John Doe I v. Nestle, USA ( 2015 )


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  •                    FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II;               No. 10-56739
    JOHN DOE III, individually
    and on behalf of proposed                D.C. No.
    class members; GLOBAL              2:05-CV-05133-SVW-
    EXCHANGE,                                  JTL
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                     ORDER AND
    AMENDED ORDER
    NESTLE USA, INC.; ARCHER
    DANIELS MIDLAND
    COMPANY; CARGILL
    INCORPORATED COMPANY;
    CARGILL COCOA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Filed May 6, 2015
    Amended June 10, 2015
    Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Kim McLane Wardlaw,
    and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.
    Order;
    Amended Order;
    Dissent by Judge Bea
    2                         DOE V. NESTLE
    SUMMARY*
    Alien Tort Statute
    The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing and, on
    behalf of the court, a petition for rehearing en banc.
    Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
    Bea, joined by Judges O’Scannlain, Gould, Tallman, Bybee,
    Callahan, M. Smith, and N.R. Smith, wrote that the panel
    majority had substituted sympathy for legal analysis in
    concluding that the defendant corporations engaged in the
    Ivory Coast cocoa trade with the purpose that the plaintiffs be
    enslaved, hence aiding and abetting the slavers and plantation
    owners. Judge Bea wrote that the panel majority’s conclusion
    was wrong, created a split with the Second and Fourth
    Circuits, and conflicted with Supreme Court doctrine
    interpreting the Alien Tort Statute.
    ORDER
    The order denying the petition for rehearing/rehearing en
    banc, filed on May 6, 2015, is hereby amended at Page 2,
    Line 3, to add the sentence:
    Judges Graber, Ikuta, Watford, Owens,
    and Friedland did not participate in the
    deliberations or vote in this case.
    SO ORDERED.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    DOE V. NESTLE                         3
    AMENDED ORDER
    Judge Rawlinson voted to grant the petition for rehearing
    and petition for rehearing en banc.
    Judge Nelson and Judge Wardlaw voted to deny the
    petition for panel rehearing. Judge Wardlaw voted to deny
    the petition for rehearing en banc and Judge Nelson so
    recommended.
    The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en
    banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the
    matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the
    votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc
    consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35.
    Judges Graber, Ikuta, Watford, Owens, and Friedland did
    not participate in the deliberations or vote in this case.
    The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for
    rehearing en banc are DENIED.
    Judge Bea’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc
    is filed concurrently with this order.
    4                             DOE V. NESTLE
    BEA, Circuit Judge, with whom O’SCANNLAIN, GOULD,
    TALLMAN, BYBEE, CALLAHAN, M. SMITH, AND N.R.
    SMITH, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of
    rehearing en banc:
    Unfortunately, the panel majority here has substituted
    sympathy for legal analysis. I quite agree plaintiffs are
    deserving of sympathy. They are alleged former child slaves
    of Malian descent, dragooned from their homes and forced to
    work as slaves on cocoa plantations in the Ivory Coast. But
    they do not bring this action against the slavers who
    kidnapped them, nor against the plantation owners who
    mistreated them. Instead the panel majority concludes that
    defendant corporations, who engaged in the Ivory Coast
    cocoa trade, did so with the purpose that plaintiffs be
    enslaved, hence aiding and abetting the slavers and plantation
    owners. By this metric, buyers of Soviet gold had the
    purpose of facilitating gulag prison slavery.
    How was the cocoa buyers’ purpose shown? By their
    purchase of cocoa and their conduct of “commercial
    activities [such] as resource development,” conduct one of
    our sister circuits has explained does not establish that a
    defendant acted with the required purpose.1 The panel
    majority’s conclusion is wrong. Even the plaintiffs admit
    defendants intended only to maximize profits, not harm
    children through slavery.2 It also creates a circuit split with
    the Second and Fourth Circuits.
    1
    Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
    582 F.3d 244
    ,
    264 (2d. Cir. 2009).
    2
    Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 
    766 F.3d 1013
    , 1025 (9th Cir. 2014).
    DOE V. NESTLE                          5
    But the consequences of the majority’s decision do not
    end there—the majority leads us into open conflict with
    Supreme Court doctrine interpreting the Alien Tort Statute
    (“ATS”). The Court unequivocally requires that federal
    judges who are fashioning federal common law torts for
    violations of customary international law under the ATS
    operate under a “restrained conception” of the extent of such
    liability. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
    542 U.S. 692
    , 725–26
    (2004). The panel majority flouts that requirement by
    permitting a broad expansion of liability under the ATS. The
    panel majority allows a single plaintiff’s civil action to effect
    an embargo of trade with foreign nations, forcing the
    judiciary to trench upon the authority of Congress and the
    President. And in the process, the majority creates a second
    circuit split by misinterpreting the Supreme Court’s decision
    in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 
    133 S. Ct. 1659
     (2013),
    as creating a new test for when the presumption against
    extraterritorial application of United States law is rebutted,
    rather than incorporating the settled doctrine of Morrison v.
