Allied Professionals Insurance v. Joanne Kong ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              AUG 16 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALLIED PROFESSIONALS                             No. 10-56968
    INSURANCE COMPANY, an Arizona
    corporation,                                     D.C. No. 8:10-cv-00414-AG-MLG
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    JOANNE KONG, an individual,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 11, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before: NOONAN and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER, Chief District
    Judge.**
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable James E. Gritzner, Chief United States District Judge
    for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    Joanne Kong appeals the district court’s order affirming an arbitration award
    in favor of Allied Professionals Insurance Company. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    I. Middle District of Florida Ruling
    As an initial matter, because “appeals from reviewable decisions of the
    district . . . court[] shall be taken to . . . the court of appeals for the circuit
    embracing the district,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1294
     (emphasis added), we do not reach
    Kong’s assertion that the District Court for the Middle District of Florida erred by
    denying Kong’s motion to remand and by granting Allied’s motion to compel
    arbitration. Accordingly, this disposition has no preclusive effect on Kong’s
    arguments that this case should be remanded to Florida state court because the
    District Court for the Middle District of Florida lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (c); and that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 1012
    (b), Florida’s insurance law reverse preempts the Federal Arbitration Act
    (“FAA”), 
    9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
    , and prohibited the District Court for the Middle
    District of Florida from compelling arbitration in Orange County, California.
    II. Central District of California Ruling
    The appeal from the order of the District Court for the Central District of
    California enforcing the arbitration award is properly before this court and is
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    reviewed de novo. See New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc.,
    
    501 F.3d 1101
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2007). “A federal court may vacate an award if the
    arbitrator engages in misbehavior that prejudices a party, or if the arbitrator
    exceeds his powers in rendering such an award.” Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent
    Techs., Inc., 
    442 F.3d 727
    , 731 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 
    9 U.S.C. § 10
    (a)(3)-(4)).
    Under § 10 of the FAA, “[a]rbitrators exceed their powers in this regard not when
    they merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the award is
    completely irrational, or exhibits a manifest disregard of law.” Id. (quoting
    Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 
    341 F.3d 987
    , 997 (9th Cir.
    2003) (en banc)). To vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law,
    “[i]t must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable
    law and then ignored it.” Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
    
    607 F.3d 634
    , 641 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    We reject Kong’s allegation that the District Court for the Central District of
    California lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Diversity of citizenship provides an
    independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.
    v. Mercury Const. Corp., 
    460 U.S. 1
    , 25 n.32 (1983). Complete diversity exists
    here because Kong is a Florida resident and Allied is an Arizona corporation. See
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    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a). The amount in controversy requirement is also satisfied
    because the subject of the arbitration was whether the Allied policy at issue
    covered an injury Kong suffered and the enforceability of an agreement between
    Kong and Allied’s insured purportedly awarding Kong $1,115,000 compensatory
    damages and assigning Kong the right to enforce the award against Allied. See 
    id.
    Kong’s personal jurisdiction challenge is similarly deficient because the
    policy’s forum selection clause provided the district court with personal
    jurisdiction, see United States v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd., 
    563 F.3d 907
    , 929 n.14
    (9th Cir. 2009), and venue was proper because Orange County, California, is
    within the Central District of California, see 
    9 U.S.C. § 9
     (stating that an
    application for the enforcement of an arbitration award “may be made to the
    United States court in and for the district within which such award was made”).
    Kong’s final argument that the arbitrator demonstrated manifest disregard of
    the law by allowing the report of Allied’s expert witness in violation of Federal
    Rule of Evidence 26 is unavailing. Even if such a violation occurred, it would not
    constitute a basis upon which to vacate the arbitration award. See U.S. Life Ins.
    Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co., 
    591 F.3d 1167
    , 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen
    interpreting and applying the FAA, we are mindful not to impose the federal
    courts’ procedural and evidentiary requirements on the arbitration proceeding;
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    rather, our responsibility is to ensure that the FAA’s due process protections were
    afforded.”).
    Kong has failed to demonstrate that the arbitration award constitutes
    manifest disregard of the law.
    III. Motion for Sanctions
    Following oral argument, Allied filed a motion under Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 38 and 
    28 U.S.C. §1927
     requesting that we impose sanctions
    on Kong’s attorney for filing a frivolous appeal. We note that Kong has not taken
    the most prudent course in prosecuting her case, has been sanctioned at other
    stages of this litigation, and has caused undue delay in other forums. In addressing
    Kong’s appeal from the enforcement of the arbitration award that is before this
    court, however, we cannot say that Kong’s “arguments of error are wholly without
    merit.” Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 
    556 F.3d 815
    , 828 (9th Cir.
    2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Allied’s Motion for Sanctions is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
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