United States v. Martel Valencia-Cortez ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    APR 24 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.   17-50330
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:16-cr-00730-H-1
    Southern District of California,
    v.                                             San Diego
    MARTEL VALENCIA-CORTEZ,                         ORDER
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: PAEZ, PARKER, * and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    The memorandum filed in this case on December 10, 2018 is amended by
    inserting the following paragraph on page 5, after line 10:
    Similarly, the District Court did not commit plain error in failing to
    define “serious bodily injury.” The District Court was only required
    to include the core defense theories and the critical elements of the
    charged crimes in its instructions, see United States v. Vazquez-
    Hernandez, 
    849 F.3d 1219
    , 1225 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding error where
    district court omitted essential element of attempted illegal reentry),
    and the question of whether there was “serious bodily injury” is
    typically a “question of fact for the jury.” 
    Rocha, 598 F.3d at 1152
    .
    Valencia-Cortez does not cite any authority requiring the term to be
    defined and the District Court was required to define only those terms
    that do not fall “within the comprehension of an average juror.”
    United States v. Dixon, 
    201 F.3d 1223
    , 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).
    “Whether a term in a jury instruction requires definition normally
    turns on whether it expresses a concept within the jury's ordinary
    experience.” United States v. Tirouda, 
    394 F.3d 683
    , 688 (9th Cir.
    2005). We are not convinced an average juror would not comprehend
    *
    The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
    for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
    what “serious bodily injury” means or attach to it a definition
    meaningfully different than what Valencia-Cortez proposes.
    The amended memorandum is filed concurrently with this order.
    With the filing of the amended memorandum, the panel has unanimously
    voted to deny the appellant’s petition for panel rehearing. The petition for
    rehearing en banc was circulated to the full court and no judge requested a vote for
    en banc consideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(f). The petition for rehearing and
    the petition for rehearing en banc are denied.
    No further petitions for rehearing may be filed.
    2
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 24 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.   17-50330
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                                             3:16–cr–00730–H
    MARTEL VALENCIA-CORTEZ,
    AMENDED MEMORANDUM *
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued November 14, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PAEZ, PARKER, ** and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    Martel Valencia-Cortez (“Valencia”) appeals his judgment of conviction for
    assault on a federal officer with a deadly weapon and bringing noncitizens into the
    United States for financial gain. See 18 U.S.C. § 111; 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, United States Circuit Judge for
    the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Eyewitness Identification Instruction
    The District Court denied Valencia’s request for a Ninth Circuit pattern
    eyewitness identification instruction (the “Model Eyewitness Instruction”) and, in
    doing so, did not abuse its discretion. In its final jury instructions, the District Court
    discussed Valencia’s identification defense and provided a general witness
    credibility instruction.     Further, the District Court permitted Valencia to elicit
    comprehensive expert testimony on, among other things, eyewitness memory,
    memory for the details of events, the ability to pick faces, and suggestibility.
    Counsel for Valencia extensively argued the identification defense to the jury based
    on this testimony.     The jury was thus alerted to potential weaknesses in the
    Government’s eyewitness identification evidence. Accordingly, we see no abuse of
    discretion in the District Court’s refusal to give the Model Eyewitness Instruction.
    While we see no abuse of discretion, we are troubled by the comment to the
    Model Eyewitness Instruction that recommends “against the giving of an eyewitness
    identification instruction.” Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the
    District Courts of the Ninth Circuit § 4.11 cmt. (2010) [hereinafter MMCJI]. There
    is now a robust body of scientific research and evidence that highlights the unique
    perils of eyewitness identification testimony as “one of the greatest causes of
    erroneous convictions.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    834 F.3d 263
    , 313–45
    2
    (3d Cir. 2016).
    The Supreme Court has acknowledged the fallibility of eyewitness testimony
    and characterized eyewitness instructions as due process safeguards that “warn the
    jury to take care in appraising identification evidence.” Perry v. New Hampshire,
    
    565 U.S. 228
    , 246 (2012); see also 
    id. at 246
    n.7 (citing the Ninth Circuit Model
    Eyewitness Instruction). Other Circuits have also encouraged the giving of such
    instructions, recognizing the inherent dangers of this type of evidence. United States
    v. Hodges, 
    515 F.2d 650
    , 653 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 
    502 F.2d 273
    ,
    277 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Telfaire, 
    469 F.2d 552
    , 556–57 (D.C. Cir.
    1972). Further, we have previously suggested that the need for heightened jury
    instructions should correlate with the amount of corroborating evidence. See United
    States v. Masterson, 
    529 F.2d 30
    , 32 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that “[i]n both Holley
    and Telfaire a single eyewitness was the only incriminating evidence against the
    defendant”). Without disagreeing that courts are given discretion in fashioning jury
    instructions, we encourage the Jury Instructions Committee to reassess their
    comment as it is inconsistent with legal precedent and growing scientific evidence.
    For similar reasons, we are also troubled by the following language in the
    comment to the Model Eyewitness Instruction:
    The Ninth Circuit has approved the giving of a comprehensive
    eyewitness jury instruction where the district court has determined that
    proffered expert witness testimony regarding eyewitness identification
    should be excluded.
    3
    MMCJI § 4.11 cmt. This comment seems to suggest that a district court may either
    give the Model Eyewitness Instruction or allow expert witness testimony, but not
    both.     Again, because of the particularly unreliable nature of eyewitness
    identification evidence, we encourage the Jury Instructions Committee to make clear
    that it is within a court’s sound discretion to provide both safeguards if the facts and
    circumstances of the case so require.
