Joseph Tribble v. Jim Gibbons , 415 F. App'x 828 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FEB 24 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOSEPH TRIBBLE,                                  No. 09-17810
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00216-ECR-
    VPC
    v.
    JIM GIBBONS, Governor; et al.,                   MEMORANDUM *
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Edward C. Reed, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 15, 2011 **
    Before:        CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Joseph Tribble, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
    court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging that the
    conditions of his parole hearing violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
    rights and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Nelson v. Heiss, 
    271 F.3d 891
    , 893
    (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal for failure to state a claim); Yanez v. United States, 
    63 F.3d 870
    , 872 (9th Cir. 1995) (judgment on the pleadings). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Tribble’s Eighth Amendment claim
    because the procedures used at his parole hearing do not offend “contemporary
    standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 
    509 U.S. 25
    , 36 (1993).
    The district court properly dismissed Tribble’s Fourteenth Amendment due
    process claim because Nevada law does not create a liberty interest in parole. See
    Moor v. Palmer, 
    603 F.3d 658
    , 662 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson,
    
    544 U.S. 74
    , 81-82 (2005) (prisoner may challenge procedures used in parole
    hearing under section 1983, provided he does not seek “immediate or speedier
    release”).
    The district court properly dismissed Tribble’s Ex Post Facto claim because
    he did not allege retroactive application of a law that significantly risked increasing
    his punishment. See id. at 663 (in the parole context, the ex post facto inquiry
    focuses on whether the amended rule creates a significant risk of prolonging a
    prisoner’s incarceration).
    2                                    09-17810
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tribble’s request
    for appointment of counsel because he failed to show exceptional circumstances.
    See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 
    616 F.2d 1089
    , 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
    Tribble’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    09-17810