    National Australia Bank Ltd., 
    561 U.S. 247
     (2010).
    For these reasons, our court should have corrected the
    panel’s mistake by granting a hearing en banc, and I
    respectfully dissent from the order denying rehearing.
    I begin by bringing to mind the basic principles of ATS
    litigation. The text of the ATS gives the federal district
    courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
    a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
    treaty of the United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1350
    . The Supreme
    Court has held that the ATS does not create a substantive tort
    action; instead, the statute is purely a grant of jurisdiction.
    Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
    542 U.S. 692
    , 724 (2004). ATS
    actions thus sound in federal common law. 
    Id.
     But because
    6                         DOE V. NESTLE
    there are “good reasons for a restrained conception of the
    discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a
    new cause of action of this kind,” an ATS claim must “rest on
    a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
    world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
    features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”
    
    Id.
     at 725–26.3 Those “good reasons” include the general
    presumption against judge-made law, the paucity of early
    cases utilizing the ATS’s jurisdictional grant, the disfavoring
    of court-created private rights of action, the risk that ATS
    litigation poses to the foreign relations of the United States,
    and the absence of an affirmative congressional mandate to
    engage in “judicial creativity” by crafting new norms. 
    Id.
     at
    726–28. Indeed, Sosa repeatedly emphasizes the need for
    restraint in extending liability to a defendant who is “a private
    actor such as a corporation or individual.” 
    Id.
     at 732 n.20.
    As the majority opinion in this case recognizes, the
    Supreme Court’s list of requirements for an ATS action is not
    exhaustive; instead, the Sosa opinion’s standard “is
    suggestive rather than precise, and is perhaps best understood
    as the statement of a mood—and the mood is one of caution.”
    Doe, 766 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Flomo v. Firestone Natural
    Rubber Co., LLC, 
    643 F.3d 1013
    , 1016 (7th Cir. 2011)). In
    light of its recognition of these principles, the majority’s
    errors are all the more curious.
    I turn now to the particulars of this case. Plaintiffs,
    alleged former child slaves who worked on cocoa plantations
    in the Ivory Coast, have sued the defendant chocolate
    companies on the theory that by purchasing the chocolate
    3
    Those paradigms are “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
    rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Sosa, 
    542 U.S. at 724
    .
    DOE V. NESTLE                                7
    produced by Ivorian plantations, providing technical
    assistance4 to the plantations, and lobbying Congress for a
    voluntary alternative to the mandatory “slave-free” licensing
    scheme Congress was considering, the defendants aided and
    abetted a violation of customary international law: child
    slavery.
    I agree with the majority and the plaintiffs that child
    slavery is a violation of customary international law. And I
    further agree that aiding and abetting a crime is itself a crime,
    with its own actus reus and mens rea elements. The parties
    in this case dispute what is the correct mens rea standard for
    ATS aiding and abetting liability. Defendants claim that a
    showing that they acted purposefully to bring about (or
    maintain) the use of slavery to produce cocoa is required to
    confer liability. Plaintiffs claim that knowledge that slavery
    was so employed, together with acts of defendants which
    circumstantially benefit the slaver, is enough; specific intent
    (purpose) that slavery be facilitated need not be alleged.
    Plaintiffs candidly admit they cannot in good faith allege
    defendants acted with the specific intent to promote slavery
    and thus harm children.
    The panel majority did not accept plaintiffs’ assertion that
    knowledge that cocoa growers employed slavery makes out
    the mens rea element of aiding and abetting liability. Rather,
    they recognized that “two of our sister circuits have
    concluded that knowledge is insufficient and that an aiding
    and abetting ATS defendant must act with the purpose of
    facilitating the criminal act . . . .” 
    Id.
     at 1023 (citing Aziz v.
    Alcolac, Inc., 
    658 F.3d 388
    , 399–400 (4th Cir. 2011);
    4
    The technical assistance is not alleged to have included whips, chains,
    or other implements of slavery.
