United States v. Lonnie Vernon , 668 F. App'x 250 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 15 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30005
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:11-cr-00022-RJB-3
v.
LONNIE G. VERNON, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30006
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:11-cr-00028-RJB-1
v.
LONNIE G. VERNON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 2, 2016
Anchorage, Alaska
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: FISHER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Lonnie G. Vernon appeals his conviction for conspiracy to murder a federal
judge and an IRS employee, claiming his plea agreement was involuntarily
rendered. We dismiss his appeal.
The government argues that Vernon waived all rights to directly appeal his
conviction. “This court regularly enforces ‘knowing and voluntary’ waivers of
appellate rights in criminal cases . . . .” United States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064,
1066 (9th Cir. 2000). Two conditions, however, must be met: “(1) the language of
the waiver encompasses [the defendant’s] right to appeal on the grounds raised,
and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Jeronimo,
398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
As to the first issue, the waiver in Vernon’s plea agreement clearly
encompasses this appeal. The agreement has two separate waiver sections, one for
Appellate Rights and one for Collateral Attack Rights. In the Appellate Rights
section, the agreement provides: “The defendant waives the right to appeal the
conviction resulting from the entry of guilty plea to the charge set forth in this
agreement.” By contrast, the waiver in the Collateral Attack Rights section carves
out two exceptions: “1) any challenge to the conviction or sentence alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel . . . ; and 2) a challenge to the voluntariness of the
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defendant’s guilty plea.” Vernon’s suggestion that these two exceptions apply to
direct appeals is contradicted by the plain language of the agreement. The terms
are “clear and unambiguous.” United States v. Clark, 218 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.
2000).
As to the second issue, Vernon’s plea agreement, and therefore his waiver,
was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Vernon’s statement that he had been
deprived of his medications did not raise a “genuine doubt” about his competency
to plead guilty. United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014). We
recognize that throughout the district court proceedings, Vernon forcefully
articulated his unorthodox opinions about our court system. However, “[h]is
comments and conduct were indicative of [his sovereign citizen] belief, not a lack
of competence. [Vernon] cannot now use those beliefs as an expression of
incompetency.” United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 657 (9th Cir. 2015).
Moreover, at the change of plea hearing, when asked by the court whether he
wanted to plead guilty, Vernon responded clearly: “Yes, I do want to enter. I’m
going to enter guilty, yes, I am.” He also clearly articulated that he understood the
waiver after it was explained by the district court: “Yes, that’s what was presented
to us.” These statements further support a finding of voluntariness. See United
States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2001); Anglin, 215 F.3d at
1067. Vernon’s waiver is therefore valid and must be enforced.
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DISMISSED.
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