Patrick Plummer v. Maricopa County Superior Court ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 10 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK ALLEN PLUMMER, No. 09-17667
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01630-ROS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Allen Plummer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action challenging two state court decisions. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003),
and for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Chodos v. W. Publ’g
Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
barred the action because it is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of two state court
decisions and raises constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with
those prior state court decisions. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158; see also Bianchi v.
Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, “[i]t is immaterial that [the plaintiff] frames his federal
complaint as a constitutional challenge to the state courts’ decisions, rather than as
a direct appeal of those decisions”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to file a third
amended complaint. See Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1003 (denial of leave to amend is
particularly appropriate where court previously permitted amendment).
Plummer’s appeal of the denial of his motion for injunctive relief is moot.
See SEC v. Mount Vernon Mem’l Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1982) (futile
to review a district court’s ruling on a request for preliminary relief where the
district court has already issued a decision on the merits).
Plummer’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
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We deny Plummer’s motions to supplement the record, his motion filed on
July 16, 2010 to dismiss claims, and the City of Phoenix’s motion for sanctions.
AFFIRMED.
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