    8                           DOE V. NESTLE
    Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
    
    582 F.3d 244
    , 259 (2d Cir. 2009)). However, the majority
    decided that it need not reach the question whether
    knowledge was a sufficient mens rea, because plaintiffs’
    allegations met the purpose standard. In particular, though
    plaintiffs “conceded that the defendants did not have the
    subjective motive to harm children,” and alleged only that
    “the defendants’ motive was finding cheap sources of cocoa,”
    the majority found that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
    defendants had the purpose of aiding child slavery because of
    defendants’ “myopic focus on profit over human welfare.”5
    Doe, 766 F.3d at 1025–26. Thus, pursuit of profit over
    human welfare, in the majority’s eyes, allows a jury to find
    the defendants specifically intended not merely to buy cocoa
    cheap, but to promote slavery as a means of buying cheap.6
    5
    Plaintiffs allege four types of conduct that, taken together, are meant
    to show the defendants acted with the purpose of aiding and abetting
    slavery. First, the defendants bought the slavers’ cocoa. Second, the
    defendants supplied the plantation owners with money, equipment and
    training for the cultivation of cocoa, while defendants knew the continued
    and expanded profitability of those farmers would facilitate the use of
    child slave labor; defendants continue to establish and honor those
    agreements today. Third, the defendants lobbied against Congressional
    efforts to curb the use of child slaves by, for example, opposing a bill that
    would require United States importers to certify and label their products
    “slave free.” The companies instead urged and secured the adoption of a
    private, voluntary enforcement mechanism for “slave free” certification,
    similar to the regime for “fair trade” coffee imports into the U.S. Fourth,
    though the corporations have enough market power effectively to control
    Ivory Coast’s cocoa markets, and could use that power to stop or limit the
    use of child slave labor if they so chose; they have taken no such action.
    6
    The panel majority does not explain how this pleading could make
    plausible a finding of purpose to promote slavery in light of the concession
    from the plaintiffs that the defendants did not have the purpose of
    promoting slavery. See Doe, 766 F.3d at 1025. After all, one would
    DOE V. NESTLE                                9
    In so reasoning, regardless what the majority contends, it
    was most certainly not following Aziz. There, the Fourth
    Circuit noted that defendant Alcolac had sold chemicals that
    could be used to produce lethal mustard gas with full
    knowledge of that possible use, despite having been told that
    the chemical in question was subject to U.S. export
    restrictions. The chemical was sold to a company defendant
    Alcolac knew was a shell company designed to evade those
    export restrictions.
    Through the shell company, the chemicals eventually
    reached Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, which used the
    chemicals to create mustard gas it then used to killed
    thousands of Kurds. Aziz, 
    658 F.3d at
    390–91. Plaintiffs
    alleged, in sum, that Alcolac sold its chemicals “with actual
    or constructive knowledge that such quantities [of the
    chemicals] would ultimately be used by Iraq in the
    manufacture of mustard gas to attack the Kurds.” 
    Id. at 394
    .
    Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit held plaintiffs had not
    adequately alleged purposeful violation of customary
    international law by Alcolac. 
    Id. at 401
    . That is, the
    allegations that Alcolac knew how the chemicals would be
    used did not amount to an allegation that Alcolac harbored
    specific intent (i.e. purpose) that the Kurds be gassed, and
    thereby accomplish a form of genocide.
    The contradiction with the majority’s holding is obvious.
    If selling chemicals with the knowledge that the chemicals
    will be used to create lethal chemical weapons does not
    assume that a panel, having concluded that the plaintiff must show
    purpose, would find that a plaintiff who concedes the defendant lacks that
    purpose has briefed himself out of his case. The panel majority’s contrary
    decision is unexplained and, I submit, inexplicable.
    10                           DOE V. NESTLE
    constitute purpose that people be killed, how can purchasing
    cocoa with the knowledge that slave labor may have lowered
    its sale price constitute purpose that people be enslaved? The
    majority replies that “the defendants [in Aziz] had nothing to
    gain from the violations of international law.” Doe, 766 F.3d
    at 1024. Demonstrably not so—the more Saddam Hussein
    used chemical weapons to kill his opponents, the more of
    Alcolac’s chemicals he would need and thus the higher the
    sales of Alcolac’s products; the higher their sales, of course,
    the higher their profit.7
    The majority fares no better with its characterization of
    the Second Circuit’s decision in Talisman, which should
    come as no surprise since the Fourth Circuit’s Aziz opinion
    explicitly relied on Talisman. Aziz, 
    658 F.3d at 398
    .
