Victory Processing, LLC v. Tim Fox ( 2019 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VICTORY PROCESSING, LLC; DAVE                      No. 18-35163
    DISHAW,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,                  D.C. No.
    6:17-cv-00027-
    v.                                CCL
    TIM FOX, in his official capacity as
    Attorney General for the State of                    OPINION
    Montana,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Charles C. Lovell, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 7, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed September 10, 2019
    Before: Ronald M. Gould and Richard A. Paez, Circuit
    Judges, and Janis Graham Jack, * District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Paez
    *
    The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    2                 VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    SUMMARY **
    Civil Rights
    The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of the Attorney General of Montana and
    remanded in an action alleging that Montana’s Robocall
    Statute, Montana Code section 45-8-216(1)(e), which
    restricts automated telephone calls promoting a political
    campaign or any use related to a political campaign, violates
    the First Amendment.
    The panel explained that regulating robocalls based on
    the content of their messaging presents a more severe threat
    to First Amendment freedoms than regulating their time,
    place, and manner. In particular, prohibiting political
    robocalls strikes at the heart of the First Amendment, as well
    as disproportionately disadvantages political candidates with
    fewer resources.
    The panel held that plaintiff had standing to challenge
    the Robocall Statute. The panel noted that as an integral part
    of its operations, plaintiff engages in political consulting and
    public opinion polling primarily through the use of
    automated telephone calls. Plaintiff alleged that it had
    sustained injury, the injury was traceable to the Robocall
    Statute, and the relief plaintiff sought would redress its own
    alleged injuries.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                    3
    The panel determined that because Montana’s Robocall
    Statute was plainly content-based, strict scrutiny applied.
    The panel held that Montana demonstrated a compelling
    state interest—protecting personal privacy—in regulating
    automated telephone calls. The panel held, however, that the
    Robocall Statute was not narrowly tailored to further the
    state’s interest in protecting privacy. The panel held that the
    statute was both underinclusive and overinclusive. It was
    underinclusive because by singling out only five topics of
    robocalling for regulation—including messages related to
    political campaigns—the Robocall Statute left consumers
    open to an unlimited proliferation of robocalls on other
    topics. The statute was overinclusive because robocalls
    related to political campaigns had not been shown to pose a
    threat to individual privacy. The panel concluded that the
    Robocall Statute’s restriction on political messages did not
    survive strict scrutiny.
    COUNSEL
    Blake E. Johnson (argued) and Katherine J. Spohn, Bruning
    Law Group, Lincoln, Nebraska; James E. Brown, The James
    Brown Law Office PLLC, Helena, Montana; for Plaintiffs-
    Appellants.
    Patrick M. Risken (argued), Assistant Attorney General;
    Timothy C. Fox, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney
    General, Helena, Montana; for Defendant-Appellee.
    4                VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    OPINION
    PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
    We must decide whether Montana Code section 45-8-
    216(1)(e)—which restricts automated telephone calls
    promoting a political campaign or any use related to a
    political campaign—violates the First Amendment. We
    hold that it does.
    Although automated telephone calls, or robocalls, fall
    within the First Amendment’s protection, they are subject to
    regulation—and for good reason. In 2018, studies estimated
    that Americans received between 25 and 40 billion
    robocalls—a 45 to 60% increase from the prior year. 1 Most
    of these robocalls cause only harmless annoyances. Some
    are even useful, such as automated appointment or payment
    reminders. At their worst, though, robocalls provide a cheap
    vehicle for scammers masquerading as the Internal Revenue
    Service, banks, or utility providers; promising nonexistent
    preapproved loans or loan forgiveness; and more—aiming to
    finagle money and sensitive information from unsuspecting
    consumers. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Yes, It’s Bad.
