Ernest Kish, Jr. v. Carolyn W. Colvin , 552 F. App'x 650 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JAN 10 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ERNEST KISH, Jr.,                                 No. 12-35867
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 3:11-cv-06045-KLS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner,
    Social Security Administration,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Karen L. Strombom, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 4, 2013
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
    Claimant Ernest Kish, Jr. appeals the denial of his application for disability
    insurance benefits. The denial of benefits was affirmed below by a magistrate
    judge reviewing on consent of the parties.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Claimant’s application by
    relying primarily on a determination that Claimant was not credible and
    discounting a psychological evaluation concluding that he suffers from depression.
    The ALJ discounted the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Jeffrey
    Hart concluding that Claimant suffered from depression. The evaluation was
    completed more than a year after Claimant’s last insured date. Tidwell v. Apfel,
    
    161 F.3d 599
    , 601 (9th Cir. 1998) (the disability must exist “on or before” the
    applicant’s last insured date). The ALJ mentioned the timing factor, but gave other
    reasons for declining to consider Dr. Hart’s evaluation. The district court,
    however, primarily relied on the timing consideration in affirming the ALJ’s
    rejection of Dr. Hart’s evaluation. Evaluations conducted after the last insured date
    can still be relevant to assessing a claimant’s condition during the appropriate
    period. Smith v. Bowen, 
    849 F.2d 1222
    , 1225 (9th Cir. 1988). There is no basis
    for concluding that Claimant’s condition as evaluated by Dr. Hart did not exist
    prior to his last insured date, and the ALJ offered none. There was therefore no
    basis for discounting the weight of Dr. Hart’s evaluation because of timing.
    As the district court observed, the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Hart’s
    opinion on the ground that petitioner had paid for it. Lester v. Chater, 
    81 F.3d 821
    ,
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    832 (9th Cir. 1995) (absent evidence of actual improprieties, an evaluation cannot
    be dismissed because of the motive for obtaining it).
    We agree with the district court’s conclusion that many of the reasons given
    to discredit Claimant’s testimony were invalid. The ALJ and the district court
    determined, nonetheless, that Claimant’s testimony as to his physical condition and
    daily activities was inconsistent with his attendance at school. However, any
    inconsistency between Kish’s attendance at a full-time vocational education
    program and his testimony regarding his limited daily activities is not sufficiently
    substantial to support the ALJ’s credibility finding. Moreover, the record shows
    that Claimant received accommodations to aid his school attendance. School
    attendance is often not as physically taxing as full-time employment, and it is not
    clear from the record that Claimant was able to sustain school attendance even with
    the accommodation. The ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s testimony was not credible
    is not supported by substantial evidence. On remand, the ALJ must therefore
    credit claimant’s testimony as to the severity of his symptoms, including his
    testimony as to pain, or make an adverse credibility finding that is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    Dr. Hart’s evaluation was objective medical evidence indicating that
    Claimant suffered from depression, and the record was ambiguous only as to the
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    severity of the condition. The Claimant requested a consultative examination to
    resolve inadequacies and ambiguities in the medical record as to his depression.
    Where the evidence is inadequate or ambiguous, the ALJ has a duty to conduct an
    appropriate inquiry. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 
    242 F.3d 1144
    , 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 
    80 F.3d 1273
    , 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)). When the
    severity of a claimant’s disorder cannot be determined, the appropriate course is to
    request a consultative evaluation, and failure to do so is good cause for remand.
    Carrillo Marin v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 
    758 F.2d 14
    , 17 (1st Cir.
    1985). The ALJ should have ordered a consultative evaluation.
    The ALJ also erred by disregarding Claimant’s limited ability to do work
    with his dominant left hand. The left-hand limitation was documented in a
    physical capacities evaluation, which Claimant’s treating doctor, Dr. Nehls
    adopted, and was supported by examining physician Dr. James F. Harris’
    evaluation. Dr. Nehls’ opinion is uncontroverted and should be given controlling
    weight. Orn v. Astrue, 
    495 F.3d 625
    , 631 (9th Cir. 2007). On remand, the ALJ
    should include that limitation in the residual functional capacity assessment. We
    therefore reverse and remand for further development of the record in accordance
    with this disposition.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    4