    Talisman Energy (“Talisman”), a Canadian oil corporation,
    was part of a conglomerate that had a business arrangement
    with the Sudanese government whereby Talisman extracted
    oil in several regions of Sudan. Talisman and its
    conglomerate worked closely with the Sudanese government:
    Talisman upgraded airstrips for the Sudanese government,
    who used the airstrips were used to conduct bombing raids on
    the ethnic South Sudanese; Talisman considered expanding
    its oil-exploration area into South Sudan despite knowing the
    government would kill the local inhabitants to give Talisman
    the land; Talisman paid royalties to the Sudanese
    government,       knowing the money would go to the
    7
    The plaintiffs in Aziz alleged that Alcolac had sold one million pounds
    of its chemicals to the shell corporation, on the understanding that the
    shell corporation “intended to place further orders in the three to six
    million pound range annually.” Aziz, 
    658 F.3d at 391
    . It belies economic
    reality to suggest that an order of that size provides no benefit to the seller
    of goods.
    DOE V. NESTLE                               11
    continuation of the ethnic genocide8 perpetrated by the
    government against the South Sudanese people; and, the
    conglomerate provided fuel to Sudanese government military
    aircraft taking off on bombing missions in pursuit of its
    genocidal aims. Talisman, 
    582 F.3d at 262
    . Nevertheless,
    the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs (Southern Sudanese
    victims of the government’s attacks) had not shown Talisman
    had aided and abetted the Sudanese government’s genocidal
    acts, because “[p]laintiffs d[id] not suggest in their briefs that
    Talisman was a partisan in regional, religious, or ethnic
    hostilities, or that Talisman acted with the purpose to assist
    persecution.” 
    Id. at 263
    . In distinguishing this case, the
    majority makes a point—Talisman was harmed by the
    government’s genocidal conduct to the extent that it
    ultimately had to abandon its Sudanese venture, while Nestle
    continued its cocoa business.9 Doe, 766 F.3d at 1024. But
    the Second Circuit also noted that “if ATS liability could be
    established by knowledge of those abuses coupled only with
    such commercial activities as resource development, the
    statute would act as a vehicle for private parties to impose
    embargos or international sanctions through civil actions in
    United States courts.” Talisman, 
    582 F.3d at 294
    .10
    8
    Genocide is a recognized violation of customary international law.
    Abagninin v. AMVAC Chemical Corp., 
    545 F.3d 733
    , 739 (9th Cir. 2008).
    9
    Of course, Talisman also benefitted from its relationship with the
    military; like any oil company doing business in a region prone to
    violence, it had to “rely on the military for defense.” Talisman, 
    582 F.3d at 262
    .
    10
    An embargo by chocolate manufacturers on Ivory Coast chocolate
    farmers is precisely the predictable economic effect plaintiffs’ successful
    action would have. Indeed, failure to effect an embargo by refusing to
    deal with the plantation owners is precisely the misuse of economic power
    12                          DOE V. NESTLE
    By contrast, defendants here are alleged to have been
    aware that slavery was occurring on the cocoa plantations, but
    not to have done anything to assist directly in the enslavement
    of plaintiffs. Indeed, the plaintiffs in this case do not even
    allege that defendants could not have procured similar prices
    from the Ivorian plantations absent their use of slave
    labor—by technological innovations or the exercise of
    monopsony power, for instance.11 By contrast, Talisman was
    required to acquiesce in the Sudanese government’s misdeeds
    if it wanted to make a profit. It bears emphasis that Alcolac
    and Talisman undoubtedly knew that their actions were
    contributing to great evils: the use of poison gas in Alcolac’s
    case, and genocide in Talisman’s. Nonetheless, the Second
    and Fourth Circuit’s decisions absolved these companies of
    ATS aiding and abetting liability, because plaintiffs’
    allegations did not make it plausible that defendants
    specifically intended Kurd or Southern Sudanese killings.
    which the majority finds sufficient to make plausible the conclusion that
    defendants acted with the purpose to promote slavery. Doe, 766 F.3d at
    1025.
    11
    Nor can the panel majority rely for its answer on the plaintiffs’
    allegations that the corporations trained farmers and lobbied Congress. As
    to farmer training, the complaint alleges that two of the named defendants
    are attempting to change farming and labor practices in the Ivory Coast in
    an effort to reduce the use of child labor; the complaint contains no
    allegation that the third defendant has engaged in any farmer training at
    all. The panel majority cannot be inferring pro-slavery purpose from anti-
    slavery activity. As for the lobbying, plaintiffs themselves allege that the
    corporations’ lobbying efforts had the intent of ensuring child labor free
    chocolate; the plaintiffs then allege that the defendants’ lobbying had the
    effect of allowing child slavery to continue. That the corporations’
    lobbying is alleged to have backfired does not mean that the backfire was
    intended.