    Robocalls, and Their Scams, Are Surging., N.Y. Times,
    1
    See Kate Fazzini, Robocalls Jumped 60 Percent in the U.S. Last
    Year and Scammers Are Finding More Ways to Make Money, CNBC,
    Jan. 4, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/02/as-robo-calling-ramps-
    up-consumers-increasingly-wonder-why-carriers-cant-stop-scammers-
    from-spoofing-their-phone-numbers.html; Paige Leskin & Prachi
    Bhardwaj, Americans Were Hit with 26.3 Billion Robocalls in 2018, a
    Whopping 46% Increase from the Year Before—Here Are Some Ways to
    Stop Them, May 2, 2019, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-stop-
    robocalls-to-cell-phone-explained-2018-5.
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                     5
    May 6, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/your-
    money/robocalls-rise-illegal.html.
    That robocalls are subject to regulation does not remove
    them from the First Amendment’s protection, however. We
    have heard numerous First Amendment challenges to laws
    regulating robocalls. See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co.,
    
    768 F.3d 871
    , 876–77 (9th Cir. 2014); Bland v. Fessler,
    
    88 F.3d 729
    , 732–36 (9th Cir. 1996); Moser v. F.C.C.,
    
    46 F.3d 970
    , 973–75 (9th Cir. 1995). We have upheld
    statutes that regulate the method rather than the content of
    robocalls as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
    See, e.g., Moser, 46 F.3d at 973–75. We have further upheld
    the application of state consumer protection laws to
    robocalls as acceptable regulation of commercial speech.
    See Bland, 
    88 F.3d at
    738–39. We have not had the occasion
    to evaluate the constitutionality of a content-based
    regulation of robocalls until now.
    Regulating robocalls based on the content of their
    messaging presents a more severe threat to First Amendment
    freedoms than regulating their time, place, and manner. In
    particular, prohibiting political robocalls strikes at the heart
    of the First Amendment, CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway,
    
    545 F.3d 867
    , 877 (9th Cir. 2008), as well as
    disproportionately disadvantages political candidates with
    fewer resources. As we discuss below, Montana’s content-
    based restrictions on robocalls cannot survive strict scrutiny.
    We thus reverse the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment to the defendant, Tim Fox in his official capacity
    as Attorney General of the State of Montana.
    I.
    In the early 1990s, the federal and state governments
    sought to address the widespread concern over computerized
    6              VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    telephone calls that were tying up phone lines, even after the
    recipient hung up the phone, and filling up answering
    machines. The federal government passed the Telephone
    Consumer Protection Act in 1991 (“TCPA”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 227
    , while states followed with their own enactments for
    addressing the problems caused by robocalls. In 1991, the
    Montana legislature enacted Montana Code section 45-8-
    216 (hereinafter “Robocall Statute”), which provides in
    subsection (1) that:
    (1) A person may not use an automated
    telephone system, device, or facsimile
    machine for the selection and dialing of
    telephone numbers and playing of recorded
    messages if a message is completed to the
    dialed number for the purpose of:
    (a) offering goods or services for sale;
    (b) conveying information on goods or
    services in soliciting sales or purchases;
    (c) soliciting information;
    (d) gathering data or statistics; or
    (e) promoting a political campaign or any
    use related to a political campaign.
    Although the Robocall Statute prohibits unsolicited
    automated calls that fall into these categories, the statute
    further provides in subsection (2) that “[t]his section does
    not prohibit the use of an automated telephone system or
    device if the permission of the called party is obtained by a
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                        7
    live operator before the recorded message is delivered.” 2 
    Id.
    Those who violate the Robocall Statute are subject to up to
    a $2,500 fine. 
    Id.
    Victory Processing is a limited liability company formed
    under the laws of Michigan and headquartered in Michigan.
    Victory Processing offers its clients political consulting and
    data gathering services throughout the United States. To
    communicate political messages and collect public opinion
    data on a variety of issues, Victory Processing primarily uses
    automated telephone calls, or “robocalls.”
