Estanislao Perez-Renderos v. William Barr ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUN 12 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ESTANISLAO PEREZ-RENDEROS,                       No.   16-73392
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A089-840-035
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 17, 2019**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: KLEINFELD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,*** District
    Judge.
    Petitioner Estanislao Perez-Renderos (“Perez-Renderos”) appeals the
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    judge’s denial of his application for withholding of removal and protection under
    the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and we DENY the petition for review.
    Under Section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the burden
    of proof rests with the applicant for withholding of removal to establish that “his or
    her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on
    account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
    political opinion.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (b); see also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3).
    Substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the BIA’s
    determination that Perez-Renderos has not borne his burden of proof in connecting
    the gang harassment directed toward him with membership in a cognizable social
    group. Perez-Renderos did not provide sufficient evidence to show that his
    proposed group of persons who spoke to the police about gang members is viewed
    by Salvadoran society as socially distinct. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
    , 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Nor did petitioner establish that the
    gangs targeted him because he reported his 1996 attack to the police. The seven-
    year gap between the 1996 and the 2003 attacks, and the lack of evidence that the
    2003 gang members were aware of his 1996 report, support the conclusion that he
    was not targeted because of the limited information he gave to the police in 1996.
    2
    Substantial evidence on the record as a whole also supports the BIA’s
    determination that petitioner did not bear his burden of proof for his CAT claim.
    His evidence did not establish “a particularized threat of torture.” See Dhital v.
    Mukasey, 
    532 F.3d 1044
    , 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Almaghzar v. Gonzales,
    
    457 F.3d 915
    , 923 (9th Cir. 2006)); cf. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 
    846 F.3d 351
    ,
    363 (9th Cir. 2017).
    Nor did petitioner demonstrate that any such torture would occur with the
    consent or acquiescence of the government or its officials. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(7) (“Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official,
    prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and
    thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
    activity.”); see also Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2014)
    (stating that “[e]vidence that the police were aware of a particular crime, but failed
    to bring the perpetrators to justice, is not in itself sufficient to establish
    acquiescence in the crime”). In 1996, the police took steps toward investigating
    the incident. The police went to the hospital after Perez-Renderos’s 1996 attack to
    ask him how his accident happened, and the police told him that they would
    investigate the incident. However, Perez-Renderos did not provide the police with
    identification or descriptions of his attackers in 1996, and he did not follow up with
    3
    the police after the hospital visit. After the 2003 attack, petitioner did not call the
    police.
    The petition for review is DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-73392

Filed Date: 6/12/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/12/2019