    Valencia’s Arrest in Mexico
    The District Court denied Valencia an evidentiary hearing and excluded
    evidence at trial concerning the circumstances of his arrest in Mexico by Mexican
    authorities and his transportation to the San Ysidro Port of Entry. The District Court
    reasoned that evidence related to Valencia’s arrest could be remote and confusing
    for a jury because of the length of time between the assault charge in the indictment
    and Valencia’s arrest. The District Court also determined that no direct connection
    existed between the arrest and the charges in the indictment, limiting the overall
    relevance of evidence related to the arrest. Considering this reasoning, the District
    Court acted within in its discretion in excluding evidence of the arrest.
    Deadly or Dangerous Weapon Enhancement
    The District Court instructed the jury that a rock is a deadly or dangerous
    weapon if it is used in a way that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
    Valencia argued that an object can constitute a deadly or dangerous weapon only if
    4
    it is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury—a heightened standard of
    probability. Subjecting this contention to plain error review, we find none.
    United States v. Smith, 
    561 F.3d 934
    , 939 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), is
    controlling precedent on dangerous weapon enhancements such as the one in this
    case. In the portion of our opinion in Smith discussing the legal standard, we said
    that “[a]n object is a dangerous weapon . . . if it is . . . used in a manner likely to
    endanger life or inflict great bodily 
    harm.” 561 F.3d at 939
    (emphasis added).
    However, assuming that the District Court committed error, such an error would not
    be plain because the Smith decision itself uses the “capable” language at other points
    in the opinion. 1 See 
    id. at 940.
    Similarly, the District Court did not commit plain error in failing to define
    “serious bodily injury.” The District Court was only required to include the core
    defense theories and the critical elements of the charged crimes in its instructions,
    see United States v. Vazquez-Hernandez, 
    849 F.3d 1219
    , 1225 (9th Cir. 2017)
    1
    While the holding of Smith suggests that the correct instruction employs the
    term “likely,” cases following Smith have been inconsistent, with some using
    “likely” and others “capable.” Compare United States v. Anchrum, 
    590 F.3d 795
    ,
    802 (9th Cir. 2009), with United States v. Rocha, 
    598 F.3d 1144
    , 1154 (9th Cir.
    2010). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions
    still employs the “capable” language. See MMCJI § 8.4. Because of this confusion,
    any error is not “so clear-cut” or “so obvious” that the District Court could have
    avoided it without objection. See United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 
    663 F.3d 419
    ,
    428 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court should address this confusion in a case where it
    would not be limited to plain error review, given the significant difference between
    “capable” and “likely.”
    5
    (finding error where district court omitted essential element of attempted illegal
    reentry), and the question of whether there was “serious bodily injury” is typically a
    “question of fact for the jury.” 
    Rocha, 598 F.3d at 1152
    . Valencia-Cortez does not
    cite any authority requiring the term to be defined and the District Court was required
    to define only those terms that do not fall “within the comprehension of an average
    juror.” United States v. Dixon, 
    201 F.3d 1223
    , 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). “Whether a
    term in a jury instruction requires definition normally turns on whether it expresses
    a concept within the jury's ordinary experience.” United States v. Tirouda, 
    394 F.3d 683
    , 688 (9th Cir. 2005). We are not convinced an average juror would not
    comprehend what “serious bodily injury” means or attach to it a definition
    meaningfully different than what Valencia-Cortez proposes.
    Valencia also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the assault with
    a dangerous weapon charge. While evidence of the assault with the rock was by no
    means conclusive, a rational jury could have convicted Valencia based on the
    evidence adduced by the Government as to the size of the rock, the way in which it
    was thrown, and the physical effects of the rock’s impact. Thus, the evidence was
    sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to convict.
    Grouping Increase
    The District Court applied a 6-point enhancement to Valencia’s sentence for
    illegally bringing in noncitizens, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 20. The
    6
    Government has conceded that the offense level should be 17. Specifically, it
    recommended only a 3-point enhancement to the base offense level for bringing in
    6 to 24 noncitizens instead of the Presentence Report’s recommendation of a 6-point
    enhancement for bringing in 28 noncitizens. The Government explained that it did
    not believe there was sufficient evidence presented at trial or at any other time that
    Valencia was involved in bringing in 28 individuals.
    The District Court applied a 1-point grouping increase pursuant to the
    Sentencing Guidelines because the adjusted offense level of the assault count—26—
    and the erroneous adjusted offense level of the illegal bringing in of noncitizens
    count—20—were within six levels of one another. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. However,
    the District Court should not have applied the 1-point grouping increase because the
    correct adjusted offense level for illegally bringing in noncitizens—17—was 9
    levels less serious than the adjusted offense level for the assault count—26—and
    therefore should have been disregarded. 
    Id. An offense
    level of 26 corresponds to
    a Sentencing Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment, as opposed to the
    range for an offense level of 27, which is 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment, and
    which was used by the District Court to sentence Valencia.
    On appeal, the Government concedes that there was an error. This error was
    plain because it contravened the direct instructions of the Sentencing Guidelines to
    “[d]isregard any [count] that is 9 or more levels less serious than the [count] with
    7
    the highest offense level.” 
    Id. Moreover, a
    sentencing error such as this affects
    Valencia’s substantial rights and seriously undermines the fairness, integrity, and
    public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Bonilla-Guizar, 
    729 F.3d 1179
    , 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, we vacate Valencia’s sentence and remand to the
    District Court for resentencing.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    8