    Victory Processing seeks to communicate political
    messages and conduct public opinion polling for clients
    through automated telephone calls to Montana voters
    without using a live voice. After consulting with legal
    counsel, however, Victory Processing refrained from
    engaging in these activities in Montana because such
    2
    Subsection 2 provides in full:
    This section does not prohibit the use of an automated
    telephone system, device, or facsimile machine
    described under subsection (1) for the purposes of
    informing purchasers of the receipt, availability for
    delivery, delay in delivery, or other pertinent
    information on the status of any purchased goods or
    services, of responding to an inquiry initiated by any
    person, or of providing any other pertinent information
    when there is a preexisting business relationship. This
    section does not prohibit the use of an automated
    telephone system or device if the permission of the
    called party is obtained by a live operator before the
    recorded message is delivered.
    Mont. Code § 45-8-216(2).
    8                 VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    activities would violate the Robocall Statute. Victory
    Processing, however, desires to use robocalls to engage in
    political speech in Montana in the future.
    Alleging that Montana’s Robocall Statute has limited its
    ability to communicate with Montana voters and chilled its
    speech, Victory Processing filed this suit under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against Tim Fox in his official capacity as the
    Attorney General of Montana (hereinafter referred to as
    “Montana”). In its complaint, Victory Processing alleges
    that subsection (1)(e) of Montana’s Robocall Statute violates
    the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, 3 as an invalid
    content-based restriction on speech. Victory Processing
    seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
    On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
    court granted summary judgment to Montana. See Victory
    Processing, LLC v. Fox, 
    307 F. Supp. 3d 1109
    , 1121 (D.
    Mont. 2018). The district court expressed concern that
    Victory Processing had provided “only a thin basis for
    standing,” noting that Victory Processing had not provided
    many details about the campaigns it sought to undertake in
    Montana, citing client confidentiality.         Id. at 1113.
    Nonetheless, the district court concluded that constitutional
    standing existed and proceeded to the merits of the cross-
    motions for summary judgment.              Id. at 1113–14.
    Concluding that the Robocall Statute was content-based, the
    district court applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 1116–17, 1119
    (“There can be no doubt that Montana’s robocall statute is
    content-based.”). The district court held that Montana had a
    3
    Victory Processing appears to have since abandoned its as-applied
    challenge. See Smith v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)
    (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed
    waived.”).
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                              9
    compelling interest in regulating automated telephone calls
    to “protect[] the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
    home,” and that the Robocall Statute was narrowly tailored
    to serve this interest. 
    Id. at 1114
    , 1120–21. Accordingly,
    the district court concluded that Montana Code section 45-
    8-216(1)(e) survived strict scrutiny. 
    Id. at 1121
    . Victory
    Processing timely appealed. 4
    II.
    We first address Montana’s contention that Victory
    Processing lacks standing to challenge the state’s Robocall
    Statute. Montana contends that the Robocall Statute affects
    the speech of Victory Processing’s clients, but that Victory
    Processing has not demonstrated standing to sue on behalf
    of these third parties. We must decide this jurisdictional
    question before we can reach the merits. 5
    4
    In 2018, Victory Processing filed a similar First Amendment facial
    challenge to the Wyoming statute upon which the Montana Robocall
    Statute is based. See Wy. Stat. Ann. § 6-6-104. In that case, the District
    Court of Wyoming applied strict scrutiny and concluded that Wyoming’s
    Robocall Statute was neither justified by a compelling state interest nor
    narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Victory Processing, LLC v.
    Michael, 
    333 F. Supp. 3d 1263
    , 1271–72 (D. Wy. 2018).
    5
    Victory Processing argues that the issue of standing is not properly
    before us because Montana did not raise the issue through a cross-appeal.
    It is true that, in general, a prevailing party may not assert an argument
    that would modify the judgment absent a cross-appeal. See Ball v.