    DOE V. NESTLE                              13
    Thus, the panel majority’s claim to have adopted the
    Second and Fourth Circuit’s analysis is simply incorrect. It
    has not done so, and has thus created a circuit split on the
    proper mens rea element for aiding and abetting liability
    under customary international law.
    Moreover, the majority is on the wrong side of the circuit
    split it creates. Sosa requires that the federal courts accept as
    proper bases of a claim for relief only those violations of
    customary international law that have “definite content and
    acceptance among civilized nations.” Thus, if there is
    conflict as to the proper scope of ATS liability, the narrower
    reading should be chosen, as no consensus can be said to exist
    on the broader one. Sosa, 
    542 U.S. at 732
    . As the majority
    opinion recognizes, “the Rome Statute rejects a knowledge
    standard and requires the heightened mens rea of purpose,
    suggesting that a knowledge standard lacks the universal
    acceptance that Sosa demands.”12 Doe, 766 F.3d at 1024.
    The conflict between the Rome Statute’s rejection of
    knowledge and the panel majority’s effective acceptance of
    knowledge is sufficient to eliminate the required consensus.
    In its assessment of our sister circuits and its reading of
    Supreme Court precedent, therefore, the panel majority is
    well off the mark.
    12
    The Rome Statute, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), is the treaty that establishes
    the International Criminal Court. The United States has signed but not
    ratified the treaty. In 2002, Under Secretary of State John Bolton sent a
    letter to then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan which stated that the
    United States did not intend to become a party to the treaty and suspended
    the United States’s signature. See Press Statement of Richard Boucher,
    United States Department of State, May 6, 2002, available at
    http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
    14                          DOE V. NESTLE
    I turn next to the question of extraterritoriality—an
    important one in this case, since all the acts of enslavement
    and maintenance of slavery are alleged to have occurred
    outside United States borders. While this case was pending
    before the panel, the Supreme Court announced its decision
    in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 
    133 S. Ct. 1659
     (2013).
    The Supreme Court held in Kiobel that the presumption
    against extraterritoriality applies to claims brought under the
    ATS; as usual, that presumption is rebuttable.13 
    Id. at 1669
    .
    To be viable, ATS claims must “touch and concern the
    territory of the United States” with “sufficient force to
    displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”
    
    Id.
     (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
    561 U.S. 247
    , 264–273 (2010)).
    The plaintiffs claim Kiobel’s “touch and concern”
    language announces a new test to determine when the
    presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted, while
    defendants argue Kiobel simply adopts the test announced in
    Morrison. Morrison’s text adopted a “focus” test, whereby
    courts must ask whether the defendants engaged in the
    conduct that is the focus of the statute at issue. Morrison,
    
    561 U.S. at
    266–67.14 The panel majority adopted plaintiffs’
    13
    This is the presumption that “when a statute gives no clear indication
    of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Kiobel, 
    133 S. Ct. at 1664
    (brackets omitted) (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
    
    561 U.S. 247
    , 255 (2010)). That is, American statutes—the 1934
    Securities Exchange Act or the 1797 Alien Tort Statute—do not apply to
    actions taken beyond our shores unless Congress tells us to the contrary.
    14
    In Morrison, an Australian bank had purchased a Florida mortgage-
    servicing company, and listed the mortgage-servicing company’s assets
    on its annual reports. It proudly touted the success of the mortgage-
    servicing company’s business and gave it a high valuation. A few years
    DOE V. NESTLE                                15
    view and held that “Morrison may be informative precedent
    for discerning the content of the touch and concern standard,
    but the opinion in Kiobel II did not incorporate Morrison’s
    focus test.” Doe, 766 F.3d at 1028. Respectfully, the
    majority is quite wrong.
    First, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kiobel counsels
    against the majority’s analysis. As the Supreme Court’s
    majority opinion states, though Morrison dealt with acts of
    Congress, “the principles underlying the [Morrison] canon of
    interpretation [which counsel against the Exchange Act’s
    extraterritorial application] similarly constrain courts
    considering causes of action that may be brought under the
    ATS.” Kiobel, 
    133 S. Ct. at 1664
    . Moreover, the Court’s
    explanation of the “touch and concern” language is
    later, however, the bank wrote down the value of the mortgage-servicing
    company’s assets, causing the bank’s share price to drop. 
    Id.
     at 251–53.
