Marjorie Knoller v. Walter Miller ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 03 2016
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MARJORIE KNOLLER, No. 14-16449
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00996-JST
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WALTER MILLER, Warden, Valley State
Prison for Women,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and DAVIS,** Circuit Judges.
Appellant Marjorie Knoller (Knoller) was convicted by a jury of second-
degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, and ownership of a mischievous animal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Andre M. Davis, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
causing death. She challenges the district court’s denial of her federal habeas
petition.
We agree with the district court that the California Court of Appeal did not
unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it determined that a
limitation on defense counsel’s ability to make objections during the end of the
Government’s closing rebuttal argument did not rise to the level of structural error.
See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (explaining that structural
error occurs only when there is a complete deprivation of counsel). Note 25 of the
Cronic opinion does not override the clear holding of the case as a whole. See
Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014) (holding that “complete denial of
summation amounts to structural error” and that existing case law did not clearly
establish the restriction of summation as structural error) (emphases in the
original).
The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably determine
harmlessness under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Davis v.
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (clarifying that when a state court concludes
that “any federal error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman,”
we “may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness
determination itself was unreasonable”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in the
2
original)). Undoubtedly, the trial judge’s threat of incarceration for further
objection, coupled with the prosecutor’s inappropriate argument, rose to the level
of constitutional error. However, Knoller has not established “actual prejudice or
that no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s application of
Chapman.” Id. at 2203.
AFFIRMED.
3