    Rodgers, 
    492 F.3d 1094
     (9th Cir. 2007). Where standing—and thus
    federal court jurisdiction—is in question, however, this rule does not
    apply. See, e.g., Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Anchorage
    Sch. Dist., 
    952 F.2d 1173
    , 1176 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that this court
    “must consider the standing issue,” even absent a cross-appeal). Thus,
    because “[s]tanding is a necessary element of federal-court
    jurisdiction[,]” we address the issue. 
    Id.
    10              VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction
    to cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
    “One of the essential elements of a legal case or controversy
    is that the plaintiff have standing to sue.” Trump v. Hawaii,
    
    138 S. Ct. 2392
    , 2416 (2018). A plaintiff must establish the
    “irreducible minimum” of standing: an “injury in fact” that
    is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions and “likely . . .
    [to] be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v.
    Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–61 (1992) (internal
    quotation marks and alterations omitted). Additionally, a
    plaintiff’s claim must be “sufficiently individualized to
    ensure effective judicial review.” See Get Outdoors II, LLC
    v. City of San Diego, 
    506 F.3d 866
    , 891 (9th Cir. 2007); see
    also Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 509 (1975) (holding that
    litigants generally cannot “assert[] the rights or legal
    interests of others in order to obtain relief from injury to
    themselves”).
    Montana’s dispute with Victory Processing’s standing is
    based on the premise that Victory Processing’s First
    Amendment claim rests on the rights of its clients, rather
    than its own. This premise misreads Victory Processing’s
    allegations and ignores its ability to assert standing on its
    own behalf. See RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
    
    307 F.3d 1045
    , 1057 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (“That [a plaintiff]
    is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert
    violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .” (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted)). As an integral part of its operations, Victory
    Processing engages in political consulting and public
    opinion polling primarily through the use of automated
    telephone calls. Some of this information gathering is for
    Victory Processing’s own use while some is for the benefit
    of paying clients. Because of the restriction on political
    robocalls, Victory Processing alleges that it has been unable
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                         11
    to convey political messages to voters through automated
    telephone calls, despite its desire to do so.
    In its complaint and throughout this litigation, Victory
    Processing has only sought to vindicate its own First
    Amendment rights, not the rights of its clients. In pursuit of
    that objective, Victory Processing alleges that it has
    sustained injury; the injury is traceable to the Robocall
    Statute; and the relief Victory Processing seeks would
    redress its own alleged injuries. Victory Processing has thus
    demonstrated standing on its own behalf. 6 See Lujan,
    
    504 U.S. at
    561–62; see also Bland v. Fessler, 
    88 F.3d 729
    ,
    736–38 (9th Cir. 1996).          Accordingly, we exercise
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and reach the
    merits of this case.
    III.
    We review de novo the constitutionality of Montana’s
    Robocall Statute. Moser v. F.C.C., 
    46 F.3d 970
    , 973 (9th
    Cir. 1995). As a preliminary matter, we must decide what
    level of scrutiny to apply.
    The level of scrutiny we apply to laws regulating speech
    varies depending on whether the law is content-based or
    content-neutral. “Content-based laws—those that target
    speech based on its communicative content—are
    presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if
    the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to
    serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
    
    135 S. Ct. 2218
    , 2226 (2015). Content-neutral laws, on the
    6
    Victory Processing need not wait for Montana to enforce its
    Robocall Statute against it in order to bring a First Amendment claim on
    its own behalf. See Lopez v. Candaele, 
    630 F.3d 775
    , 785–88 (9th Cir.
    2010); LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 
    204 F.3d 1146
    , 1154–56 (9th Cir. 2000).
    12              VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    other hand, are subject to lesser scrutiny and can be justified
    as time, place, and manner restrictions. See Clark v. Cmty.
    for Creative Non-Violence, 
    468 U.S. 288
    , 293 (1984).
    A law can be content-based in one of two ways. Reed,
    
    135 S. Ct. at 2227
    . The most commonsense way a law can
    be content-based is if it distinguishes particular speech based
    on the topic discussed, viewpoint or idea expressed, or, more
    subtly, the function or purpose of the speech. 