    The plaintiffs, Australian shareholders in the bank, brought suit for
    violation of SEC Rule 10b-5, which states that it is unlawful “to use or
    employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
    on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any
    manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
    rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
    prescribe.” Id. at 262 (ellipses and brackets in original). The district court
    dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the conduct occurred abroad,
    and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reclassified the issue
    as merits-based rather than jurisdictional, and affirmed. In light of the
    presumption against the extraterritorial applicability of federal law, the
    Court held that “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place
    where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities
    in the United States.” Id. at 266–67. Because the statute intended only to
    regulate domestic transactions and protect prospective parties to domestic
    transactions alone, the plaintiffs’ claims, which arose out of deception
    occurring in Australia, between Australian buyers and sellers of Australian
    bank shares, were dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.
    16                           DOE V. NESTLE
    encompassed in one citation to Morrison. Id. at 1669.15 The
    meaning is clear: the Supreme Court stated that the Morrison
    presumption against extraterritorial application of American
    statutes is to be applied to ATS cases. And, since the
    15
    Kiobel cites to pages 2883–88 of Morrison. In those pages, the
    Supreme Court explained why the Australian share fraud claims in
    Morrison did not have sufficient “contact with the territory of the United
    States.” Morrison, 
    561 U.S. at 2884
    . The Court first noted that the
    principal purpose of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act was to protect
    transactions on domestic exchanges, as Congress could not regulate
    foreign exchanges. Second, as to securities traded on foreign exchanges,
    the Securities Exchange Act was exclusively focused on domestic
    purchases and sales; here, the transaction had not occurred in the United
    States. 
    Id.
     Furthermore, there was no contemporary statutory context
    suggesting that Congress’s “comprehensive regulation of securities
    trading” was meant to encompass foreign transactions on securities not
    registered in the United States. Id. at 2885. Indeed, the strong risk of
    incompatibility with foreign law counseled against application of the
    Securities and Exchange Act to such transactions. Id. The Court further
    noted, in rejecting the test proposed by the Solicitor General (“SG”), the
    fact that the SG’s test (which asked if “significant and material conduct”
    had happened in the United States) would open the floodgates of class
    action litigation for lawyers representing victims of foreign securities
    fraud. Id. at 2886. Finally, the Court explained that the consistency of the
    SG’s proposed test with international law meant only that adoption of the
    SG’s test would not violate international law, not that it was required by
    international law, and that the SEC’s interpretation was not entitled to
    deference because it was based on cases which the Supreme Court had
    disapproved.
    Thus, a court applying the Morrison test in the ATS context should
    focus on the location of the alleged violation of customary international
    law, statutory indicia that Congress intended U.S. courts to regulate the
    particular conduct at issue, the risk of an increase in future litigation, and
    the existence of a well-founded interpretation of applicable law to which
    the court should defer. All of these considerations point to the conclusion
    that plaintiffs’ claims here lack sufficient contact with the territory of the
    United States.
    DOE V. NESTLE                              17
    presumptions are the same, it follows that the very same
    evidence is needed to rebut either presumption. Moreover,
    the Kiobel opinion cannot have imparted any additional
    meaning to the “touch and concern” test; the Kiobel majority
    did not apply the test or provide any further guideposts as to
    its possible meaning. Against this evidence, the panel
    majority points to the mere use of different language, as well
    as some language in the concurrences of Justices Kennedy
    and Alito in Kiobel, to claim a new but undefined test was
    created by the Court. Doe, 766 F.3d at 1028. This is too thin
    a reed on which to support such an expansive argument.
    Second, the two circuits to consider this issue agree that
    Kiobel simply directs application of the Morrison test; the
    panel majority’s contrary conclusion thus creates another
    circuit split. In Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 
    767 F.3d 1229
     (11th Cir. 2014), the Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]he
    Court in Kiobel looked to Morrison v. National Australia
    Bank Ltd., 
    561 U.S. 247
     (2010), for a discussion of when
    claims that ‘touch and concern the territory of the United
    States’ do so ‘with sufficient force to displace the
    presumption against extraterritorial application.’”16 
    Id.
     at
    16
    Baloco was a Colombian national and the child of a union leader who
    worked for Drummond Ltd. at Drummond’s coal mining operation in
    Colombia. Drummond is a closely-held corporation with its principal
    place of business in Alabama. The union leader was murdered, Baloco
    alleged, by paramilitary members of the AUC, an organization affiliated
    with Colombia’s military which provided security for Drummond’s coal
    mining operation and was engaged in a guerrilla war with FARC. Baloco
    brought suit under the ATS, Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and
    Colombia’s wrongful death statute.        The district court granted
    Drummond’s motion to dismiss Baloco’s ATS claims for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The
    court adopted the presumption that the ATS statute did not touch murders
    occurring outside the United States, and applied the Kiobel “touch and
    18                          DOE V. NESTLE
    1236–37 (quoting Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. At 1669). Similarly, in
    Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 
    770 F.3d 170
    , 182–86 (2d Cir.
