Daniel Mannion v. Nancy Berryhill ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 14 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DANIEL MANNION,                                 No.    17-36026
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            No. 1:17-cv-00008-MA
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
    Commissioner Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 12, 2019**
    Before:      FARRIS, LEAVY, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
    Daniel Mannion appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
    benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
    The administrative law judge (ALJ) did not err in determining that
    Mannion’s impairment did not meet or equal Listing 8.06 for hidradenitis
    suppurativa (“HS”). The evidence does not demonstrate that Mannion’s condition
    fulfills the requirements of Listing 8.06. Specifically, Mannion has not shown his
    lesions are “extensive,” meaning that they “result in a very serious limitation,”
    such as those that interfere with joint motion and “very seriously limit” use of
    more than one extremity, those on the palms of both hands that “very seriously
    limit” fine and gross motor movements, or those “on the soles of both feet, the
    perineum, or both inguinal areas that very seriously limit your ability to ambulate.”
    
    20 C.F.R. § 404
    , Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 8.00(C)(1). Mannion has not pointed to
    medical records showing that his lesions very seriously limit the use of his
    extremities, his fine and gross motor movements, or his ability to ambulate. His
    medical records instead indicate that his lesions did not affect these types of
    movements.
    The ALJ did not err in determining Mannion’s condition does not equal
    Listing 8.06. At the hearing before the ALJ, Mannion did not offer a specific
    theory to establish equivalence. The ALJ therefore was not required to analyze the
    evidence to make an equivalency determination. See Burch v. Barnhart, 
    400 F.3d 676
    , 683 (9th Cir. 2005).
    2
    The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Mannion’s
    testimony, citing inconsistencies between Mannion’s reported daily activities and
    his alleged symptoms, inconsistencies between Mannion’s testimony and other
    evidence in the record, and a lack of supporting medical evidence. See Molina v.
    Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
    
    554 F.3d 1219
    , 1227 (9th Cir. 2009). An ALJ may rely on evidence that the
    claimant’s condition “ha[s] remained constant for a number of years” and “ha[s]
    not prevented [the claimant] from working over that time.” Gregory v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 664
    , 666-67 (9th Cir. 1988).
    The ALJ did not err by isolating periods of improvement in Mannion’s
    condition when evaluating his testimony in light of his daily activities. The ALJ’s
    discussion reviewed evidence of the severity of Mannion’s condition at various
    times from 2012 through 2015. The ALJ reasonably interpreted Mannion’s ability
    to take part in daily activities such as driving, shopping, and working part time
    from home as inconsistent with his allegations that he is unable to perform
    sedentary work. While Mannion objects to the district court’s reasoning that
    Mannion’s “symptom testimony is not credible because there are long periods
    when [he] has not sought medical treatment for his [HS],” the ALJ did not proffer
    this as a reason in support of discounting Mannion’s testimony. The court
    3
    “review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 
    871 F.3d 664
    , 675 (9th Cir. 2017).
    Mannion’s contention that the ALJ erred by posing an incomplete
    hypothetical to the vocational expert assumes the ALJ erred in evaluating
    Mannion’s testimony. Because the ALJ did not commit harmful error when
    evaluating Mannion’s testimony, this contention lacks merit. See Stubbs-
    Danielson v. Astrue, 
    539 F.3d 1169
    , 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008).
    AFFIRMED.
    4