Mila Washington v. Patrick Donahoe ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 19 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MILA B. WASHINGTON,                             No.   16-15798
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02444-SPL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster
    General,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 8, 2017**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BEA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI,*** District
    Judge.
    Mila Washington asked the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) to shorten
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for
    the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
    her work day during her pregnancy, but still pay her for a full day. USPS initially
    allowed Washington to take “personal absence time” for hours not worked, but later
    reclassified this time off as unpaid Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave.
    That reclassification required Washington to use her accumulated paid leave hours
    to receive pay for the unworked hours. In this suit, Washington alleges gender and
    pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
    The district court granted USPS’s motion for summary judgment. We have
    jurisdiction of Washington’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm, because
    Washington failed to provide direct or circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment
    based on her pregnancy or gender. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
    135 S. Ct. 1338
    , 1345 (2015).
    1.   Washington claims that USPS improperly denied her 4.61 hours of
    personal absence time and reclassified 99.03 hours of personal absence time as
    FMLA sick leave. But, under USPS’s personal absence time policy, USPS managers
    are permitted to “require the use of . . . sick leave in the case of partial-day absences
    for FMLA-covered conditions,” which includes absences caused by pregnancy
    complications. Therefore, USPS’s denial and reclassification of personal absence
    1
    Although Washington’s complaint also alleged race discrimination, she failed
    to argue this claim either in response to USPS’s motion for summary judgment or
    on appeal. “Because this argument was not raised clearly and distinctly in the
    opening brief, it has been waived.” McKay v. Ingleson, 
    558 F.3d 888
    , 891 n.5 (9th
    Cir. 2009).
    2
    time do not by themselves “prove[] the fact of discriminatory animus without
    inference or presumption.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 
    150 F.3d 1217
    , 1221 (9th
    Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration incorporated).
    Nor did Washington “offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful
    discrimination.” Hawn v. Exec. Jet. Mgmt., Inc., 
    615 F.3d 1151
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration incorporated). She failed to show that
    similarly situated non-pregnant employees were treated more favorably in the
    provision of personal absence time, or that any “other circumstances surrounding”
    USPS’s denial and reclassification of personal absence time, which were allowed
    under USPS policy, permit “an inference of discrimination.” 
    Id. at 1156
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    2. Washington claims that USPS denied her call-in request for 8 hours of paid
    sick leave. But, she provided no direct evidence of discrimination, nor does she
    identify any similarly situated, non-pregnant employees who called in for sick leave
    and received it, or describe circumstances from which one could infer
    discrimination. See 
    id. 3. Washington
    claims that USPS improperly revoked its original
    accommodation which allowed her to work less than 8 hours a day. But it is
    undisputed that Washington worked less than 8 hours daily from April 11 to August
    23, 2012, was paid for full 8-hour days during that period, and was given FMLA
    3
    leave going forward. That USPS did not charge this leave as personal absence time
    does not mean it denied Washington a work accommodation. And, Washington
    identifies no similarly situated employees who were so accommodated. 
    Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354
    .
    4.   Washington claims that USPS subjected her to an investigation for
    requesting a pregnancy accommodation. The investigation “did not materially affect
    the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of [Washington’s] employment”
    and thus did not constitute an adverse employment action. Chuang v. Univ. of Cal.
    Davis, Bd. of Trs., 
    225 F.3d 1115
    , 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). And, Washington provided
    no evidence that the investigation, which was initiated because of suspected
    timekeeping fraud, was discriminatory.
    AFFIRMED.
    4