    2014), the Second Circuit applied the Morrison “focus” test
    in a post-Kiobel ATS case to determine if the presumption
    against extraterritoriality had been rebutted.17
    concern the territory of the United States” standard to see if the
    presumption was rebutted. The court explained that “[t]he [Supreme]
    Court in Kiobel looked to Morrison for a discussion of when claims that
    ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States’ do so ‘with sufficient
    force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”
    Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1236–37 (quoting Kiobel, 
    133 S. Ct. at 1669
    ).
    Examining the allegations of Baloco’s complaint, Baloco’s “claims are not
    focused within the United States” because the killings occurred in
    Colombia in the context of a guerrilla war in Colombia. Baloco, 767 F.3d
    at 1237–38.
    17
    Mastafa was an Iraqi woman who was the victim of torture by agents
    of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. She brought suit against Chevron,
    alleging that it paid kickbacks and other unlawful payments to the regime
    which enabled the regime to survive and torture her. The district court
    granted Chevron’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel “significantly clarified the
    jurisdictional grant of the ATS with respect to extraterritoriality.”
    Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 181–82. The court noted that in Kiobel, the Supreme
    Court had not explained how this presumption could be displaced; “[t]o
    determine how to undertake the extraterritoriality analysis where plaintiffs
    allege some ‘connections’ to the United States, we first look to the Court’s
    opinion in Morrison.” Id. at 183. The circuit interpreted the Morrison
    methodology as requiring that the conduct which touched and concerned
    the territory of the United States be the conduct which gave rise to ATS
    liability. The circuit then concluded that the only conduct alleged in the
    complaint which touched and concerned the United States (maintenance
    of escrow accounts and arrangement of payments in New York bank
    accounts) did not constitute a violation of customary international law.
    Thus, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction. Applied here, the only conduct of defendants which touched
    and concerned the U.S. were (1) sales of cocoa products in the US and
    DOE V. NESTLE                                 19
    The panel majority’s analysis thus puts our court on one
    side of yet another circuit split; yet again, the majority has
    taken the minority, incorrect side.18
    Finally, I note that this case squarely presents the question
    whether ATS liability should extend to corporations.19 Our
    court’s earlier affirmative answer to this question in the panel
    was vacated by the Supreme Court, making this a question of
    first impression in this circuit. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC,
    
    671 F.3d 736
    , 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated by
    (2) lobbying efforts in the Congress. Neither sales nor lobbying are even
    colorable violations of customary international law.
    18
    There is one other court to have opined on this issue: the Fourth
    Circuit, in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 
    758 F.3d 516
    (4th Cir. 2014). The paragraphs in which the Fourth Circuit decided that
    the Morrison presumption against extraterritorial application was rebutted
    do not cite the “focus” test; of course, those paragraphs also do not cite the
    “touch and concern” test. 
    Id.
     at 528–29. However one interprets the
    Fourth Circuit opinion, it does not affirmatively hold that “the opinion in
    Kiobel II did not incorporate Morrison’s focus test.” Doe, 766 F.3d at
    1028. The majority opinion in this case is the first to come to that
    conclusion. And the panel majority is the first to hold that Kiobel
    necessitates remand of the case to decide whether the presumption against
    extraterritoriality has been vacated, a conclusion the Fourth Circuit did not
    reach.
    19
    A circuit split exists on whether the ATS’s grant of jurisdiction
    extends to claims against corporations. Compare, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone
    Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 
    643 F.3d 1013
    , 1021 (7th Cir. 2011)
    (“[C]orporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute . . . .”) with
    Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
    621 F.3d 111
    , 148–49 (2d. Cir.
    2011) (“[C]orporate liability has not attained a discernable, much less
    universal, acceptance among nations of the world in their relations inter
    se, and it cannot, as a result, form the basis of a suit under the ATS.”).
    20                           DOE V. NESTLE
    
    133 S. Ct. 1995
     (2013).20 The panel majority chose to
    “reaffirm the corporate liability analysis” of Sarei. Doe, 766
    F.3d at 1021. Here again, the majority has erred.
    The Sarei analysis, as the majority adopts it today, comes
    in three parts. First, the analysis of customary international
    law is norm-by-norm, as “there is no categorical rule of
    corporate immunity or liability” in ATS cases. Id. Second,
    corporate liability can be imposed in the absence of
    “international precedent enforcing legal norms against
    corporations.”21 Id. Third, norms that are “‘universal and
    20
    Sarei was vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel
    and the opinion was not reinstated on remand. Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
    
    722 F.3d 1109
     (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Instead, “a majority of the en
    banc court” voted to affirm the district court’s judgment of dismissal with
    prejudice without any further explanation. Thus, the original Sarei en
    banc opinion has no precedential effect.
