FTC v. Jonathan Eborn ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 04 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,                        No. 14-16485
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01112-GMN-VCF
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    INFUSION MEDIA, INC., et al.,
    Defendants,
    and
    JONATHAN EBORN, individually and as
    an officer of Infusion Media, Inc., Two
    Warnings, LLC., Two Part Investments,
    LLC., and West Coast Internet Media, Inc.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 21, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Before: GRABER and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** Senior
    District Judge.
    Defendant-appellant Jonathan Eborn appeals from the district court’s order
    entering judgment against him in the amount of $26,971,926.50. On October 4,
    2010, in resolution of litigation initiated by the Federal Trade Commission (the
    “FTC”), a consent judgment was entered against Eborn and his co-defendants,
    which included a suspended monetary judgment. On March 25, 2014, the FTC
    filed a motion to reinstate the monetary judgment against Eborn in light of material
    misrepresentations and omissions that it identified in the financial statements
    Eborn submitted prior to the entry of the consent judgment. Eborn contends that
    the factual findings in the district court’s order granting that motion were clearly
    erroneous and that the order runs afoul of Rule 52(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure. We affirm.
    1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), which requires a district court
    to “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately” under
    specified circumstances, does not apply because the FTC’s motion and the district
    court’s resolution thereof was not “an action tried on the facts without a jury or
    with an advisory jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). To the contrary, the FTC’s motion
    **
    The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2
    was governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(3), which provides that
    courts are “not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion
    under Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide otherwise, on any other motion.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3) (emphasis added); see Nuveen Mun. High Income
    Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 
    730 F.3d 1111
    , 1127 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (noting that Rule 52(a)(1) governs bench trials and Rule 52(a)(3) governs
    motions).
    2. Although Rule 52(a)(1) is thus inapplicable, nonetheless, under the
    consent judgment the monetary judgment could not be reinstated without the
    district court’s finding that Eborn made material misstatements or omissions in his
    financial statements. Here, the district court’s order is sufficiently clear, and the
    record sufficiently detailed, to permit meaningful review in this case. See
    GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 
    202 F.3d 1199
    , 1210 (9th Cir. 2000).
    3. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. The clear
    error standard “is significantly deferential, and we will accept the lower court’s
    findings of fact unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been committed.” Allen v. Iranon, 
    283 F.3d 1070
    , 1076 (9th Cir.
    2002). Here, there was ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s
    factual determinations. Indeed, many of the underlying facts supporting the district
    3
    court’s ruling were undisputed — such as Eborn’s compensation from Augusta
    Capital and Link Media, and his failure to accurately report his residence and
    personal property — or not credibly disputed.1 Eborn’s misrepresentations and
    omissions were material as a matter of law, both because the FTC’s agreement to
    the consent judgment was expressly conditioned on the truthfulness of Eborn’s
    financial statements and because the parties stipulated that those financial
    statements provided the basis for the monetary judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Although Eborn did present some evidence to the district court that
    contradicted some of the FTC’s allegations, he does not challenge the district
    court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflicting evidence
    and questions of credibility.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-16485

Filed Date: 8/4/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/4/2016