTON JAMAR ADAMS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 14, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and AMON,** District Judge.
This appeal arises from an indictment charging Peyton Adams with criminal
contempt for violating the district court’s no-contact order. The district court
imposed the order when it revoked Adams’s supervised release and sentenced him
to sixteen months’ incarceration, followed by eighteen months of supervised
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
release, for assaulting his then-girlfriend and mother of his child, J.B. The no-
contact order prohibited Adams from contacting J.B. while incarcerated and on
supervised release. While in prison, Adams called J.B. numerous times to harass
and threaten her. As a result, the government charged Adams with criminal
contempt for violating the no-contact order. The district court denied Adams’s
motion to dismiss the indictment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment is reviewed de
novo. United States v. Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
United States v. Caruto, 663 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 2011)). Adams argues that he
did not violate the no-contact order because the order did not apply to his term of
imprisonment. However, at the sentencing, the district court spoke directly to
Adams and ordered him not to contact J.B. “while . . . in custody . . . .” Likewise,
the written judgment clearly stated that Adams was prohibited from contacting J.B.
“in any manner, directly, [or indirectly] . . . including the duration [of] the period
of his incarceration within the Bureau of Prisons.” Thus, the district court did not
err in denying Adams’s motion to dismiss the criminal contempt indictment on the
basis that Adams plainly violated the no-contact order while incarcerated.
Adams also argues that the no-contact order was invalid because the district
court erred in exercising its power to impose the order. However, the collateral bar
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rule prevents Adams from challenging the validity of the no-contact order in
contempt proceedings. In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works, 881
F.2d 722, 725–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (court order may not be collaterally attacked in
criminal contempt proceedings even though the order may be incorrect and even
unconstitutional). To be sure, an order is invalid, and may be challenged in
contempt proceedings, if a court issues the order without subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 726. But, in this case, the court had jurisdiction over Adams’s
supervised release violation, which gave rise to the no-contact order. See United
States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(3)). Further, Adams concedes that district courts may exercise their
inherent authority to impose no-contact orders in limited circumstances. See
Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116, 1123–25 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, the
subject matter-jurisdiction exception to the collateral bar rule does not apply in this
case, and Adams is precluded from collaterally attacking the validity of the no-
contact order in contempt proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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