    21
    In the Sarei en banc court’s words, “[t]hat an international tribunal has
    not yet held a corporation criminally liable does not mean that an
    international tribunal could not or would not hold a corporation criminally
    liable under customary international law.” Sarei, 
    671 F.3d at 761
    . Of
    course, as the Sarei opinion did not state, that an international tribunal has
    not yet held a corporation criminally liable does not mean that an
    international tribunal would hold a corporation criminally liable, either.
    And as the Second Circuit noted in Kiobel, the Sarei panel’s factual
    premise was incorrect: the refusal to extend liability to corporations like
    IG Farben, which aided and abetted Nazi war crimes, was “not a matter
    of happenstance or oversight,” but a careful decision reflecting the central
    moral principle of holding men, not “abstract entities,” accountable for
    evil actions. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 134–35.
    Moreover, as I discuss below, Sarei’s willingness to rush ahead of
    international tribunals’ declarations of law is inconsistent with the
    Supreme Court’s cautious mood in Sosa.
    DOE V. NESTLE                         21
    absolute,’ or applicable to ‘all actors,’ can provide the basis
    for an ATS claim against a corporation.” Id.
    There are many problems with this approach. Our court
    was wrong enough in Sarei to join those circuits which held
    that corporate liability could exist under the ATS. But even
    amongst those circuits that erroneously conclude that
    corporate liability can exist under the ATS, the Sarei
    approach resuscitated by the panel majority distinguishes
    itself as particularly erroneous, in two ways.
    First, the Court has explained that a norm cannot give rise
    to ATS liability unless it is “specific, universal, and
    obligatory.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
    542 U.S. 692
    , 733
    (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
    Litigation, 
    25 F.3d 1467
    , 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). Well and
    good. In this case, the panel majority finds that the norm
    against slavery is sufficiently specific, universal, and
    obligatory to give rise to ATS liability. Doe, 766 F.3d at
    1022. I agree. The majority then says that because of the
    “categorical nature of the prohibition on slavery and the
    moral imperative underlying that prohibition,” corporations
    must be liable for aiding and abetting slavery. Doe, 766 F.3d
    at 1022. But this is circular reasoning: by the panel’s
    reasoning, any norm “categorical” enough to give rise to an
    ATS claim based on customary international law necessarily
    gives rise to corporate liability for violation of that norm.
    And worse yet, the majority’s reasoning contradicts the
    Supreme Court’s teaching in Sosa that there must be a
    meaningful inquiry—not a mere labeling of norms as
    ‘categorical’—as to whether the particular international norm
    at issue, which is assumed to confer liability under the ATS
    generally, would allow for corporate liability in particular.
    Sosa, 
    542 U.S. at
    732 n.20.
    22                          DOE V. NESTLE
    Second, the Sarei opinion rested its analysis on common
    sense inference about “congressional intent when the ATS
    was enacted.” Sarei, 
    671 F.3d at 761
    . Because Congress
    could not have anticipated the “array of international
    institutions that impose liability on states and non-state actors
    alike in modern times,” the Sarei panel refused to be bound
    “to find liability only where international fora have imposed
    liability.” 
    Id.
     But this approach is forestalled by Sosa’s
    reminder that federal courts have “no congressional mandate
    to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the
    law of nations.” Sosa, 
    542 U.S. at 728
    . In light of the
    cautious mood expressed by Sosa, therefore, a desire to “get
    ahead” of international law cannot be followed.
    In sum, the majority’s error violates the Supreme Court’s
    commands and opens our doors to an expansive vision of
    corporate liability.22
    We do the law a disservice when we allow our
    sympathies, no matter how well-founded, to run our decisions
    afoul of the Supreme Court’s unequivocal commands.
    Because this court has done such a disservice by refusing to
    take this case en banc, I respectfully dissent.
    22
    More expansive, even, than the Sarei decision that the Court vacated.
    In the Sarei en banc opinion, we first noted that there was an international
    norm against war crimes, then noted international law cases which
    recognized aiding and abetting liability for war crimes. Sarei, 
    671 F.3d at
    763–66. By contrast, the panel majority here finds an international
    norm against slavery and a general international law principle of aiding
    and abetting liability—without finding such liability applied to
    slavery—and finds those two sufficient to give rise to liability. Thus, the
    panel imposes liability for aiding and abetting slavery without citing a
    single case in which an international tribunal recognized the applicability
    of this form of liability for this particular norm.