Henry Gossage v. Richard Terrill ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             DEC 4 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HENRY GOSSAGE,                                   No. 13-35006
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00631-JCC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    RICHARD TERRILL; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 18, 2014**
    Before:        LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Henry Gossage appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    as time-barred his action alleging that defendants violated his rights under Bivens
    v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971), and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), by allegedly failing to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    inform him that his debarment from federal employment had been lifted. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 
    393 F.3d 918
    , 926 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Gossage’s Bivens claim as time-barred
    because Gossage filed this action more than three years after he knew that his
    debarment from federal employment had been lifted. See Bagley v. CMC Real
    Estate Corp., 
    923 F.2d 758
    , 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (limitations period for Bivens
    action is three years under Washington state law; claim accrues when plaintiff
    “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Gossage’s primary argument on
    appeal, the district court properly concluded that Gossage set forth no basis for
    equitable tolling. See Papa v. United States, 
    281 F.3d 1004
    , 1009 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (like the statute of limitations, “[t]olling provisions for Bivens claims are also
    borrowed from the forum state”); Trotzer v. Vig, 
    203 P.3d 1056
    , 1062 (Wash. Ct.
    App. 2009) (setting forth predicates for equitable tolling).
    We do not consider issues raised in Gossage’s opening brief that are not
    supported by argument, including the district court’s dismissal of Gossage’s FOIA
    2                                        13-35006
    claim. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 
    7 F.3d 139
    , 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Issues
    raised in a brief which are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                      13-35006