John Bettys v. Kevin Quigley ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN E. BETTYS, No. 18-35285
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-05076-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KEVIN QUIGLEY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2019**
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Washington civil detainee John E. Bettys appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising
from his pretrial detention at Washington’s Special Commitment Center (“SCC”).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Mitchell v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bettys’s mental
health treatment and conditions of confinement claims because defendants
demonstrated that any differences between what Bettys was provided during his
pretrial detention and what was provided to criminal inmates at Washington State
Department of Corrections facilities were justified by legitimate, non-punitive
interests, and Bettys failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
any conditions he experienced amounted to punishment or were excessive in
relation to legitimate government interests. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537
(1979) (some losses of freedom of movement and choice are inherent discomforts
of confinement, and not every disability imposed during detention “amounts to
‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense”); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932, 935
(9th Cir. 2004) (a rebuttable presumption of punitive treatment arises when a
detainee awaiting civil commitment proceedings is detained in “conditions
identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than, those in which his criminal
counterparts are held”).
To the extent Bettys challenges the mental health treatment he received after
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his civil commitment, the district court properly granted summary judgment
because Bettys failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants substantially departed from accepted professional judgment. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982) (imposing liability where a
decision is “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment”); Mitchell, 818 F.3d at 443-44 (at summary
judgment, a civil detainee must present evidence sufficient to rebut the Youngberg
professional judgment standard).
The district court properly dismissed Bettys’s double jeopardy claim because
his civil detention under Washington law is not unconstitutionally punitive “as
applied” to him. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (rejecting a double
jeopardy challenge to implementation of civil confinement of persons charged with
sex offenses).
We do not consider Bettys’s due process claims concerning vendor access
privileges and facility policies because Bettys voluntary dismissed these claims.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448
(9th Cir. 1986) (“A plaintiff may not appeal a voluntary dismissal because it is not
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an involuntary adverse judgment against him”).
AFFIRMED.
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