    Id. at 2227
    .
    Such a law is content-based because it explicitly draws
    distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. 
    Id.
    The law’s purpose will not alter the level of scrutiny: “A law
    that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
    regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-
    neutral justification or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas
    contained’ in the regulated speech.” 
    Id. at 2228
    .
    A law need not draw explicit distinctions to be content-
    based, however. 
    Id. at 2227
    . Even a law that appears
    “facially content neutral” may be content-based if it cannot
    be justified without reference to the content of the regulated
    speech or if it was adopted because the government
    disagreed with the message the regulated speech conveyed.
    
    Id.
     For example, in United States v. Swisher, we found a
    statute that criminalized wearing unauthorized military
    medals to be content-based not because it explicitly
    distinguished between types of speech, but rather because it
    could not be justified without reference to the message
    communicated by the regulated conduct. 
    811 F.3d 299
    , 312–
    13 (9th Cir. 2016).
    Here, Montana’s Robocall Statute is plainly content-
    based. Under the Robocall Statute, a person cannot use an
    automated telephone system “for the purpose of: (a) offering
    goods or services for sale; (b) conveying information on
    goods or services in soliciting sales or purchases;
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                    13
    (c) soliciting information; (d) gathering data or statistics; or
    (e) promoting a political campaign or any use related to a
    political campaign.” 
    Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-216
    (1). The
    law explicitly targets certain speech for regulation based on
    the topic of that speech; accordingly, we must apply strict
    scrutiny. See Reed, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2227
    . Even if these
    distinctions could be substantiated with content-neutral
    justifications—as the district court suggested—it would not
    change the level of scrutiny we must apply. See 
    id. at 2228
    .
    Thus, in order for the Robocall Statute’s restriction on
    political speech to survive strict scrutiny, Montana must
    demonstrate that the law is justified by a compelling interest
    and is narrowly tailored to further that interest. 
    Id. at 2231
    .
    A.
    First, we must decide whether Section 45-6-216(1)(e) is
    justified by a compelling state interest. There can be no
    doubt that “[t]he State’s interest in protecting the well-being,
    tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
    highest order in a free and civilized society.” Carey v.
    Brown, 
    447 U.S. 455
    , 471 (1980). “One important aspect of
    residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener.”
    Frisby v. Schultz, 
    487 U.S. 474
    , 484 (1988). Although, in
    many public locations, individuals are expected to avoid
    speech they do not wish to hear, “individuals are not required
    to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and []
    the government may protect this freedom.” 
    Id. at 485
    .
    Congress sought to do just that when it passed the TCPA,
    
    42 U.S.C. § 227
    . In the 1990s, Congress was concerned that
    unsolicited automated calls—predominantly to landline
    telephones—were invading individuals’ homes and tying up
    their phone lines. In Moser, we noted the “significant
    evidence before Congress of consumer concerns about
    telephone solicitation in general and about automated calls
    14              VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    in particular,” leading us to “conclude that Congress
    accurately identified automated telemarketing calls as a
    threat to privacy” and thus had a significant interest in
    restricting these calls. 46 F.3d at 974.
    We have not only reaffirmed this conclusion, but we also
    have held that this interest in protecting privacy justifies
    applying the TCPA to cellular devices. We have never held
    that the interest in privacy ends at one’s home. See Gomez
    v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 
    768 F.3d 871
    , 876–77 (9th Cir.
    2014). Indeed, cellular phones have become such critical
    fixtures in everyday life that they often serve as the primary
    phone used in the home as well as the device holding an
    individual’s most sensitive data. Id.; cf. also Riley v.
    California, 
    573 U.S. 373
    , 393–96 (2014); United States v.
    Cotterman, 
    709 F.3d 952
    , 966 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, the
    interest in protecting privacy applies with equal force to
    cellular devices.
