Donald Allen v. Charles Ryan , 668 F. App'x 734 ( 2016 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     AUG 25 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DONALD ALPHONSO ALLEN,                           No. 15-16505
    Plaintiff-Appellant,        D.C. No. 3:14-cv-08235-SRB-
    DMF
    v.
    CHARLES L. RYAN, et al.,                         MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 16, 2016**
    Before:        O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    Donald Alphonso Allen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging excessive force and deliberate
    indifference claims arising out of events that occurred while he was in Arizona
    state prison. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm in part, reverse in part,
    and remand.
    The district court properly dismissed Allen’s claims against defendants
    Ryan, Rider, Management Training Corporation, and “Capts, Sgts, and Lts of the
    first shift staff,” because Allen failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
    claim for relief. See Starr v. Baca, 
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (a
    supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the
    constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the
    supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Allen’s motion for leave to amend his complaint against
    these defendants because amendment would have been futile. See Gordon v. City
    of Oakland, 
    627 F.3d 1092
    , 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review
    and explaining that leave to amend may denied if amendment would be futile).
    The district court denied Allen’s motion for additional time to serve
    defendant Denoyer and dismissed Allen’s claims against Denoyer for failure to
    serve. However, Allen demonstrated good cause to extend the time for service.
    See Walker v. Sumner, 
    14 F.3d 1415
    , 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) overruled on other
    2                                      15-16505
    grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 483–84 (1995) (“So long as the
    prisoner has furnished the information necessary to identify the defendant, the
    marshal’s failure to effect service is automatically good cause” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Sheehan, 
    253 F.3d 507
    , 511 (9th Cir.
    2001) (setting forth standard of review); Puett v. Blandford, 
    912 F.2d 270
    , 273 (9th
    Cir. 1990) (party proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to have summons and
    complaint served by United States Marshal).
    Moreover, the district court erred by dismissing Allen’s claims against
    Denoyer as barred by the applicable statute of limitations without providing Allen
    with an opportunity to demonstrate whether he was entitled to equitable tolling.
    See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 
    5 F.3d 1273
    -77 (9th Cir. 1993) (determination
    of equitable tolling ordinarily requires reference to materials outside of the
    complaint and generally cannot be resolved on the face of the pleadings alone).
    In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Allen’s claims against all
    defendants except Denoyer, and affirm the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion
    for leave to amend his complaint. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of
    Allen’s claims against Denoyer for failure to serve and as barred by the statute of
    limitations and remand for further proceedings.
    3                                     15-16505
    Allen’s request to appoint counsel, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
    4                                    15-16505