United States v. Kevin Taylor ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 14 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    18-10235
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 4:09-cr-00398-SBA-4
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KEVIN MICHAEL TAYLOR,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 10, 2019**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RAYES,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the
    District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    Defendant-Appellant Kevin Michael Taylor appeals the district court’s
    revocation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.
    1. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Taylor’s supervised release.
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(h)–(i); see United States v. Wing, 
    682 F.3d 861
    , 864–65 (9th
    Cir. 2012) (“In 18 U.S.C. § 3583, Congress has established a scheme where
    separate and distinct terms of supervised release may be imposed upon a repeat
    offender of supervised release conditions.”).
    2. Taylor’s due process rights were not violated by the delay in his
    revocation hearing. Although a supervised releasee has a due process right to have
    his revocation hearing held “within a reasonable time,” Fed. R. Crim P. 32.1(b)(2),
    “relief is not called for unless there was both unreasonable delay and prejudice,”
    United States v. Santana, 
    526 F.3d 1257
    , 1260 (9th Cir. 2008). Even if we were to
    assume that Taylor’s revocation hearing was unreasonably delayed, the delay
    caused no prejudice. Taylor was not in custody during this time, and he identifies
    no concrete way in which the delay prejudiced him or his defense.
    3. Balancing Taylor’s interest in confrontation against the Government’s
    cause for denying it, the district court did not violate Taylor’s due process rights by
    considering hearsay evidence during the revocation hearing. See United States v.
    Comito, 
    177 F.3d 1166
    , 1170 (9th Cir. 1999). Although the evidence at issue was
    2
    important to the district court’s ultimate finding, the Government’s interest in
    presenting this evidence through Taylor’s probation officer, rather than divert drug
    testing and treatment employees from their work, sufficiently outweighed Taylor’s
    interest in confrontation, which was lessened by the fact that he did not contest the
    authenticity or credibility of the evidence before the district court, and evidence
    like the drug treatment center’s no-show reports is generally considered reliable.
    See United States v. Hall, 
    419 F.3d 980
    , 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
    Martin, 
    984 F.2d 308
    , 314 (9th Cir. 1993).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-10235

Filed Date: 6/14/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/14/2019