    In enacting the Robocall Statute, Montana sought to
    protect a person’s personal privacy as well as privacy at
    home. The sponsor of the Robocall Statute in the Montana
    House of Representatives observed that automated calls had
    been tying up residential phone lines, answering machines,
    and fax machines. Proponents emphasized individuals’ right
    of privacy and argued that “this [Robocall Statute] supports
    that.” Montana continues to emphasize that its Robocall
    Statute serves a compelling interest in protecting the privacy
    and tranquility of its residents. Considering that this interest
    is “of the highest order,” Carey, 
    447 U.S. at 471
    , and that we
    have recognized that robocalls directly threaten this interest,
    Moser, 46 F.3d at 974, we conclude that Montana has
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                             15
    demonstrated a compelling state interest in regulating
    automated telephone calls. 7
    B.
    Our inquiry does not end here, however. We must next
    decide whether the Robocall Statute is narrowly tailored to
    advance Montana’s compelling interest. “A statute is
    narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than
    the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Frisby,
    
    487 U.S. at 485
    . If a less restrictive alternative would serve
    the state’s compelling interest with the same level of
    effectiveness, the state must use that alternative. See United
    States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 
    529 U.S. 803
    , 813
    (2000). Furthermore, when the plaintiff offers “a plausible,
    less restrictive alternative . . . to a content-based speech
    restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that
    the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.” 
    Id. at 816
    . To meet this burden, the state must provide “more
    than anecdote and supposition;” it must point to evidence in
    the legislative record or present other evidence that
    demonstrates why the challenged restriction, rather than a
    less restrictive alternative, is necessary to further its
    significant interests. 
    Id.
     at 820–22.
    While narrow tailoring requires that a statute not cover
    more speech than is necessary to serve a compelling
    government interest, a statute can also fail strict scrutiny if it
    covers too little speech. “Underinclusivity creates a First
    Amendment concern when the State regulates one aspect of
    7
    Victory Processing seeks to distinguish the protection of individual
    privacy as a significant governmental interest, but not a compelling one.
    This distinction is unpersuasive. We recognize the protection of
    individual privacy as an interest “of the highest order,” and it is thus both
    significant and compelling. Carey, 
    447 U.S. at 471
    .
    16             VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    a problem while declining to regulate a different aspect of
    the problem that affects its stated interest in a comparable
    way.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 
    135 S. Ct. 1656
    , 1670
    (2015) (emphasis in original). While we do not require the
    government to address all aspects of a problem in one fell
    swoop, an underinclusive restriction “can raise doubts about
    whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it
    invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or
    viewpoint.” 
    Id. at 1668
     (internal quotation marks omitted);
    see also Reed, 
    135 S. Ct. at 2231
    .               Additionally,
    underinclusivity may show that the law does not in fact
    advance the state’s compelling interest. See Williams-Yulee,
    135 F.3d at 1668.
    Although we have not yet addressed whether a content-
    based regulation of robocalls is narrowly tailored to protect
    individual privacy, the Fourth Circuit recently addressed this
    question in Cahaly v. Larosa, 
    796 F.3d 399
     (4th Cir. 2015).
    There, the Fourth Circuit addressed a First Amendment
    challenge to South Carolina code section 16-17-446(A),
    which prohibited all consumer and political robocalls subject
    to limited exceptions. 
    Id.
     at 402–03. Applying strict
    scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit held that although South
    Carolina’s interest in protecting privacy was compelling,
    section 16-17-446(A) was not narrowly tailored to serve that
    interest. Id. at 405. Rather, the Fourth Circuit held that the
    challenged statute was both overinclusive and
    underinclusive. Id. at 406. The South Carolina statute was
    overinclusive because federal “[c]omplaint statistics show
    that unwanted commercial calls are a far bigger problem
    than unsolicited calls from political or charitable
    organizations.”      Id.    Additionally, the statute was
    underinclusive      because     it  permitted      “unlimited
    proliferation” of all robocalls that are not political or
    commercial. Id.
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                          17
    We similarly hold that section 45-8-216(1)(e) is not
    narrowly tailored to further the state’s interest in protecting
    privacy.     Notably, according to the Montana State
    Legislature, the privacy threat posed by robocalls relates to
    the methods or effects of robocalls—the fact that they tie up
    phone lines and fill answering machines—rather than their
    content. Accordingly, regulating robocalls based on their
    content does not address Montana’s expressed concerns.
    Montana argues that “the method of delivery, not the
    message, is the target” of the Robocall Statute, emphasizing
    that the law does not entirely prohibit robocalls, but rather
    requires that a live operator announce the message for five
    enumerated topics. See Mont. Code § 45-8-216(2). Even
    with the live operator exception, Montana nonetheless seeks
    to address problems caused by robocalls by distinguishing
    based on the content of the calls. 8 See id.
    If Montana’s quarrel with robocalling is indeed with the
    method, rather than the content, of the calls, then its
    Robocall Statute is underinclusive. By singling out only five
    topics of robocalling for regulation—including messages
    related to political campaigns—the Robocall Statute leaves
    consumers open to an “unlimited proliferation” of robocalls
    on other topics. See Cahaly, 796 F.3d at 406. Although
    Montana argues that “virtually every conceivable subject of
    calling is covered,” there are many categories of robocalls
    8
    If Montana had required all robocalls to be announced by a live
    operator, rather than imposing this requirement based on the topic of the
    robocall, our analysis may be different. California, for example, has
    addressed similar concerns about robocalls by requiring a live operator
    to obtain the consent of the person they call before playing a recorded
    message, regardless of the content of the message. See California Pub.
    Util. § 2874. Because this regulation was content-neutral, we did not
    apply strict scrutiny and concluded that the statute was constitutional.
    Bland, 
    88 F.3d at 733, 739
    .
    18             VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX
    that Montana’s Robocall Statute does not cover, such as
    those related to government services, medical information,
    or charitable solicitations. Montana has offered no reason
    why, for example, an automated fundraising call from a
    political campaign is inherently more intrusive than a similar
    automated fundraising call from an apolitical nonprofit
    entity—both would tie up phone lines and answering
    machines in the exact same manner.                       This
    underinclusiveness raises doubts about whether the Robocall
    Statute aims to address the problems caused by robocalling
    or instead to hinder discussion of certain topics.
    Even assuming that political messages and the other four
    topics regulated by the Robocall Statute pose a greater threat
    to privacy that justifies singling them out, Montana has not
    presented evidence to this effect. Indeed, available evidence
    does not support this conclusion. In passing the TCPA,
    Congress identified that “unwanted commercial calls are a
    far bigger problem than unsolicited calls from political or
    charitable organizations.” H.R. Rep. 102-317 at 16, 102nd
    Cong. (1st Sess. 1991). More up-to-date research suggests
    that robocall scams pose one of the biggest threats to
    consumers, constituting 40% of all robocalls. See Fazini,
    supra; The FFC’s Push to Combat Robocalls & Spoofing,
    Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, http://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-
    initiatives/fccs-push-combat-robocalls-spoofing (last visited
    June 1, 2019). Robocalls related to political campaigns, by
    contrast, have not been shown to pose a threat to individual
    privacy. By regulating categories of robocalling that have
    not been shown to pose a threat, the Robocall Statute is
    overinclusive in its efforts to further Montana’s compelling
    interest in protecting privacy.
    In regulating the content of robocalls by restricting
    political speech, rather than their method, in a way that is
    VICTORY PROCESSING V. FOX                 19
    both underinclusive and overinclusive, section 45-8-
    216(1)(e) is not narrowly tailored to address the State’s
    compelling governmental interests. Thus, the Robocall
    Statute’s restriction on political messages does not survive
    strict scrutiny.
    IV.
    For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment to Fox and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.